The policy of the European Union (EU) towards Taiwan has mostly been analysed either as a by-product of EU-China relations or with reference to the general lack of a European geopolitical approach towards East Asia. By adopting a lobbying approach which focusses on Taiwan’s different ‘channels of influence’ within the complex European foreign policy system in Brussels, this study provides new insights into the functioning of EU-Taiwan relations. It also sheds new light on the implications of the radical change in Taiwanese diplomacy after 2008, when Chen Shui-bian’s assertive and identity-based diplomacy was replaced with the Kuomintang’s new dogma of ‘workable diplomacy’.
Based on semi-guided interviews with Taiwanese and European actors, this paper examines why Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels, albeit very active and professional, is not salient enough to meet the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese competition and from the increasing proliferation of regional trade agreements – with active EU participation – in the Asia-Pacific region. It argues that the pragmatic ‘workable diplomacy’ approach, while smoothing out working-level relations between Taiwan and the EU, fails to attract a sufficient degree of political and public attention in Europe to the Taiwan question and thus fosters the neglect of Taiwan by European foreign policy-makers. The main challenge faced by Taiwanese diplomacy, however, is not simply one of convincing through technical arguments, but one of agenda setting, that is, of redefining European priorities in Taiwan’s favour.

Taiwanese Lobbying in the European Union: ‘Workable Diplomacy’ and its Limitations. EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2015

The article reexamines the theories of recognition and non-recognition in the context of the evolving framework of the European Union (EU)’s trade and investment relations with Taiwan from legal and international relations perspectives. Notwithstanding its one-China policy, the EU has developed a pragmatic approach to engaging Taiwan under bilateral consultations and World Trade Organization negotiations that have built the foundation for the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). The article argues that since the 1980s, the EU has accorded diverse forms of recognition to Taiwan and the BIA will buttress the process. To substantiate the contention, the article systemically explores the political and trade policies of European states and EU institutions in line with their strategies toward cross-strait relations. 

By deciphering the new momentum that has galvanized the European Commission’s strategy towards the EU-Taiwan BIA, the research sheds light on the implications of European Parliament resolutions and the EU’s investment talks with China. The structure and impact of the BIA are also analyzed in light of EU investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Hence, the findings contribute to the interdisciplinary study of international law and international relations and enhance the understanding of the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3673643_code585990.pdf?abstractid=3555574&mirid=1

Rethinking Non-Recognition: The EU’s Investment Agreement with Taiwan under the One-China Policy

China is the second largest economy and the biggest exporter in the world Its growth in 2016 reached 67% and it is expected that China may be in the way to become the world's largest economy by the end of this decade , with an internal market of over two billion Euro in potential consumers  China's rise as a major global economy was driven by its WTO accession in 2001 which allowed the opening of its economy This led China to establish itself as a major global trader and largest world exporter These notes outline a history of recent trade relations between China and the European Union, discussing its evolving dynamics and volume in international trade

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Notes on the Trade Relations between China and European Union (2008-2016)

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, many people have called for a more active role for the EU in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. While acknowledging its immense power and influence, this paper argues that the EU's role will remain limited for three structural reasons. Despite the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's sui generis system will continue to constrain its policy towards cross-strait relations. With 27 countries of varying interests, power and perspectives, it is difficult to expect the EU to change its current policies, which consist of the 'one-China' notion and the principle of a peaceful solution. Second, the regional structure along the strait is so complex that the EU can hardly come up with new initiatives. Given the fact that China is more important than Taiwan, the EU can hardly make its policy more favourable to Taiwan. However, supporting Chinese unification, especially in a non-peaceful way, will run counter to the EU's interests and principles. Even if it is willing to play a more active role, the EU lacks power to do so. Finally, the global structure will limit the EU's freedom of action. The EU does not live in a care-free environment, and nearby stability tops its security agenda. In its dealing with global issues, the EU may benefit from Chinese cooperation. Although the EU has close relations with the US, the American factor can hardly be expected to cause major changes in the EU's policy towards cross-strait relations.

Shaohua Hu

Papers

Structural Constraints on the EU's Role in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relationsa