“... friendship between the[m]... and an exchange... published in... Partisan Review...” Craven, Alice Mikal, William E. Dow, Yoko Nakamura, editors, Of Latitudes Unknown: James Baldwin’s Radical Imagination (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020). Cronin, Sean, James Connolly: Irish Revolutionary (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2020). Connolly spent some years in the U.S. Crowe, David, Hemmingway and Ho Chi Minh in Paris: The Art of Resistance, (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2020). Curtin, Maureen F., “Drag and the Aesthetics of Free Speech in the Mosaic of Mary McCarthy’s Postmodern Affinities,” Women’s Studies 49, no. 4 (2020), 374–90. Cushman, Barry, “The Judicial Reforms of 1937,” William & Mary Law Review 61, no. 4 (2020), 995–1051. Return to the beginning of the Biographical & Individuals-Based Works section. Return to the beginning of the Bibliography.

Communist History Bibliography 2020: United States & International

Introduction: Who Changed China? The Feudalization of Chinese Farmers: Bound to the Land Baochan Daohu: Breaking the Log Jam Markets: The Currents in the Farmer Sea Rural Industries: Waves of the Farmer Sea Migration: The Countryside Swamps the City Farmers Engulf the One-Child Family Policy Rural Women: Floating to Power Conclusion: Farmers Changed China

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/5392A4BE3AE19DEFD2B58EE94580BE02/S002191180004290Xa.pdf/div-class-title-span-class-italic-how-the-farmers-changed-china-power-of-the-people-span-by-kate-xiao-zhou-boulder-colo-westview-press-1996-xxviii-275-pp-59-95-div.pdf

How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People . By Kate Xiao Zhou Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996. xxviii, 275 pp. $59.95.

本だな 「The Two Koreas--A Contemporary History」

Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars. Yet most large and rapid shifts result from endogenous military investments. We show that when the investment decision is perfectly transparent, peace prevails. Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power shifts as a fait accompli. Knowing this, their adversaries may strike preventively even without conclusive evidence of militarization. In fact, the more effective preventive wars are, the more likely they will be launched against states that are not militarizing. Our argument emphasizes the role of imperfect information as a cause of war. It also explains why powerful states may attack weaker targets even with ambiguous evidence of their militarization. We illustrate our theory through an account of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

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Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War

The principal subject of this annual bibliography is the English language scholarly literature of United States Communism (supplemented by some articles from serious journals of opinion, obituaries...

United States Communist History Bibliography 2017 – and Selective International Communist History Bibliography (with a special section on the Russian Revolution)

After a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep bipolar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the atomic age: now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War.

The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.

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MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The subtitle of this new biography of Mao Zedong, the long-time leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by Alexander Pantsov and Steven Levine—“the real story”—implicitly challenges an earlier biography by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Knopf, 2005). Chang and Halliday met with criticism in some scholarly circles for making far-fetched claims about Mao—in effect, for demonizing him. Pantsov and Levine, by contrast, are clear from the start that, in their eyes, “Mao was neither a saint not a demon, but rather a complicated figure” (pp. 5–6). This “balanced” assessment of Mao highlights his achievements of having unified China and having liberated it from the shackles of imperialism (the authors’ terms) while criticizing his “criminal” behavior in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The authors discuss Mao’s cunning and his political talents in the struggle for power, but they also emphasize his ideological delusions and genuine belief in the potential of a revolutionary transformation of China. The book’s major claim to novelty is the use of Russian archival sources, especially materials from the Russian State Archive of Social-Political History, which holds the records of the Communist International (Comintern). One of the authors, Pantsov, is chiefly known to Western audiences as a historian of relations between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1920s and the 1930s, and the present biography is perhaps at its strongest in dealing with that earlier period of Mao’s rise to power. It is here that Pantsov and Levine are most persuasive, their evidence is most compelling, and their narrative is at its most gripping. This part is also the most detailed. By comparison, the post-1949 years come across as an afterthought. Perhaps the most important argument advanced by Pantsov and Levine is that Mao consistently received backing from the Comintern and from the Soviet Union, and that this support proved crucial to his political survival amid the treacherous tides of the late 1920s and the 1930s. The authors discredit the Chinese leader’s later claim that the Soviet leader Iosif Stalin continually undercut his position by supporting Mao’s rivals in the CCP leadership. Pantsov and Levine show how Mao, for his part, professed firm commitment to Stalin and Stalinism—a very different picture from the one that casts Mao in the role of a rebellious revolutionary who bravely opposed Moscow’s diktat. Opposing Moscow, Pantsov and Levine argue, was, in any case, a non-starter, given the CCP’s complete reliance on covert Soviet cash infusions.

Mao: The Real Story

This paper examines the full cycle of political power transitions and the dynamics of party competition during the 2016 parliamentary and 2017 presidential elections in Mongolia. It argues that the existence of multiple interlinked patronage networks and factionalism explains the persistence of the electoral democracy in Mongolia. The article focuses on the internal politics of the Democratic Party.

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Mongolia in the 2016–17 Electoral Cycle: The Blessings of Patronage

The article recounts the story of the secret negotiations between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), North and South Korea, in the run-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The author contends that the Games offered an opportunity for the South Korean leadership to isolate and humiliate North Korea; that the head of IOC Juan Antonio Samaranch played an important – and conscious – role in the process; and that the trilateral talks in Lausanne, under the IOC auspices, were meant not so much to bring about Pyongyang's participation in the Olympiad, as to dissuade the socialist bloc from a potentially damaging boycott. Both China and the Soviet Union, however, proved all too willing to disregard the interests of their ally and did little to encourage an accommodating attitude on Seoul's part. The author concludes that the success of the Seoul Olympic Games actually contributed to the long-term instability on the Korean peninsula by humiliating North Korea into taking the stand of militant defiance.

Sergey Radchenko

Papers

The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War

MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

Mao: The Real Story

Mongolia in the 2016–17 Electoral Cycle: The Blessings of Patronage

It’s Not Enough to Win : The Seoul Olympics and Roots of North Korea’s Isolation