The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries. Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce. The state can seize money by the only method which is permitted by the laws of a civilized society, by taxation. The state can ordain the physical movements of resources and the economic decisions of households and firms without their consent.

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The Theory of Economic Regulation

This study tests whether firms that would benefit from import relief (eg, tariff increases and quota reductions) attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) The import relief determination made by the ITC is based on several factors that are specified in the federal trade acts, including the profitability of the industry Explicit use of accounting numbers in import relief regulation provides incentives for managers to manage earnings in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining import relief and/or increase the amount of relief granted While studies of earnings management typically examine situations in which all contracting parties have incentives to "perfectly" monitor (adjust) accounting numbers for such manipulation, import relief investigations provide a specific motive for earnings management that is not

http://course.sdu.edu.cn/G2S/eWebEditor/uploadfile/20130217205533187.pdf

Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations

The assumption that government bonds are perceived as net wealth by the private sector is crucial in demonstrating real effects of shifts in the stock of public debt. In particular, the standard effects of "expansionary" fiscal policy on aggregate demand hinge on this assumption. Government bonds will be perceived as net wealth only if their value exceeds the capitalized value of the implied stream of future tax liabilities. This paper considers the effects on bond values and tax capitalization of finite lives, imperfect private capital markets, a government monopoly in the production of bond "liquidity services," and uncertainty about future tax obligations. It is shown within the context of an overlapping-generations model that finite lives will not be relevant to the capitalization of future tax liabilities so long as current generations are connected to future generations by a chain of operative intergenerational transfers (either in the direction from old to young or in the direction from young to old). Applications of this result to social security and to other types of imposed intergenerational transfer schemes are also noted. In the presence of imperfect private capital markets, government debt issue will increase net wealth if the government is more efficient, at the margin, than the private market in carrying out the loan process. Similarly, if the government has monopoly power in the production of bond "liquidity services," then public debt issue will raise net wealth. Finally, the existence of uncertainty with respect to individual future tax liabilities implies that public debt issue may increase the overall risk contained in household balance sheets and thereby effectively reduce household wealth.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Are Government Bonds Net Wealth

In a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, the size of government, measured by the share of income redistributed, is determined by majority rule. Voters rationally anticipate the disincentive effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choices of their fellow citizens and take the effect into account when voting. The share of earned income redistributed depends on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. Under majority rule, the equilibrium tax share balances the budget and pays for the voters' choices. The principal reasons for increased size of government implied by the model are extensions of the franchise that change the position of the decisive voter in the income distribution and changes in relative productivity. An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government.

A Rational Theory of the Size of Government

This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: both are produced by the competition for political favors.

A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence

The Social Costs of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden

Regulation of automobile safety

The banking structure and the transmission of monetary policy

The full cost of shopping includes the cost of the shopper's time.When that cost increases, stores have incentives to respond in waysthat economize on shopper time. One response is to substitute in-storelabor for shopper time. Pooled cross-sectional tests using data fromsuburban and city food stores show that various labor intensitymeasures are higher where the opportunity cost of shopper time ishigher. We distinguish between income and cost of time effects byshowing that store labor intensity depends on the composition ofincome between male and female members of the family, and notonly on the level of family income. We obtain similar results for twoother ways that food stores can economize on shopper time – locatingcloser to the customer and offering more check out stations withina store. We also use a unique shopping time survey to showthat shoppers from higher income households make fewer visitsto food stores, spend less time per visit in the check out line andare more likely to shop at stores with longer hours.

Sam Peltzman

Papers

The Social Costs of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden

Regulation of automobile safety

The banking structure and the transmission of monetary policy

Firm Responses to Income Inequality and the Cost of Time

State and local fiscal policy and growth at the border