计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

机构投资者作为证券市场中的重要力量,越来越受到理论界和实务界的关注。论文对宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院会计学教授布赖恩-布希（Brian Bushee）的论文＂The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior＂（机构投资者对企业短视研发投资行为的影响,以下简称Bushee（1998））进行评价并提出相关的建议和研究方向。

《The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior》述评

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multi-period contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors.

/pdf/the-role-of-information-and-financial-reporting-in-corporate-50nxv9rcoq.pdf

The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting

https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=accounting_papers

The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting

In fundamental analysis, it is customary to interpret an increase in the ratio of selling, general, and administrative costs to sales (the SG&A cost ratio) between two periods as a negative signal ...

Cost Behavior and Fundamental Analysis of SG&A Costs:

In this paper we investigate how incentives affect managers’ input resource expenditure decisions and how firms make equity grant decisions considering managerial behavior. Focusing on selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenditure, we first document that SG&A expenditure creates future value that varies across firms and industries. We hypothesize and find that new equity incentives lead to an increase in SG&A expenditure in companies where SG&A creates a high future value. The extent to which long-term incentives impact managers’ expenditure decisions depends on the future value it creates. We also find that firms with high level of SG&A spending grant more new equity incentives when SG&A creates more future value. The evidence is consistent both with managers making rational investment decisions in response to new equity incentives and with firms making efficient grant decisions based on managers’ expected behavior. Overall, this study documents the importance of considering the future value created by input resource expenditure in examining the association between equity incentives and managerial spending behavior.

Equity Incentives and Long-Term Value Created by SG&A Expenditure

Accounting performance measures such as earnings and cash flows are useful for both valuation and performance evaluation purposes. However, little evidence exists on whether there is any association between these two roles. In this study, we provide large sample empirical evidence that the value relevance of earnings explains a significant amount of the cross-sectional variation in the pay-sensitivity of earnings and the incremental value relevance of cash flows explains variation in the marginal pay-sensitivity of cash flows. We document that while both value relevance and compensation weight on earnings decline from the subperiod of 1993 to 1997 to the subperiod of 1998 to 2003, both value relevance and compensation weight on cash flows increase from the earlier subperiod to the later subperiod. Overall, our results provide additional evidence that value relevance of a performance measure plays a significant role in its use for performance evaluation.

Incentive Contracting and Value Relevance of Earnings and Cash Flows

This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a CEO’s ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly-hired CEOs. We also find that while current salary is positively associated with future performance, current bonus is not. As the model suggests, salary is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent, and is positively correlated over time to reflect ability. Bonus serves to address moral hazard and adverse selection by separating high-ability agents into riskier contracts. Our results indicate that it is important to disaggregate cash compensation into salary and bonus components to understand the dynamic interaction between incentives and performance.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2111847_code346129.pdf?abstractid=2111847&mirid=5

Rong Huang

Papers

Cost Behavior and Fundamental Analysis of SG&A Costs:

Equity Incentives and Long-Term Value Created by SG&A Expenditure

Incentive Contracting and Value Relevance of Earnings and Cash Flows

The Relation between CEO Compensation and Past Performance

Equity Incentives and Long‐Term Value Created by SG&A Expenditure*