Showing papers by "Ross Anderson published in 1995"
27 Aug 1995
TL;DR: A number of attacks, some new, on public key protocols are presented, and a number of principles which may help designers avoid many of the pitfalls, and help attackers spot errors which can be exploited.
Abstract: We present a number of attacks, some new, on public key protocols. We also advance a number of principles which may help designers avoid many of the pitfalls, and help attackers spot errors which can be exploited.
221 citations
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: The task is to program a computer which gives answers which are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient possible moment.
Abstract: Cryptographic protocols are used in distributed systems to identify users and authenticate transactions. They may involve the exchange of about 2–5 messages, and one might think that a program of this size would be fairly easy to get right. However, this is absolutely not the case: bugs are routinely found in well known protocols, and years after they were first published. The problem is the presence of a hostile opponent, who can alter messages at will. In effect, our task is to program a computer which gives answers which are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient possible moment. This is a fascinating problem; and we hope that the lessons learned from programming Satan's computer may be helpful in tackling the more common problem of programming Murphy's.
178 citations
TL;DR: The NHS is spending a nine figure sum on building a nationwide computer network, with the aim of making access to administrative and health records easier, but once the records are aggregated into a database covering tens of millions of patients, that database will be a major target for data thieves, blackmailers, and others with less than altruistic motives.
Abstract: The NHS is spending a nine figure sum on building a nationwide computer network, with the aim of making access to administrative and health records easier. For example, if a patient from another part of the country comes into a surgery complaining of abdominal pain, states that it is a recurrence of a chronic complaint, but is unable to say what, then online access to his or her records would be convenient and might occasionally save life.
But wider access brings with it a problem that the NHS has ignored--the threat of aggregation. At present, hospitals make do with relatively little security; after all, not many people will walk into a ward and steal a file from the note trolley. But once the records are aggregated into a database covering tens of millions of patients, that database will be a major target for data thieves, blackmailers, and others with less than altruistic motives. Evidence for this comes from the military, the banking industry, and the American health care system.
Firstly, soldiers know that if you gather a lot of information together then the collection may be …
50 citations
03 Jul 1995
TL;DR: This paper shows that the public debate on cryptography policy assumes that the issue is between the state's desire for effective policing and the privacy of the individual, and shows that this is misguided.
Abstract: The public debate on cryptography policy assumes that the issue is between the state's desire for effective policing and the privacy of the individual. We show that this is misguided.
21 citations
08 May 1995
TL;DR: The successful introduction of cryptology into a new application area-protecting prepayment electricity meters from token fraud is described, which presents some interesting security challenges.
Abstract: We describe the successful introduction of cryptology into a new application area-protecting prepayment electricity meters from token fraud. These meters are used by a number of utilities from Scotland to South Africa, and they present some interesting security challenges. >
17 citations