A life cycle sustainability assessment of organic and conventional pork supply chains in Sweden

The public health community has become increasingly critical of the role that powerful corporations play in driving unhealthy diets, one of the leading contributors to the global burden of disease. While a substantial amount of work has examined the political strategies used by dominant processed food manufacturers that undermine public health, less attention has been paid to their use of market strategies to build and consolidate power. In this light, this paper aimed to systematically review and synthesise the market strategies deployed by dominant processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate their power. A systematic review and document analysis of public health, business, legal and media content databases (Scopus, Medline, ABI Inform, Business Source Complete, Thomas Reuters Westlaw, Lexis Advance, Factiva, NewsBank), and grey literature were conducted. Data extracted were analysed thematically using an approach informed by Porter’s ‘Five Forces’ framework. 213 documents met inclusion criteria. The market strategies (n=21) and related practices of dominant processed food manufacturers identified in the documents were categorised into a typological framework consisting of six interconnected strategic objectives: i) reduce intense competition with equivalent sized rivals and maintaining dominance over smaller rivals; ii) raise barriers to market entry by new competitors; iii) counter the threat of market disruptors and drive dietary displacement in favour of their products; iv) increase firm buyer power over suppliers; v) increase firm seller power over retailers and distributors; and vi) leverage informational power asymmetries in relations with consumers. The typological framework is well-placed to inform general and jurisdiction-specific market strategy analyses of dominant processed food manufacturers, and has the potential to assist in identifying countervailing public policies, such as those related to merger control, unfair trading practices, and public procurement, that could be used to address market-power imbalances as part of efforts to improve population diets.

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Market strategies used by processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate their power: a systematic review and document analysis.

Unfair trading practices (UTPs) imposed by parties with superior power in the context of a vertical relationship are an issue at the periphery of competition law, private law, and, sometimes, sectoral regulation. For a long time, the mainstream competition law approach has been to relegate such issues to other areas of law and regulation. In the EU, where complaints about the prevalence of such practices in the agricultural and food supply chain have been voiced for decades, the approach of the European Commission has been to pursue a strict separation between competition issues and fair-trading issues. This article questions the reasonableness of such a strict division of labour. Taking the sum of various initiatives undertaken to regulate UTPs in the agri-food supply chain as a case study, it argues that the effect of limiting competition law enforcement on this issue has been counterproductive. The article firstly explains the background of the problem and the issue of UTPs in the agri-food supply chain. Secondly, it maps the various legislative developments which have taken place at the EU Member State level. Thirdly, by referring to Grabosky’s (1995) regulatory studies typology of counterproductive regulation, the article focuses attention on some of the perverse side effects which arise when regulation of power imbalances and UTPs occurs at the national level in the context of an integrated market like the EU. In light of the analysis, it expresses doubt that these pitfalls will be fully corrected by Directive 2019/633 on UTPs in the food supply chain. The conclusion is that national legislative developments have not been able to make up for the lack of supra-national enforcement of EU competition law on this issue and have possibly even exacerbated the problem at hand. The article concludes that supranational competition law enforcement can play a key role in addressing the fundamental problems underlying business-to-business unfair trading practices. It argues that this role cannot be played by other instruments in the context of an integrated market with multi-level governance. This article shows that while competition law may not be capable of solving all the problems with UTPs, it remains indispensable in safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal market as well as the interests of consumers and taxpayers.

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Regulating unfair trading practices in the EU agri-food supply chain: A case of counterproductive regulation?

Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements targeting food waste: A policy assessment in select EU Member States

