The Central Eastern European member states of the European Union have introduced a host of anti-corruption measures in the past two decades, yet corruption is still prevalent. Rather than asking what is wrong with the letter of the law, which has traditionally been the focus of analysis, this article identifies some of the reasons why those whose behavior the law seeks to change fail to act as expected. Drawing on theoretical insights from implementation studies and using Hungary as an illustrative example, the article finds that both incentives and normative judgments are skewed towards non-compliance with anti-bribery laws. The main policy implications are that anti-corruptioninterventionsshouldpaymoreattentiontoraisingawarenessamongtargetgroups, take existing social norms into account, and rely on positive incentives as well as, or rather than, increasing penalties.

Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance perspective

Corruption and anti-corruption are now mainstream public policy challenges. Politicians and the public alike now discuss corruption with the type of rhetoric that they never did before. Perhaps surprisingly, however there remains little detailed, cross-national analysis of which anti-corruption strategies work and which don't. This book aims to make a contribution towards redressing this imbalance.

Through case studies in six countries (Bangladesh, Kenya, Germany, Poland, South Korea and the UK) this book illustrates that those looking to fight corruption must understand that quality of governance and successful anti-corruption strategies are indelibly linked. Only when this relationship is understood, will progress in tackling corruption be made. The book is empirically rich and theoretically driven, and should be core reading for anyone interested in understanding why corruption flourishes and what works in trying to fight it.

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Corruption, Anti-Corruption and Governance

This article examines the practical application of legal reforms to fight corruption in Turkey, focusing on three policy sectors: civil administration, public finance management and public procurement. Facing increasing pressure, incumbent governments have adopted international anti-corruption norms and programs in the last two decades. However, the adoption and adaptation of formal institutions tends to remain decoupled from informal behavioral practices, thereby curbing the effectiveness of Europeanization in the Turkish public sector – albeit to varying degrees. The policy comparison of this article shows that external anti-corruption efforts, especially those initiated by the EU, can help domestic actors to address the problem of decoupling when certain domestic factors are present.

Public sector reforms to fight corruption in Turkey: A case of failed Europeanization?

Transnational corporate bribery is complexly organized at a multi-jurisdictional level However, enforcement remains at the local, national level where investigators and prosecutors are pressured t

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Responding to transnational corporate bribery using international frameworks for enforcement: Anti-bribery and corruption in the UK and Germany

Corrupt practices in organizations are commonly explained via the rational choice of individual employees, with the benefits of deviant actors at the heart of the theoretical approach. This Article challenges the rational choice perspective with reference to cases of corruption in which the organizational benefits are crucial and personal gains negligible. The authors propose to embed the concept of “useful illegality” (Luhmann) into an institutional theory framework and develop a set of indicators for the systematic comparison of individual case studies. Exemplary analyses of two landmark cases of corporate bribery on behalf of German corporations' subsidiaries abroad (Siemens Argentina and Magyar Telekom) show that active corruption was neither simply a function of individual deviance, nor of personal gain. In contrast, institutional theory allows the modeling of organizational deviance as a function of unwritten rules that lend legitimacy to the deviant behavior of bribe payers. Despite plentiful opportunities in the periphery of these two multinational corporations, the few instances of personal gain were either in line with the organizational incentive structures (as in Telekom) or attributable to the loss of membership (as in Siemens). Mostly high-ranking employees, loyal to their organization, committed those crimes at high personal risks. The discussion of factors that explain why these “company men” nonetheless complied with the unwritten rules, in support of organizational benefits, leads the authors to conclude with likely consequences for effective regulation. They argue that it is the usefulness of the illegal behavior for the organization, its entrenchment in organizational cultures, and amplified adaptation problems with regard to changing institutional environments that explain what makes corrupt practices so hard to control and to regulate in a formal legal organization.

