The reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance.For comments and advice we are grateful to Christopher Ansell, Ian Bache, Richard Balme, Arthur Benz, Tanja Borzel, Renaud Dehousse, Burkard Eberlein, Peter Hall, Edgar Grande, Richard Haesly, Bob Jessop, Beate Kohler-Koch, David Lake, Patrick Le Gales, Christiane Lemke, David Lowery, Michael McGinnis, Andrew Moravcsik, Elinor Ostrom, Franz U. Pappi, Thomas Risse, James Rosenau, Alberta Sbragia, Philippe Schmitter, Ulf Sverdrup, Christian Tusschoff, Bernhard Wessels, the political science discussion group at the University of North Carolina, and the editor and three anonymous reviewers of APSR. We received institutional support from the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung in Berlin. Earlier versions were presented at the European Union Studies Association meeting, the ECPR pan-European Conference in Bordeaux, and Hannover Universitat, Harvard University, Humboldt Universitat, Indiana University at Bloomington, Mannheim Universitat, Sheffield University, Sciences Po (Paris), Technische Universitat Munchen, and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The authors' names appear in alphabetical order.

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Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

The concept of “wicked problems” has attracted increasing focus in policy research, but the implications for public organizations have received less attention. This article examines the main organizational and cognitive dimensions emerging from the research literature on wicked problems. We identify several recent approaches to addressing problem complexity and stakeholder divergence based on the literatures on systems thinking, collaboration and coordination, and the adaptive leadership roles of public leaders and managers. We raise some challenges for public management in some key functional areas of government—strategy making, organizational design, people management, and performance measurement. We argue that provisional solutions can be developed, despite the difficulties of reforming governance processes to address wicked problems more effectively.

Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management

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Working With Emotional Intelligence

Using agency and stewardship theories, this study examines how public administrators manage contracting relationships with nonprofit organizations. Interviews were conducted with public and nonprofit managers involved in social services contract relationships at the state and county level in New York State. The use of trust, reputation, and monitoring as well as other factors influence the manner in which contract relationships are managed. The findings suggest that the manner in which nonprofits are managed evolves over time from a principal-agent to a principal-steward relationship but with less variance than the theories would suggest. This results in part from the contextual conditions that include the type ofservice, lack ofmarket competitiveness, and managementcapacity constraints. Theintergovernmental environment in which social services are implemented and delivered presents complex challenges for public managers responsible for managing contract relationships. The findings from this study document those challenges and the corresponding management practices used with nonprofit contractors.

Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship

The recent “inhabited institutions” research stream in organizational theory reinvigorates new institutionalism by arguing that organizations are not merely the instantiation of environmental, institutional logics “out there,” where organizational actors seamlessly enact preconscious scripts, but are places where people and groups make sense of, and interpret, institutional vocabularies of motive. This article advances the inhabited institutions approach through an inductive case study of a transitional housing organization called Parents Community. This organization, like other supportive direct service organizations, exists in an external environment relying increasingly on federal funding. Most scholars studying this sector argue that as federal monies expand to pay for these organizations’ services, non-profit organizations will be forced to become ever more bureaucratic and rationalized. However, I find that three key service departments at Parents Community respond in multiple ways to this external environment, depending on each department members’ creative uses of institutional logics and local meanings, which emerge from their professional commitments, personal interests, and interactional, on-the-ground decision making. By looking carefully at these three departments’ variable responses to the external environment, we have a better map for seeing how human agency is integrated into organizational dynamics for this and other organizations.

For love and money: Organizations’ creative responses to multiple environmental logics

What are the sources of citizen satisfaction with local government? Our answers to this question remain fragmentary due to limits in our tools of investigation which have not been well suited for disentangling individual- and jurisdictional-level determinants of citizens' evaluations and distinguishing these from city-specific effects. We employ a comparison group design to jointly assess three theoretical accounts of the source of satisfaction. The results point to a very understandable account of satisfaction with local government. On the individual's side of the relationship, we find an important role for local government efficacy and attachment to the local community. And on the government,s, our model points to what officials actually do for citizens: provision of some level and quality of services.

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Citizen Satisfaction with Local Governance: A Test of Individual, Jurisdictional, and City-Specific Explanations

Contracting for public services from public or private suppliers is now a common prescription to improve government efficiency. The competitive bidding model is usually viewed as the ideal contracting process. However, this article explains that two other approaches—the negotiation model and the cooperation model—may be more appropriate under certain conditions. The primary factors that are likely to determine which of the three approaches is most suitable are (a) the characteristics of the external environment (especially the number of service suppliers), (b) the level of organizational resources (e.g., personnel, funds, time, and expertise), and (c) the degree of uncertainty about funding, future events, service technologies, and causal relationships between service outputs and desired outcomes. The main point is that there is no one best way to contract for services; rather, government units should adapt their contracting procedures to both internal external conditions to implement service contracting in an effective manner.

Competition, Negotiation, or Cooperation: Three Models for Service Contracting

The Politics of Dissatisfaction: Citizens, Services, and Urban Institutions is destined to be a classic in public administration and public policy; it makes major theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature in both fields. It is a rigorous empirical attempt to assess the public choice view of citizenship and local government. The research upon which this book is based was founded on conversations between two of its authors, W. E. Lyons and David Lowery, during the early 1980s.

The Politics of Dissatisfaction: Citizens, Services and Urban Institutions

Contracting Out for Human Services: Economic, Political, and Organizational Perspectives

To evaluate the influence of turnover among city management professionals, data were gathered and analyzed in a study that followed the careers of 133 city managers in Florida since 1986. In contrast to previous studies, conflict was found to be a frequent cause of turnover among those city managers who left their positions during the study period. The type of conflict involved made a difference. Situations involving policy or style disagreements between a manager and the city council were more likely to cause turnover than conflictual conditions emerging from disagreement among council factions. However, other factors, such as electoral changes in council composition and opposition by a popularly elected mayor, were found meaningful. More concern for conflict and conflict-management skills among city management professionals and educators may help solve areas of conflict.

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Ruth Hoogland DeHoog

Papers

Citizen Satisfaction with Local Governance: A Test of Individual, Jurisdictional, and City-Specific Explanations

Competition, Negotiation, or Cooperation: Three Models for Service Contracting

The Politics of Dissatisfaction: Citizens, Services and Urban Institutions

Contracting Out for Human Services: Economic, Political, and Organizational Perspectives

City Managers Under Fire: How Conflict Leads to Turnover