A customs union refers in general terms to a political structure established by two or more states apparently not only to create a free trade platform but also to establish a common trade policy towards third countries, including the creation of common trade barriers. While progress has been made so far, significant aspects of these modules remains to be done. There has been problem of non-uniform customs tariffs existing within the E.A member states slowing down faster integration. The main purpose of the research study was to establish the institutional factors affecting implementation of customs integration in East Africa. The study narrowed its research undertakings into three major specific objectives which were to evaluate the effect of Revenue Collection Methods on implementation of customs integration in East Africa, to assess the effect of Infrastructure development on implementation of customs integration in East Africa and to investigate the effect of capacity development on implementation of customs integration in East Africa. The study area was Kenya border posts with Uganda and Tanzania. The sample size was 145 respondents. The study adopted stratified random sampling where the population was divided into stratum and the sample was selected randomly. The study found out that a strong and positive relationship between Revenue Collection Methods and implementation of custom integration. The relationship was significant (r = 0.336, p<0.01). There was a strong and positive relationship between Infrastructure development and implementation of customs integration in East Africa. The relationship was significant at (r = 0.223, p< 0.01). There was a very strong and positive relationship between capacity development improvement and cross boarder logistics efficiency. The Relationship is significant at (r = 0.335, p<0.01). The value of R is 0.239, revealing 23.9% variability in factors relating to Revenue Collection Methods, Infrastructure development and Infrastructure development improvement accounted to implementation of custom integration variables in the model developed. Anova results shows that the p-value of 0.000 that is below 5% significance shows that Revenue Collection Methods, Infrastructure development and Infrastructure development improvement has little but significance effect on custom integration. The beta coefficients result showed that this model implies that every per unit increase in Revenue Collection Methods leads to 0.238 increase in implementation of custom integration. An increase in Infrastructure development leads to 0.032 decrease in implementation of custom integration. A unit increase in capacity development improvement leads to 0.252 increase in implementation of custom integration. The study concluded that there has been little improvement in Revenue Collection Methods since implementation of custom integration in E.A. East Africa partner states has poor Infrastructure development which is a major hindrance to custom integration. Employees are not skilled enough to facilitate implementation of custom integration. The study recommended that the East African Member states need to come up with common policies that will improve Revenue Collection Methods at the border point, come up with policies that are aimed at ensuring Infrastructure development projects development that supports custom integration and finally a common policy that support capacity development improvement for customs integration within East African member states for mutual benefit. However, further study is necessary to identify other institutional factors affecting implementation of customs integration in East Africa.

Factors Affecting Implementation of Customs Integration in East Africa

Ce dossier est specialement dedie a la reglementation des pratiques commerciales deloyales de la chaine d'approvisionnement alimentaire, et presente une selection de contributions sur les differents…

Unfair trading practices in the food supply chain

Many European countries have some form of national regulation of unfair trading practices (“UTPs”) in the business to business segment. These regulations are meant to prevent ‘big’ companies from treating ‘small’ companies unfairly by taking advantage of their gate keeper position and superior bargaining power. Some of these regulations are sector specific; the food supply chain being the prime example. One often sees allegations of inefficient or unfair competition in this sector, such as claims about supermarket chains taking advantage of their bargaining power to the detriment of small businesses or consumers. As a consequence, this sector is often the subject of regulation or at least proposals for regulation, such as for instance the EU Commission’s proposal for a Directive regulating unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain, currently being discussed in the EU-institutional trilogue between the European Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Regulations of UTPs or proposals of such regulations may have its basis in competition policy, agricultural policy, marketing law or ‘unfair competition’ law. 

Some of the background for these national regulations is that they are not necessarily prohibited by EU/EEA competition law. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements in Article 101 TFEU and the prohibition of abuse of dominance in Article 102, only prohibit these practices if they are anti-competitive, but not on the basis of them being ‘unfair’.

UTPs have been defined as “practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, are contrary to good faith and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on another”. These practices are often considered as unilateral conduct exerted by the large undertaking on the smaller contractual partner and imposing unwanted contractual clauses or duties. Most of the existing regulations of UTPs also refer to expressions of unilateral conduct. What we have discovered is that many of these practices are not unilateral conduct sensu stricto, but rather agreements between undertakings. Whether these practices are agreements or unilateral conduct is decisive for the competence of the EU Member States to regulate them in national competition law. According to Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003, Member States may not have a stricter regime towards agreements, than what already follows Article 101 TFEU. In this paper we discuss to what extent Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 limits the scope for Member States to regulate these practices. We do not discuss whether regulation of UTPs could conflict with the freedom of establishment or the provision of services. We analyse the regulation of UTPs in general, however, as these rules, or proposals or claims for such regulation, often are connected to the food supply chain we will use examples from this sector. 

Before discussing the content and implications of Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003, we start out by introducing the concepts of buyer power and UTPs in section 2. Then, we will present the different forms of existing regulations in Europe in section 3 before we discuss the extent of the limitations the Article 3 of Reg. 1/2003 impose on national authorities in section 4. Finally we present our conclusions in section 5.

Ronny Gjendemsjø

Papers

Unfair trading practices in the food supply chain

The Scope for National Regulation of Unfair Trading Practices

European Union ∙ Evaluating the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Unfair Trading Practices. Competition in Fairness?

Noen kommentarer til Støvletthældommen, Rt. 2006 s. 179

Article 54 [Abuse of a dominant position]