The second edition of this acclaimed graduate text provides a unified treatment of two methods used in contemporary econometric research, cross section and data panel methods. By focusing on assumptions that can be given behavioral content, the book maintains an appropriate level of rigor while emphasizing intuitive thinking. The analysis covers both linear and nonlinear models, including models with dynamics and/or individual heterogeneity. In addition to general estimation frameworks (particular methods of moments and maximum likelihood), specific linear and nonlinear methods are covered in detail, including probit and logit models and their multivariate, Tobit models, models for count data, censored and missing data schemes, causal (or treatment) effects, and duration analysis. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data was the first graduate econometrics text to focus on microeconomic data structures, allowing assumptions to be separated into population and sampling assumptions. This second edition has been substantially updated and revised. Improvements include a broader class of models for missing data problems; more detailed treatment of cluster problems, an important topic for empirical researchers; expanded discussion of "generalized instrumental variables" (GIV) estimation; new coverage (based on the author's own recent research) of inverse probability weighting; a more complete framework for estimating treatment effects with panel data, and a firmly established link between econometric approaches to nonlinear panel data and the "generalized estimating equation" literature popular in statistics and other fields. New attention is given to explaining when particular econometric methods can be applied; the goal is not only to tell readers what does work, but why certain "obvious" procedures do not. The numerous included exercises, both theoretical and computer-based, allow the reader to extend methods covered in the text and discover new insights.

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Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data

Preface.1. Introduction.1.1 Panel Data: Some Examples.1.2 Why Should We Use Panel Data? Their Benefits and Limitations.Note.2. The One-way Error Component Regression Model.2.1 Introduction.2.2 The Fixed Effects Model.2.3 The Random Effects Model.2.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation.2.5 Prediction.2.6 Examples.2.7 Selected Applications.2.8 Computational Note.Notes.Problems.3. The Two-way Error Component Regression Model.3.1 Introduction.3.2 The Fixed Effects Model.3.3 The Random Effects Model.3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation.3.5 Prediction.3.6 Examples.3.7 Selected Applications.Notes.Problems.4. Test of Hypotheses with Panel Data.4.1 Tests for Poolability of the Data.4.2 Tests for Individual and Time Effects.4.3 Hausman's Specification Test.4.4 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.5. Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation in the Error Component Model.5.1 Heteroskedasticity.5.2 Serial Correlation.Notes.Problems.6. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions with Error Components.6.1 The One-way Model.6.2 The Two-way Model.6.3 Applications and Extensions.Problems.7. Simultaneous Equations with Error Components.7.1 Single Equation Estimation.7.2 Empirical Example: Crime in North Carolina.7.3 System Estimation.7.4 The Hausman and Taylor Estimator.7.5 Empirical Example: Earnings Equation Using PSID Data.7.6 Extensions.Notes.Problems.8. Dynamic Panel Data Models.8.1 Introduction.8.2 The Arellano and Bond Estimator.8.3 The Arellano and Bover Estimator.8.4 The Ahn and Schmidt Moment Conditions.8.5 The Blundell and Bond System GMM Estimator.8.6 The Keane and Runkle Estimator.8.7 Further Developments.8.8 Empirical Example: Dynamic Demand for Cigarettes.8.9 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.9. Unbalanced Panel Data Models.9.1 Introduction.9.2 The Unbalanced One-way Error Component Model.9.3 Empirical Example: Hedonic Housing.9.4 The Unbalanced Two-way Error Component Model.9.5 Testing for Individual and Time Effects Using Unbalanced Panel Data.9.6 The Unbalanced Nested Error Component Model.Notes.Problems.10. Special Topics.10.1 Measurement Error and Panel Data.10.2 Rotating Panels.10.3 Pseudo-panels.10.4 Alternative Methods of Pooling Time Series of Cross-section Data.10.5 Spatial Panels.10.6 Short-run vs Long-run Estimates in Pooled Models.10.7 Heterogeneous Panels.Notes.Problems.11. Limited Dependent Variables and Panel Data.11.1 Fixed and Random Logit and Probit Models.11.2 Simulation Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Panel Data.11.3 Dynamic Panel Data Limited Dependent Variable Models.11.4 Selection Bias in Panel Data.11.5 Censored and Truncated Panel Data Models.11.6 Empirical Applications.11.7 Empirical Example: Nurses' Labor Supply.11.8 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.12. Nonstationary Panels.12.1 Introduction.12.2 Panel Unit Roots Tests Assuming Cross-sectional Independence.12.3 Panel Unit Roots Tests Allowing for Cross-sectional Dependence.12.4 Spurious Regression in Panel Data.12.5 Panel Cointegration Tests.12.6 Estimation and Inference in Panel Cointegration Models.12.7 Empirical Example: Purchasing Power Parity.12.8 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.References.Index.

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Econometric Analysis of Panel Data

This book describes the new generation of discrete choice methods, focusing on the many advances that are made possible by simulation. Researchers use these statistical methods to examine the choices that consumers, households, firms, and other agents make. Each of the major models is covered: logit, generalized extreme value, or GEV (including nested and cross-nested logits), probit, and mixed logit, plus a variety of specifications that build on these basics. Simulation-assisted estimation procedures are investigated and compared, including maximum simulated likelihood, method of simulated moments, and method of simulated scores. Procedures for drawing from densities are described, including variance reduction techniques such as anithetics and Halton draws. Recent advances in Bayesian procedures are explored, including the use of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and its variant Gibbs sampling. No other book incorporates all these fields, which have arisen in the past 20 years. The procedures are applicable in many fields, including energy, transportation, environmental studies, health, labor, and marketing.

