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Credibility and transparency of central banks: new results based on Ifo's world economic survey

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TLDR
This article reported the results of a survey among private sector economists about credibility and transparency of central banks and found that the Federal Reserve is the most credible, transparent and independent central bank out of seven large central banks.
Abstract
This paper reports the results of a survey among private sector economists about credibility and transparency of central banks. In line with the survey of Alan Blinder among central bankers, we asked participants in Ifo’s World Economic Survey to answer questions on the importance and determinants of credibility. The results of both surveys are very comparable. Credibility is considered to be important to attain price stability at low cost, while the best ways to earn credibility are a history of honesty and a high level of central bank independence. According to our respondents, the Federal Reserve is the most credible, transparent and independent central bank out of seven large central banks. The ECB is not perceived as highly credible or tranparent, even though our respondents consider it to be very independent.

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Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

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How Much Does Violence Tax Trade

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Transparenting Transparency: Intial Empirics and Policy Applications

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an initial construction of a transparency index for 194 countries based on over twenty 20 independent sources, which comprises an aggregate transparency index with two sub-components: economic/institutional transparency, and political transparency.
References
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Book

Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss monetary policy with private information under perfect information and asymmetric information and changing objectives under discretion, and provide an overview of the employment and revenue motivations for monetary expansion.
Journal ArticleDOI

Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries

TL;DR: In this article, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini investigated the role of institutions in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers and found that there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline.
Journal ArticleDOI

A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information

Alex Cukierman, +1 more
- 01 Sep 1986 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, a positive theory of credibility, ambiguity, and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information is developed. But the authors do not consider the impact of monetary control on the public's ability to distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors.
Posted Content

Optimal contracts for central bankers

TL;DR: The authors adopts a principal-agent framework to determine how a central banker's incentives should be structured to induce the socially optimal policy, and shows that the optimal contract ties the rewards of the central banker to realized inflation.
Journal ArticleDOI

Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the Fed funds futures market

TL;DR: In this article, the impact of monetary policy actions on bill, note, and bond yields is estimated using data from the futures market for Federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components.
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