Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Review on thermal properties of nanofluids: Recent developments.

Capture and subsequent injection of carbon dioxide into deep geological formations is being considered as a means to reduce anthropogenic emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere. If such a strategy is to be successful, the injected CO2 must remain within the injection formation for long periods of time, at least several hundred years. Because mature continental sedimentary basins have a century-long history of oil and gas exploration and production, they are characterized by large numbers of existing oil and gas wells. For example, more than 1 million such wells have been drilled in the state of Texas in the United States. These existing wells represent potential leakage pathways for injected CO2. To analyze leakage potential, modeling tools are needed that predict leakage rates and patterns in systems with injection and potentially leaky wells. A new semianalytical solution framework allows simple and efficient prediction of leakage rates for the case of injection of supercritical CO2 into a brine-saturated d...

Semianalytical Solution for CO2 Leakage through an Abandoned Well

Rheological and filtration characteristics of drilling fluids are considered as two critical aspects to ensure the success of a drilling operation. This research demonstrates the effectiveness of cellulose nanoparticles (CNPs), including microfibrillated cellulose (MFC) and cellulose nanocrystals (CNCs) in enhancing the rheological and filtration performances of bentonite (BT) water-based drilling fluids (WDFs). CNCs were isolated from MFC through sulfuric acid hydrolysis. In comparison with MFC, the resultant CNCs had much smaller dimensions, more negative surface charge, higher stability in aqueous solutions, lower viscosity, and less evident shear thinning behavior. These differences resulted in the distinctive microstructures between MFC/BT- and CNC/BT-WDFs. A typical “core–shell” structure was created in CNC/BT-WDFs due to the strong surface interactions among BT layers, CNCs, and immobilized water molecules. However, a similar structure was not formed in MFC/BT-WDFs. As a result, CNC/BT-WDFs had sup...

Cellulose nanoparticles as modifiers for rheology and fluid loss in bentonite water-based fluids.

Robello Samuel

Papers

Effect of CuO and ZnO nanofluids in xanthan gum on thermal, electrical and high pressure rheology of water-based drilling fluids

Formation and characterization of thermal and electrical properties of CuO and ZnO nanofluids in xanthan gum

How Good Is the Torque/Drag Model?

Friction factors: What are they for torque, drag, vibration, bottom hole assembly and transient surge/swab analyses?

Stuck Pipe Prediction and Avoidance: A Convolutional Neural Network Approach