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Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation

A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

Policy makers view public sector-sponsored employment and training programs and other active labor market policies as tools for integrating the unemployed and economically disadvantaged into the work force. Few public sector programs have received such intensive scrutiny, and been subjected to so many different evaluation strategies. This chapter examines the impacts of active labor market policies, such as job training, job search assistance, and job subsidies, and the methods used to evaluate their effectiveness. Previous evaluations of policies in OECD countries indicate that these programs usually have at best a modest impact on participants’ labor market prospects. But at the same time, they also indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of these programs. For some groups, a compelling case can be made that these policies generate high rates of return, while for other groups these policies have had no impact and may have been harmful. Our discussion of the methods used to evaluate these policies has more general interest. We believe that the same issues arise generally in the social sciences and are no easier to address elsewhere. As a result, a major focus of this chapter is on the methodological lessons learned from evaluating these programs. One of the most important of these lessons is that there is no inherent method of choice for conducting program evaluations. The choice between experimental and non-experimental methods or among alternative econometric estimators should be guided by the underlying economic models, the available data, and the questions being addressed. Too much emphasis has been placed on formulating alternative econometric methods for correcting for selection bias and too little given to the quality of the underlying data. Although it is expensive, obtaining better data is the only way to solve the evaluation problem in a convincing way. However, better data are not synonymous with social experiments. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs

In this paper authors point out that the coefficients obtained from using Tobit-here called "beta" coefficients - provide more information than is commonly realized. In particular, authors show that Tobit can be used to determine both changes in the probability of being above the limit and changes in the value of the dependent variable if it is already above the limit$ and authors show that this decomposition can be quantified in rather useful and insightful ways.

The Uses of Tobit Analysis

Perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that "more is better than less." Virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can, in a certain sense, be derived from the assumption that "goods are good." Interestingly, however, this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low-income population, for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls. For example, it has been estimated that in 1970, only about 69 percent of the families eligible for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) participated in the program (see Richard Michel, 1980). The corresponding percentage for AFDC-U, the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible, was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the Food Stamp Program was only 38 percent (see Maurice McDonald, 1977). This phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets. Consequently, most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior. In this paper, this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma -that is, from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se.1 The existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature (Patrick Horan and Patricia Austin, 1974; Lee Rainwater, 1979), where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self-respect and " negative self-characterizations" from participation in welfare. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been modeled, and many questions consequently remain. When is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation? Shouldn't we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions? What is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit? Also, in a slightly different vein, how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma? These questions have been given scant attention by economists, yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population. Here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility-maximizing decision. The model is developed and estimated for the AFDC program.2 The model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income, but

An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma

The author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and helpful comments from three anonymous referees, Rebecca Blank, Howard Chernick, John Fitzgerald, Irwin Garfinkel, Peter Gottschalk, Edward Gramlich, David Greenberg, Judith Gueron, James Heckman, V. Joseph Hotz, Robert Hutchens, Michael Keane, Frank Levy, Larry Mead, Michael Murray, Robert Plotnick, Anuradha Rangarajan, Philip Robins, Howard Rolston, Jeffrey Smith, and Daniel Weinberg. All opinions and errors are those of the author alone.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2727878.pdf

Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review

A PROBLEM OF ESTIMATION that has long confronted many economists is the difficulty of estimating the parameters of equations with limited dependent variables on cross-section time-series (i.e., panel) data. While there are widely available packaged computer programs for estimating either (a) cross-section probit and Tobit models or (b) simple permanent-transitory, random-effects panel models with continuous dependent variables, there are no available computationally feasible methods of combining these two models. This is because the likelihood function that arises in such a combined model contains multivariate normal integrals whose evaluation is quite difficult, if not impossible, with conventional approximation methods. There is a widespread feeling among those working in the area that one possible method of evaluation, the use of quadrature techniques, is in principle possible but is in practice computationally too burdensome to consider (e.g., Albright et al. [2, p. 13]; Hausman and Wise [6, p. 12]). In this note we point out that this is true only of standard quadrature techniques such as trapezoidal integration or its improved variants; Gaussian quadrature, on the other hand, is extremely efficient and is well within the bounds of computational feasibility on modern computers. In what follows, we state the nature of the integrals that need to be evaluated, provide a brief exposition of Gaussian quadrature, and provide a numerical illustration of its use in

A computationally efficient quadrature procedure for the one-factor multinomial probit model

By 1989 the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) had experienced approximately 50 percent sample loss from cumulative attrition from its initial 1968 membership. We study the effect of this attrition on the unconditional distributions of several socioeconomic variables and on the estimates of several sets of regression coefficients. We provide a statistical framework for conducting tests for attrition bias that draws a sharp distinction between selection on unobservables and on observables and that shows that weighted least squares can generate consistent parameter estimates when selection is based on observables, even when they are endogenous. Our empirical analysis shows that attrition is highly selective and is concentrated among lower socioeconomic status individuals. We also show that attrition is concentrated among those with more unstable earnings, marriage, and migration histories. Nevertheless, we find that these variables explain very little of the attrition in the sample, and that the selection that occurs is moderated by regression-to-the-mean effects from selection on transitory components that fade over time. Consequently, despite the large amount of attrition, we find no strong evidence that attrition has seriously distorted the representativeness of the PSID through 1989, and considerable evidence that its cross-sectional representativeness has remained roughly intact.

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Robert A. Moffitt

Papers

The Uses of Tobit Analysis

An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma

Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review

A computationally efficient quadrature procedure for the one-factor multinomial probit model

An Analysis of Sample Attrition in Panel Data: The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics