Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

We provide a comprehensive and user-friendly compendium of standards for the use and interpretation of structural equation models (SEMs). To both read about and do research that employs SEMs, it is necessary to master the art and science of the statistical procedures underpinning SEMs in an integrative way with the substantive concepts, theories, and hypotheses that researchers desire to examine. Our aim is to remove some of the mystery and uncertainty of the use of SEMs, while conveying the spirit of their possibilities.

Specification, evaluation, and interpretation of structural equation models

As well as review the literature on the notion of institutional entrepreneurship introduced by Paul DiMaggio in 1988, we propose a model of the process of institutional entrepreneurship We first present theoretical and definitional issues associated with the concept and propose a conceptual account of institutional entrepreneurship that helps to accommodate them We then present the different phases of the process of institutional entrepreneurship from the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs to their implementation of change Finally, we highlight future directions for research on institutional entrepreneurship, and conclude with a discussion of its role in strengthening institutional theory as well as, more broadly, the field of organization studies

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How actors change institutions : Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship

This article presents a critique of a number of shortcomings with the technology acceptance model (TAM) and points to specific remedies in each case. In addition, I present a model for the purposes of providing a foundation for a paradigm shift. The model consists first of a decision making core (goal desire → goal intention → action desire → action intention) that is grounded in basic decision making variables/processes of a universal nature. The decision core also contains a mechanism for self-regulation that moderates the effects of desires on intentions. Second, added to the decision making core are a number of causes and effects of decisions and self-regulatory reasoning, with the aim of introducing potential contingent, contextual nuances for understanding decision making. Many of the causal variables here are contained within TAM or its extensions; also considered are new variables grounded in emotional, group/social/cultural, and goal-directed behavior research.

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The Legacy of the Technology Acceptance Model and a Proposal for a Paradigm Shift

In this article, the authors clarify a framework for qualitative research, in particular for evaluating its quality, founded on epistemology, methodology, and method. They define these elements and discuss their respective contributions and interrelationships. Epistemology determines and is made visible through method, particularly in the participant- researcher relationship, measures of research quality, and form, voice, and representation in analysis and writing. Epistemology guides methodological choices and is axiological. Methodology shapes and is shaped by research objectives, questions, and study design. Methodologies can prescribe choices of method, resonate with particular academic disciplines, and encourage or discourage the use and/or development of theory. Method is constrained by and makes visible methodological and epistemic choices. If we define good quality qualitative research as research that attends to all three elements and demonstrates internal consistency between them, standardized checklists can be transcended and innovation and diversity in qualitative research practice facilitated.

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Justifying Knowledge, Justifying Method, Taking Action: Epistemologies, Methodologies, and Methods in Qualitative Research

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY APPENDIX 1: LOGICAL SYMBOLS APPENDIX 2: KEY INTRODUCTORY TERMS APPENDIX 3: SPECIALIST TERMS CHRONOLOGY

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

This volume collects together some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgements relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that discourages the view that there are substantial issues at stake. The figure of the 'quasi-realist' dramatizes the difficulty of conducting these debates. Typically philosophers thinking of themselves as realists will believe that they alone can give a proper or literal account of some of our attachments - to truth, to facts, to the independent world, to knowledge, and to certainty. The quasi-realist challenge, developed by Blackburn in this volume, is that we can have those attachments without any metaphysic that deserves calling realism, so that the metaphysical picture that goes with our practices is quite idle. The cases treated here include the theory of value, of knowledge, modality, probability, causation, intentionality and rule-following, and explanation. A substantial new introduction has been added, drawing together some of the central themes. The essays articulate a fresh alternative to a primitive realist/anti-realist opposition, and their cumulative effect is to yield a new appreciation of the delicacy of the debate in these central areas.

Essays in quasi-realism

I see a cup of coffee in front of me. I reach out, pick it up, and drink from it. I must then have learned how far the cup wasfrom me, and in what direction, for it is the position of the cup relative to me, and not its absolute position, that determines how I need to move my arm. But how can this be? I am not in the field of vision: no component of my visual experience is a perception of me. How then can this experience provide me with information about how objects are related to me? One might suppose that while no component of my perception is of me, some component of the knowledge to which it gives rise must be. Perhaps I am able to infer where the cup is from me, because I know how things look, when they are a certain distance and direction from me. Without a component standing for me, how could this knowledge guide my action, so that it is suited to the distance the cup is from me? But some philosophers think that our most primitive knowledge about ourselves lacks any such component: basic self-knowledge is intrinsically selfless. Something like this was presumably behind Lichtenberg's remark, that Descartes should have said 'It thinks' rather than 'I think'. And according to Moore, Wittgenstein approved of Lichtenberg's remark:

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Thought without Representation

The Individual Strikes Back

Notes on the contributors Preface Part I. The Descartes Lectures 2008: 1. Naturalism without representationalism 2. Two expressivist programmes, two bifurcations 3. Pluralism, 'world' and the primacy of science Part II. Commentaries: 4. Pragmatism: all or some? 5. Naturalism, deflationism and the relative priority of language and metaphysics 6. How pragmatists can be local expressivists Part III. Postscript and Replies: 7. Prospects for global expressivism Bibliography Index.

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Simon Blackburn

Papers

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

Essays in quasi-realism

Thought without Representation

The Individual Strikes Back

Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism