S
Shuntian Yao
Researcher at Nanyang Technological University
Publications - 37
Citations - 587
Shuntian Yao is an academic researcher from Nanyang Technological University. The author has contributed to research in topics: General equilibrium theory & Market liquidity. The author has an hindex of 11, co-authored 36 publications receiving 576 citations. Previous affiliations of Shuntian Yao include Cowles Foundation & Yale University.
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A strategic market game with complete markets
TL;DR: In this paper, an exchange economy is modeled as a strategic market game with all pairwise markets available, and the existence of noncooperative equilibria is proved, and it is shown that if resources are distributed in a skewed manner, in equilibrium prices may not satisfy the no arbitrage condition.
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The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices☆
Siddhartha Sahi,Shuntian Yao +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, an exchange economy with complete markets is described and a general theorem for the existence of active Nash equilibria is proved, and it is further shown that under replication of traders, these equilibrium approaches competitive equilibrium of the economy.
Journal ArticleDOI
Privilege and Corruption: The Problems of China's Socialist Market Economy
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed the concepts of implicit corruption and explicit corruption to explain how the granting of privileges has directly created implicit corruption in China's socialist market economy and pointed out that unless a political reform is initiated and privileges are eliminated, China's problem of corruption will never be solved.
Posted Content
The Noncooperative Equilibria of a Trading Economy with Complete Markets and Consistent Prices
Siddhartha Sahi,Shuntian Yao +1 more
Posted Content
Institutionalized Corruption and Privilege in China's Socialist Market Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis
Ke Li,Russell Smyth,Shuntian Yao +2 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a general equilibrium model to consider the effects of corruption caused by institutionalized privilege on economic welfare, the network size of division of labour and productivity, and the effects on welfare when a privileged group is chosen to work as high level administrators.