Robert Nuscheler

TL;DR: It is shown that hospital competition is amplified by higher GP attendance but dampened by improved diagnosing accuracy, therefore, compulsory gatekeeping may result in excessive quality competition and too much specialization, unless the mismatch costs and the Diagnosing accuracy are sufficiently high.

Abstract: In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator. If the regulator can commit to a price prior to the choice of locations, the optimal (second-best) price causes overinvestment in quality and an insufficient degree of horizontal differentiation (compared with the first-best solution) if the transportation cost of consumers is sufficiently high. Under partial commitment, where the regulator is not able to commit prior to location choices, the optimal price induces first-best quality, but horizontal differentiation is inefficiently high.

TL;DR: The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996 and to limit direct risk selection the regulator required open enrollment but there is no evidence for selection by funds.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse the deficits of the German Lander (regional states) for the period 1960 to 2005 and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political economy of public deficits.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians' incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation, and show that if the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best policy.