American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

(1) Whereas the objectives of the Community, as laid down in the Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, include creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, fostering closer relations between the States belonging to the Community, ensuring economic and social progress by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, encouraging the constant improvement of the living conditions of its peoples, preserving and strengthening peace and liberty and promoting democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitution and laws of the Member States and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Some Preliminary Comments on the DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

We are currently witnessing a sharp rise in the use of algorithmic decision-making tools. In these instances, a new wave of policy concerns is set forth. This article strives to map out these issues, separating the wheat from the chaff. It aims to provide policy makers and scholars with a comprehensive framework for approaching these thorny issues in their various capacities. To achieve this objective, this article focuses its attention on a general analytical framework, which will be applied to a specific subset of the overall discussion. The analytical framework will reduce the discussion to two dimensions, every one of which addressing two central elements. These four factors call for a distinct discussion, which is at times absent in the existing literature. The two dimensions are (1) the specific and novel problems the process assumedly generates and (2) the specific attributes which exacerbate them. While the problems are articulated in a variety of ways, they most likely could be reduced to two bro...

The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making

We propose a new type of attack for finding adversarial examples for image classifiers. Our method exploits spanners, i.e. deep neural networks whose input space is low-dimensional and whose output range approximates the set of images of interest. Spanners may be generators of GANs or decoders of VAEs. The key idea in our attack is to search over latent code pairs to find ones that generate nearby images with different classifier outputs. We argue that our attack is stronger than searching over perturbations of real images. Moreover, we show that our stronger attack can be used to reduce the accuracy of Defense-GAN to 3\%, resolving an open problem from the well-known paper by Athalye et al. We combine our attack with normal adversarial training to obtain the most robust known MNIST classifier, significantly improving the state of the art against PGD attacks. Our formulation involves solving a min-max problem, where the min player sets the parameters of the classifier and the max player is running our attack, and is thus searching for adversarial examples in the {\em low-dimensional} input space of the spanner. 
All code and models are available at \url{this https URL}

The Robust Manifold Defense: Adversarial Training using Generative Models

The Silent majority

The Article sets forth a conclusive and unprecedented answer to one of the most fundamental questions in tort law, which has bedeviled and divided courts and scholars for centuries: should reasonableness be a normative or a positive notion? Put differently, should the reasonable person be defined in accordance with a particular normative ethical commitment, be it welfare-maximization, equal freedom, ethic of care, etc., or in accordance with an empirically observed practice or perception? Only after answering this question can one move on to selecting a concrete definition of reasonableness. Our own answer is radical but inescapable: only normative definitions are logically acceptable.The Article does not endorse a particular definition of reasonableness. Instead, it focuses on the fundamental choice between the two conflicting paradigms. We put forward and defend the thesis that normative definitions are categorically preferable to positive definitions, because the latter are logically unacceptable, whereas the former merely raise partially surmountable practical problems. Although the Article focuses on the reasonable person in torts, the implications of our analysis are far-reaching, because the concept of reasonableness prevails in most areas of American law.Part I presents the most salient normative definitions of the reasonable person, namely those that stem from the ideas of welfare maximization, equal freedom, and the feminist ethic of care. It explains their practical weaknesses, and shows that these weaknesses surface mostly at the margins, and can be alleviated to some extent. In contrast, Part II shows that a positive definition of reasonableness is a logical impossibility. We do not study any specific positive definition but construct a formal model of the reasonable person that allows us to study all such definitions simultaneously. The formal model is built with tools from a branch of economics known as social choice theory, and is analogous to the groundbreaking theorem for which Kenneth Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1972. We impose five axioms on the reasonable person; all of them are necessary characteristics of any positive definition. We then prove that a positive definition cannot possibly satisfy all five. Consequently, any empirical methodology used to study the reasonable person is necessarily invalid.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1923045_code364528.pdf?abstractid=1883208&mirid=1

The Reasonable Person

This article is the first academic attempt to explain in a systematic manner how the third-form-of-justice, usually thought of as one of the theoretical foundations of criminal law, operates within the law of torts. Tort jurisprudence is definitely not the natural habitat for retributive concerns. Since retributive justice is technically inconsistent with the corrective structure of tort law its role is (and probably ought to be) very limited. The article first explains the notion of retributive justice and defends the view that it constitutes a third form of justice, distinct from the classical Aristotelian forms. It then rejects monistic retributive theories of tort law, and argues that retributive justice penetrates the corrective pattern of tort law only within two conceptual paradigms: (1) the prevention of abominable disproportion paradigm, and (2) the preservation of criminal justice paradigm. It subsequently demonstrates this theory in a methodical manner with notable examples from various common-law jurisdictions.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID849926_code364528.pdf?abstractid=846309&rulid=4309866&mirid=1

The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory

This Article provides a critical assessment of theoretical and practical arguments for judicial state recognition by the International Criminal Court (ICC). It does so both generally and with regard to a highly pertinent contemporary example, namely a judge-made Palestinian state. In the wake of the Israel–Gaza 2008-09 armed conflict and the recently commenced process in the ICC, the Court will soon face a major challenge – one that holds the potential to define its degree of judicial independence and overall legitimacy. It may need to decide whether a Palestinian state exists, for the purposes of the Court itself, and perhaps in general. Apart from the possibility that such a declaration may constitute a controversial intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, it would also set a precedent within public international law concerning judicial state recognition. The Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the ICC created a state-based system, so that the existence of a Palestinian state is a precondition for the present proceedings to continue. Moreover, although the ICC potentially bears the authority to investigate crimes that fall under its subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of where they were committed, the question remains as to whether and to what extent it has jurisdiction over non-member states, in this case Israel.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1733569_code662046.pdf?abstractid=1391963&mirid=1&type=2

Israel, Palestine and the ICC

Cyberbullying has become a notorious epidemic, culminating in widely publicized suicides. Whether a new and distinct problem or an old one in a new guise, the technological setting has undoubtedly generated new challenges and, at the same time, new opportunities for legal response. Regrettably, while delegation of power to educational institutions and criminalization of cyber-misconduct are relatively common, at least in public discourse, the potential impact of civil liability has been downplayed. This Article puts the underexplored regulatory tool under the spotlight. It provides systematic legal and economic analyses of civil liability for cyberbullying, based on a trichotomy of potential defendants—primary wrongdoers, real-life supervisors (parents, schools), and virtual supervisors (mostly online platform operators).

Ultimately, the Article lays the foundations for an efficiency-oriented model which integrates technological features to reduce supervisors’ information costs. In order to incentivize parents to reasonably use advanced surveillance applications, the proposed model imposes liability when failure to employ such tools results in juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, in addition to standard liability for not taking reasonable precautions upon learning about the risk. The model also imposes liability on schools for cyberbullying through school devices if they failed to: (1) enforce reliable identification of users, (2) employ advanced surveillance tools, or (3) take reasonable measures to prevent harm upon notification of possible misconduct. Finally, the model holds a virtual supervisor liable if the victim has insufficient information to identify the wrongdoer, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the virtual supervisor did not properly respond.

/pdf/civil-liability-for-cyberbullying-1myou2qq1q.pdf

Ronen Perry

Papers

The Reasonable Person

The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory

Israel, Palestine and the ICC

Civil Liability for Cyberbullying

The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory