J
Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich
Researcher at Temple University
Publications - 28
Citations - 744
Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich is an academic researcher from Temple University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Adverse selection & Executive compensation. The author has an hindex of 11, co-authored 27 publications receiving 653 citations. Previous affiliations of Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich include University of California & University at Buffalo.
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Demand Uncertainty and Cost Behavior
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate analytically and empirically the relationship between demand uncertainty and cost behavior and show that firms will choose higher capacity of fixed inputs when uncertainty increases in order to reduce congestion costs.
Posted Content
The Relation between CEO Compensation and Past Performance
TL;DR: This article developed a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006, finding that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly-hired CEOs.
Journal ArticleDOI
A theory of serial entrepreneurship
TL;DR: This article proposed a theory of serial entrepreneurship in which an entrepreneur has three occupational choices: maintain his business in operation, shut it down to enter the labor market to earn an exogenous wage, or launch a new venture while incurring a serial startup cost.
Journal ArticleDOI
Demand Uncertainty and Cost Behavior
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the relationship between demand uncertainty and cost behavior and show that firms will choose a higher capacity of fixed inputs when uncertainty increases in order to reduce congestion costs.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Relation between CEO Compensation and Past Performance
TL;DR: This paper developed a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006, finding that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs.