The dual effect of board gender diversity on R&D investments

Do busy directors influence the cost of debt? An examination through the lens of takeover vulnerability

How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR) during a stressful time? Evidence from the financial crisis

Motivated by agency theory, we explore the effect of independent directors on corporate risk taking. To minimize endogeneity, we exploit the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that raises board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that board independence diminishes risk-taking significantly, as evidenced by the substantially lower volatility in the stock returns. In particular, board independence reduces total risk and idiosyncratic risk by 24.87% and 12.60%, respectively. The evidence is consistent with the notion that board independence represents an effective governance mechanism that prevents managers from taking excessive risk. Additional analysis based on propensity score matching also confirms our results. Our research design is based on a natural experiment and is far more likely to show causality, rather than merely an association.

How do Independent Directors Influence Corporate Risk-Taking? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

https://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12249&context=ecuworkspost2013

Fiduciary duty or loyalty? Evidence from co-opted boards and corporate misconduct

Do co-opted directors mitigate managerial myopia? Evidence from R&D investments

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on R&D investments. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office. Because a co-opted board represents a weakened governance mechanism that diminishes the probability of executive removal, managers are less likely to be removed and are more motivated to make long-term investments. Our evidence shows that board co-option leads to significantly higher R&D investments. To draw a causal inference, we execute a quasi-natural experiment using an exogenous regulatory shock from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Our results reveal that the effect of board co-option on R&D is more likely causal.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2756172_code397752.pdf?abstractid=2756172

Do Co-Opted Directors Mitigate Managerial Myopia? Evidence from R&D Investments

We examine the board structure of firms following stock-for-stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre-merger target board. The relative size of the target firm, target firm profitability, and target blockholder ownership also influence whether target directors join the combined board. We conclude that competition for board seats on the combined board is won by target directors with greater bargaining positions.

Competition For Board Seats Following Stock‐For‐Stock Mergers

Board composition after mergers, does it matter to target shareholders?

We examine the board structure of firms following stock-for-stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre-merger target board. The relative size of the target firm, target firm profitability, and target blockholder ownership also influence whether target directors join the combined board. We conclude that competition for board seats on the combined board is won by the target directors with greater bargaining positions.

Sameh Sakr

Papers

Do co-opted directors mitigate managerial myopia? Evidence from R&D investments

Do Co-Opted Directors Mitigate Managerial Myopia? Evidence from R&D Investments

Competition For Board Seats Following Stock‐For‐Stock Mergers

Board composition after mergers, does it matter to target shareholders?

Competition for Board Seats Following Stock-for-Stock Mergers