This paper proposes simple tests of error cross section dependence which are applicable to a variety of panel data models, including stationary and unit root dynamic heterogeneous panels with short T and large N. The proposed tests are based on average of pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals from the individual regressions in the panel, and can be used to test for cross section dependence of any fixed order p, as well as the case where no a priori ordering of the cross section units is assumed, referred to as CD(p) and CD tests, respectively. Asymptotic distribution of these tests are derived and their power function analyzed under different alternatives. It is shown that these tests are correctly centred for fixed N and T, and are robust to single or multiple breaks in the slope coefficients and/or error variances. The small sample properties of the tests are investigated and compared to the Lagrange multiplier test of Breusch and Pagan using Monte Carlo experiments. It is shown that the tests have the correct size in very small samples and satisfactory power, and as predicted by the theory, quite robust to the presence of unit roots and structural breaks. The use of the CD test is illustrated by applying it to study the degree of dependence in per capita output innovations across countries within a given region and across countries in different regions. The results show significant evidence of cross dependence in output innovations across many countries and regions in the World.

General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication-mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication, can be an important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks' macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication, strategies across central banks suggests that a. consensus has yet to emerge, on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.

/pdf/central-bank-communication-and-monetary-policy-a-survey-of-qnyqvbkzrj.pdf

Central bank communication and monetary policy: A survey of theory and evidence

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19010/1/cesifo1_wp1546.pdf

Trade and business cycle synchronization in OECD countries: A re-examination

Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

This paper reports updated measures of transparency and independence for more than 100 central banks. The indices show that there has been steady movement in the direction of greater transparency and independence over time. In addition, we show that outcomes such as the variability of inflation are significantly affected by both central bank transparency and independence. Disentangling the impact of the two dimensions of central bank arrangements remains difficult, however.

/pdf/central-bank-transparency-and-independence-updates-and-new-496o73azzz.pdf

Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures

This paper reports the results of a survey among private sector economists about credibility and transparency of central banks. In line with the survey of Alan Blinder among central bankers, we asked participants in Ifo’s World Economic Survey to answer questions on the importance and determinants of credibility. The results of both surveys are very comparable. Credibility is considered to be important to attain price stability at low cost, while the best ways to earn credibility are a history of honesty and a high level of central bank independence. According to our respondents, the Federal Reserve is the most credible, transparent and independent central bank out of seven large central banks. The ECB is not perceived as highly credible or tranparent, even though our respondents consider it to be very independent.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/76575/1/cesifo_wp1199.pdf

Credibility and transparency of central banks: new results based on Ifo's world economic survey

An examination of the debates on European Central Bank monetary policy, focusing on issues of transparency, credibility, and accountability and the effect of the ECB's decentralized structure.

The European Central Bank: Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization

The European Central Bank (ECB) ranks highly on our proposed central bank disclosure indicator, measuring activities of central banks to enhance the public's understanding of their policies. Nevertheless, our survey evidence suggests that private-sector economists do not consider the ECB transparent. We argue that this may be caused by the quality of the information provided by the ECB. In addition, the way intermediaries report on the ECB may influence the public's perceptions. The ECB also does not rank highly in terms of credibility; still, most ECB policy decisions were in line with financial markets' expectations.

The transparency and credibility of the European Central Bank

This paper reports the results of a survey among private sector economists about credibility and transparency of central banks. In line with the survey of Alan Blinder among central bankers, we asked participants in Ifo's World Economic Survey to answer questions on the importance and determinants of credibility. The results of both surveys are very comparable. Credibility is considered to be important to attain price stability at low cost, while the best ways to earn credibility are a history of honesty and a high level of central bank independence. According to our respondents, the Federal Reserve is the most credible, transparent and independent central bank out of seven large central banks. The ECB is not perceived as highly credible or tranparent, even though our respondents consider it to be very independent.

Sandra Waller

Papers

Credibility and transparency of central banks: new results based on Ifo's world economic survey

The European Central Bank: Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization

The transparency and credibility of the European Central Bank

Credibility and Transparency of Central Banks: New Results Based on Ifo's World Economic Survey

The European Central Bank: Centralization, transparency and credibility