Personal Gain or Organizational Benefits? How to Explain Active Corruption

The Gesetz zur Bekampfung der Korruption (KorrBekG – Anti-Corruption Act), enacted in 1997, was the last measure to improve Germany's anti-corruption criminal law that was solely initiated by German political actors. Since then all amendments originated in international legal instruments. Implementing only the minimum requirements of these international provisions has led to inconsistencies within the criminal law dealing with active and passive bribery. Further anti-corruption conventions signed by the German government require additional modifications. This opportunity should be used as a starting point for a thorough reform of Germany's anti-corruption criminal law.

Modernization of the German Anti-Corruption Criminal Law by International Legal Provisions

This article compares the results of Council of Europe and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) anti-corruption monitoring reports to two Transparency International instruments, the Corruption Perceptions Index and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Progress Report. It constructs and applies a simple typology (four-cell matrix) consisting of the combinations of good/deficient implementation of international anti-corruption provisions and high/low level of perceived corruption. As the sources and the comparative method used cannot prove causality, the article introduces three ideal types of interpretation to discuss the relevance of the anti-corruption regulatory framework in both domestic and cross-border anti-corruption policies. In the conclusion it is argued that there is a specific Eastern European pattern of anti-corruption performance that implies a need for new strategies.

Assessing Eastern Europe's anti-corruption performance: views from the Council of Europe, OECD, and Transparency International

Only a few European integration experts know that Jean Monnet, one of the masterminds of the European Coal and Steel Community, strongly preferred the European Atomic Energy Community to the European Economic Community in the 1950s and 1960s. From his point of view, sectoral and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy seemed to be much more promising in order to foster European integration than cross-sectoral economic integration. Monnet and others believed that nuclear energy could, inter alia, solve all energy supply problems, would revolutionize research and technical development, and could contribute to unifying the peoples of Europe in a few decades. However, nuclear energy in general and Euratom in particular have belied these expectations.

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Euratom, the European Court of Justice, and the limits of nuclear integration in Europe

The research note comments on W. Veenendaal's article “A Big Prince in a Tiny Realm: Smallness, Monarchy, and Political Legitimacy in the Principality of Liechtenstein”. It is argued, inter alia, that the phenomenon of “princely self-restraint” should not be underestimated in Liechtenstein's constitutional reality. The character of the microstate's actual political system strongly depends on the individual personality of the Reigning Prince. A strong monarch who acts as a political actor with his own agenda should not be conceptualized as a neutral traditional leader. From the perspective of many citizens of Liechtenstein, the principality's political system is legitimate since it combines traditional authority and legal-rational authority in a unique way. Largely due to the powerful role of the government, the microstate is characterized by consensus-oriented hierarchical governance. Elite surveys can be seen as a useful instrument to overcome some of the methodological pitfalls of the elite interview approach.

Different Approaches, Different Results in Small State Studies: Complementary Views on the Monarchy and Traditional Governance in Liechtenstein

This Article takes a preliminary look at some distinct, unintended effects of anti-bribery law. In an exemplary and exploratory way, it intends to examine structural socio-legal problems and dilemmas of designing and implementing legislation against corruption. Firstly, it outlines four ideal types of legal norms that are meant to combat corruption but display significant negative features. Secondly, the typology is briefly applied to selected recent developments in German federal anti-bribery legislation. The Article concludes, inter alia, that the design, implementation, and interpretation of anti-corruption law is full of functional, legal, political, and moral pitfalls.

Sebastian Wolf

Papers

Modernization of the German Anti-Corruption Criminal Law by International Legal Provisions

Assessing Eastern Europe's anti-corruption performance: views from the Council of Europe, OECD, and Transparency International

Euratom, the European Court of Justice, and the limits of nuclear integration in Europe

Different Approaches, Different Results in Small State Studies: Complementary Views on the Monarchy and Traditional Governance in Liechtenstein

Dark Sides of Anti-Corruption Law : a Typology and Recent Developments in German Anti-Bribery Legislation