All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Two Treatises of Government.

Scholars of culture, humanities and social sciences have increasingly come to an appreciation of the importance of the legal domain in social life, while critically engaged socio-legal scholars around the world have taken up the task of understanding "Law's Empire" in all of its cultural, political, and economic dimensions. The questions arising from these intersections, and addressing imperialisms past and present forms the subject matter of a special symposium issue of Social Identities under the editorship of Griffith University's Rob McQueen, and UBC's Wes Pue and with contributions from McQueen, Ian Duncanson, Renisa Mawani, David Williams, Emma Cunliffe, Chidi Oguamanam, W. Wesley Pue, Fatou Camara, and Dianne Kirkby. This paper introduces the volume, forthcoming in late 2007. The central problematique of this issue has previously been explored through the 2005 Law's Empire conference, an informal but vibrant postcolonial legal studies network.

Law's Empire

Taking Rights Seriously.

20th anniversary edition of "The End of History and the Last Man", a landmark of political philosophy by Francis Fukuyama, author of "The Origins of Political Order". With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 the threat of the Cold War which had dominated the second half of the twentieth century vanished. And with it the West looked to the future with optimism but renewed uncertainty. "The End of History and the Last Man" was the first book to offer a picture of what the new century would look like. Boldly outlining the challenges and problems to face modern liberal democracies, Frances Fukuyama examined what had just happened and then speculated what was going to come next. Tackling religious fundamentalism, politics, scientific progress, ethical codes and war, "The End of History and the Last Man" remains a compelling work to this day, provoking argument and debate among its readers. "Awesome ...a landmark ...profoundly realistic and important ...supremely timely and cogent ...the first book to fully fathom the depth and range of the changes now sweeping through the world." (George Gilder, "The Washington"). Post Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. His work includes "America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy" and "After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong". He now lives in Washington D.C. with his wife and children, where he also works as a part time photographer.

http://library.um.ac.id/free-contents/downloadpdf.php/buku/the-end-of-history-and-the-last-man-kemenangan-kapitalisme-dn-demokrasi-liberal-oleh-francis-fukuyama-penerjemah-m-h-amrullah-10836.pdf

The end of history and the last man : kemenangan kapitalisme dn demokrasi liberal / oleh Francis Fukuyama, penerjemah M.H. Amrullah

This paper raises several concerns about vulnerability as an alternative language to conceptualize injustice and politicize its attendant injuries. First, the project of resignifying “vulnerability” by emphasizing its universality and amplifying its generative capacity, I suggest, might dilute perceptions of inequality and muddle important distinctions among specific vulnerabilities, as well as differences between those who are injurable and those who are already injured. Vulnerability scholars, moreover, have yet to elaborate the path from acknowledging constitutive vulnerability to addressing concrete injustices. Second, vulnerability studies respond to, and have been shaped by, debates in the 1980s and 1990s over oppression, identity and agency. This genealogy needs to be acknowledged and evaluated. As I demonstrate, prominent theorists define vulnerability in contradistinction to victimization, adopting neo-liberal formulations of victims and victimhood. Finally, I turn to address the politics of vuln...

All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others: The Political Ambiguity of Vulnerability Studies, an Ambivalent Critique

This text explores the ways in which various legal systems are mixed or mixing jurisdictions. The contributors are experts in the jurisdictions on which they write and have direct experience of living and working within that jurisdiction. The classical frame of reference for the analysis of mixed jurisdictions uses the concept of "legal families" as its base. The problem of this approach is its reliance on a notion of mixed jurisdictions which sees them as arising at the point of contact between various legal traditions. This work argues that even the classical examples of mixed jurisdictions, such as Quebec, Australia, the European Community and the Basque Country, no longer seem to fit the mould and that a new framework is called for, or at least a more "fuzzy" approach to the theory of mixed jurisdictions. The final chapter offers some original ideas on what an alternative framework might include.

Studies in legal systems : mixed and mixing

Introduction Part I. Jurisprudence: 1. Jurisprudence and the liberal order 2. Concept and reality in jurisprudence 3. On the 'Protestant' inheritance of juridical thought 4. The form and direction of Anglo-American jurisprudence 5. Three approaches to jurisprudence Part II. Understanding the Present: 6. Authority and tradition: visions of law and politics 7. Legalism and modernity I: identifying and understanding the problem 8. Legalism and modernity II: reflections upon the problem 9. Political thought and the 'well-ordered society' 10. The limits of legal ideologies 11. Conservatism and its dilemmas 12. Liberal jurisprudence and its order Part III. Justice: 13. Justice without mercy 14. Justice and moral argument 15. Fallen justice 16. Freedom and justice in a democratic age.

