The issue of setting the values of various parameters of an evolutionary algorithm is crucial for good performance. In this paper we discuss how to do this, beginning with the issue of whether these values are best set in advance or are best changed during evolution. We provide a classification of different approaches based on a number of complementary features, and pay special attention to setting parameters on-the-fly. This has the potential of adjusting the algorithm to the problem while solving the problem. This paper is intended to present a survey rather than a set of prescriptive details for implementing an EA for a particular type of problem. For this reason we have chosen to interleave a number of examples throughout the text. Thus we hope to both clarify the points we wish to raise as we present them, and also to give the reader a feel for some of the many possibilities available for controlling different parameters. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.

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Parameter Control in Evolutionary Algorithms

Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication-mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication, can be an important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks' macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication, strategies across central banks suggests that a. consensus has yet to emerge, on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.

/pdf/central-bank-communication-and-monetary-policy-a-survey-of-qnyqvbkzrj.pdf

Central bank communication and monetary policy: A survey of theory and evidence

Working Paper 2004-14 June 2004 Abstract: A multivariate model, identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances, is confronted with U.S. data since 1959. The best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only. Among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients, the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule. That model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime. The three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed, and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting, though statistically ill determined. The estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early '80s but was also important sporadically in the '70s. The changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the '70s nor to its decline in the '80s. JEL classification: E52, E47, C53 Key words: counterfactuals, Lucas critique, policy rule, monetary targeting, simultaneity, volatility, model comparison I. THE DEBATE OVER MONETARY POLICY CHANGE In an influential paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler 2000 (CGG) presented evidence that US monetary policy changed between the 1970's and the 1980's, indeed that in the 70's it was drastically worse. They found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70's was one that, when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models, would imply non-uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to "sunspot" fluctuations of arbitrarily large size. Their estimated policy rule for the later period, on the other hand, eliminated this indeterminacy. These results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70's and of its subsequent decline. The CGG analysis has two important weaknesses. One is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility. US macroeconomic variables, and particularly the federal funds rate, have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation, with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period. Ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant, but it strongly biases--toward a finding of changed parameters--tests of the stability of the forecasting equations. The other weakness is that the CGG analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions. They require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation, money growth, or output. It is hard to understand why this should be so, especially in the 70's, when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates, Congress was requiring reports from the Fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates, and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers. The requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right-hand side of the reaction function. If we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function, we are bound to get distorted conclusions. On the one hand, because expected future inflation will be a "noisy" measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy, we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin-variables effect. On the other hand, to the extent that expected future inflation (like most expected future values) shows less variation than current nominal variables, we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients. …

/pdf/were-there-regime-switches-in-u-s-monetary-policy-2nweh3djdv.pdf

Were there regime switches in U.S. monetary policy

A multivariate model, identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances, is confronted with U.S. data since 1959. The best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only. Among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients, the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule. That model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime. The three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed, and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting, though statistically ill determined. The estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early '80s but was also important sporadically in the '70s. The changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the '70s nor to its decline in the '80s.

/pdf/were-there-regime-switches-in-u-s-monetary-policy-1z7orlq5wd.pdf

Were there Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy

We investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a Presidential administration could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or it could be a result of partisan considerations in Presidential appointments to the Board of Governors. To investigate these two channels of influence, we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the FOMC. Our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise.

/pdf/partisan-monetary-policies-presidential-influence-through-3nyic8k34a.pdf

Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment

In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices.To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.

Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee

This paper investigates decision making within the Federal Open Market
Committee of the Federal Reserve, focusing on the competing pressures
of majority rule, consensus building, and the power of the Chairman. To
undertake this analysis, we have constructed an original data set recording
desired federal funds rates for each member of the Committee over the 1970-
78 period. Our results confirm a disproportionate influence of the Chairman
in the policy process; they also confirm that other voting members of
the Committee have an impact on policy choices. Estimates indicate that the
Chairman exercises 40% to 50% of the voting weight in Committee decisions.

Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC

We devise and apply a method for estimating monetary policy reaction functions for individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve. Our method uses members’ votes on the monetary policy directive in FOMC meetings as the key source of data on individual preferences. The analysis provides a ranking by preference for ease for 84 FOMC members who served during the 1966–1996 period.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1061535.pdf

A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/26385.pdf

Rob Roy McGregor

Papers

Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment

Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee

Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC

A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior

Regional economic conditions and monetary policy