Showing papers by "Robert C. Feenstra published in 1990"

Trade and Uneven Growth

Abstract: We consider trade between two countries of unequal size, where the creation of new intermediate inputs occurs in both. We assume that the knowledge gained from R&D in one country does not spillover to the other. Under autarky, the larger country would have a higher rate of product creation. When trade occurs in the final goods, we find that the smaller country has its rate of product creation stowed, even in the long run. In contrast, the larger country enjoys a temporary increase in its rate of R&D. We also examine the welfare consequences of trade in the final goods, which depend on whether the intermediate inputs are traded or not.

Trade and Uneven Growth

Abstract: We consider trade between two countries of unequal size, where the creation of new intermediate inputs occurs in both. We assume that the knowledge gained from R&D in one country does not spillover to the other. Under autarky, the larger country would have a higher rate of product creation. When trade occurs in the final goods, we find that the smaller country has its rate of product creation stowed, even in the long run. In contrast, the larger country enjoys a temporary increase in its rate of R&D. We also examine the welfare consequences of trade in the final goods, which depend on whether the intermediate inputs are traded or not.

New Goods and Index Members: U.S. Import Prices

Abstract: Researchers constructing index number frequently face the problem of new (or disappearing) goods, for which the price and quantity are not available in some periods. In theory, the correct way to handle a new good is to treat its price before it appears as equal to the reservation price (i.e., where demand is zero); in practice, this method can be difficult to implement. However, if the underlying aggregator function is CES then the reservation price is infinity, and we show that the corresponding price index takes on a very sensible form. We apply this formula to measure the price index for six disaggregate U.S. imports, which have been supplied from many new countries over the past several decades. We find that by incorporating the new supplying countries, the price index for developing countries is significantly lower than would otherwise be measured.

Designing Policies to Open Trade

Abstract: In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.

Designing Policies to Open Trade

Abstract: In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas. using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies. In a world or full information, it makes little sense to use auction quotas rather than tariffs. Similarly, it is unclear why an elaborate program of temporary protection is needed, rather than immediately opening trade and compensating people with an income transfer. When the government has Limited information, however, these policies become quite sensible and may even be optimal.

Distributing the Gains from Trade with Incomplete Information

Abstract: We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. We solve for the optimal government policies. subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint. We find that the optimal policies take the form of nonlinear tariffs, so that both buyers and sellers of the import face an effective price which exceeds its world level. We find that the tariffs are never complete, in the sense of bringing prices (or all individuals back to their initial level. Rather, it will always be possible to make some individuals strictly better off than at the initial prices, while ensuring that no persons are worse off.