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Dimensions of Politics and English Jurisprudence

The modem lawyer operates within a conception of law as a body of rules To confront the law of contract, of torts, or of property, is to familiarize oneself with an intricate set of rules Such familiarity is not yet legal scholarship, much less legal practice For in order to use the rules as lawyers use them, the rules must be contemplated and considered, and the relationship between the different rules must be understood Because the intellectual processes involved in handling the rules exhibit a high degree of sophistication, those intellectual processes may themselves become the subject matter of philosophical argument Thus we may regard jurisprudential theories as embodying differing understandings of the processes of handling legal rules; and we may conceive of legal theory as the attempt to grasp the moral significance of rules as a foundation for social order This essay shall offer some thoughts on the relationship between the rule of law, considered as a moral ideal, and the notion of rules as the principal means by which legal order is manifested 1 Positivism, Idealism and Common Law When juristic thinking emerged from the early modern age and entered the 18th century, the notion of rule through law came increasingly to be associated with the idea of government through rules Yet the same intellectual conditions which had brought about the evolution (in Hume's words) from a government of will to a government of law, also encouraged an interpretation of those developments along lines which were fundamentally alien to the legal conceptions and practices from which those ideas had emerged Two traditions of thought would come to dominate speculative debate about the nature of law as a social institution: moral idealism, which continued to locate the foundations of law's authority in the system of natural rights; and an empirically-minded version of liberalism, which would ultimately develop into an austere form of legal positivism, and which would emphasize law as an instrument of deliberate social engineering The effect of this debate was to change fundamental features of common law scholarship, both through the development of doctrinal legal science and, at the same time, through a changing conception of juristic speculation as a body of questions about doctrinal science It is idealism, rather than positivism, which might be thought of as more closely describing the forms of reasoning and scholarship which embody traditional * Reader in Jurisprudence, University College London Email: scoyle@uclacuk ? The Author 2006 Published by Oxford University Press All rights reserved For permissions, please e-mail: journalspermissions@oxfordjournalsorg This content downloaded from 1575539209 on Sat, 14 May 2016 06:21:20 UTC All use subject to http://aboutjstororg/terms 258 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies VOL 26 common law practice For idealism, with its emphasis on moral values and rights, seems to offer the best explanation of the characteristic fluidity of common law 'rules' Yet insofar as the emergence of doctrinal legal science constituted a genuinely new way of thinking about the law, developments in speculative jurisprudence had rather less impact on the ordinary business of judicial argument and procedure which made up the bulk of the lawyer's intellectual engagement with the law than did the upsurge in parliamentary intervention into traditional common law areas, or the development of ideas concerning freedom of contract A form of common law scholarship therefore continued to survive, which differs in essential respects from both positivism and idealism: a form of scholarship for which precedent and custom, rather than rights or rules, supplies the ground of authority and justification Positivism and idealism can be regarded as attempts to theorize and regiment these traditional conceptions in ways which made them intelligible and justifiable to contemporary audiences whose understandings of social life rendered doubtful the idea that rule through law can be achieved on the basis of customs and shared practices Both positivism and idealism, in different ways, describe a legal order constituted by a body of rules For the positivist, political stability and social order represent a political achievement attainable only through articulated legal rules: in a world characterized by apparently unbridgeable diversity between individual conceptions of moral worth and political value, customary practices provide a doubtful focus for collective interpretations, and a system of deliberately created, authoritative rules comes to be seen as the unique means of bringing about harmony and certainty in the interpersonal relationships on which social order

Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law

Modern jurisprudence embodies two distinct traditions of thought about the nature of law. The first adopts a scientific approach which assumes that all legal phenomena possess universal characteristics that may be used in the analysis of any type of legal system. The main task of the legal philosopher is to disclose and understand such characteristics,which are thought to be capable of establishment independently of any moral or political values which the law might promote, and of any other context-dependent features of legal systems. Another form of jurisprudential reflection views the law as a complex form of moral arrangement which can only be analysed from within a system of reflective moral and political practices. Rather than conducting a search for neutral standpoints or criteria, this second form of theorising suggests that we uncover the nature and purpose of the law by reflecting on the dynamic properties of legal practice. Can legal philosophy aspire to scientific values of reasoning and truth? Is the idea of neutral standpoints an illusion? Should legal theorising be limited to the analysis of particular practices? Are the scientific and juristic approaches in the end as rigidly distinct from one another as some have claimed? In a series of important new essays the authors of Jurisprudence or Legal Science? attempt to answer these and other questions about the nature of jurisprudential thinking, whilst emphasising the connection of such 'methodological' concerns to the substantive legal issues which have traditionally defined the core of jurisprudential speculation. The list of contributors includes R. Alexy, S. Coyle, J. Gorman, C. Heidemann, P. Leith, J. Morison, G. Pavlakos and V. Rodriguez-Blanco.

Jurisprudence or Legal Science?: A Debate About the Nature of Legal Theory

An underpinning assumption of modern legal positivism isthat the question of how legal standards differ fromnormative standards in other spheres of human thoughtis resolved via the concept of a legal system and thenotion of internal logic, through use of contextualdefinition. This approach is seen to lead to anuntenable form of structuralism altogether atodds with the positivist's intentions. An alternativestrategy is offered which allows the positivists toretain their deepest insights, though at a price.

Sean Coyle

Papers

Studies in legal systems : mixed and mixing

Dimensions of Politics and English Jurisprudence

Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law

Jurisprudence or Legal Science?: A Debate About the Nature of Legal Theory

Hart, Raz and the Concept of a Legal System