Partnerships between companies receive a great deal of attention from top managers and researchers at the time of their formation. This attention results largely from the common perception that the initial structuring of partnerships and establishment of common goals determines partnership outcomes and success. In Alliance Advantage, Doz and Hamel shift the focus away from deal making to the internal processes within the partnership and the unfolding interactions among partners that play an important and relatively unexplored role in shaping outcomes. Focusing on the underlying reasons why companies enter alliances and the processes by which they continually learn from their interactions and re-evaluate common--and individual--goals, the authors paint a sophisticated picture of alliance dynamics over time. The authors challenge organizations to define their objectives for alliance formulation and consider whether their own corporate culture provides an "alliance ready" atmosphere.

Alliance advantage : the art of creating value through partnering

Eric Ries was born in September 1978. He graduated from Yale University and moved to silicon Valley in the beginning of the millennium. He pioneered the philosophy of Lean Startup, based on his experience with multiple startups, primary being IMVU which he co-founded along with Will Harvey in 2004. Eric Ries originated his Lean Startup philosophy after getting inspired from the Japanese Philosophy of Lean Manufacturing.

The Lean Startup:How Today's Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses

Two-person Cooperative Games

Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract

A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures

The growing sophistication of component technologies and the rising costs and uncertainties of developing and launching new products require firms to collaborate in the development of new products. However, the management of new product development that occurs jointly between firms presents a new set of challenges in sharing the costs and benefits of innovation. Although collaboration enables each firm to focus on what it does best, it also introduces new issues associated with the alignment of decisions and incentives that have to be managed alongside conventional performance and timing uncertainties of new product development. In this paper, we conceptualize and formulate the joint development of products involving two firms with differing development capabilities and examine the implications of arrangements that go beyond sharing of revenues to include sharing of development cost and work. We term these approaches that involve sharing of the development cost and sharing of the development work investment sharing and innovation sharing, respectively. These cost and effort sharing mechanisms have subtle interactions with the degree to which revenues are shared between firms and the type of development project under consideration. Our analysis shows that investment and innovation sharing are particularly relevant for products with no preexisting revenues, and their benefits also depend on the degree to which revenues are shared between the firms. Whereas investment sharing is more attractive for new-to-the-world product projects with significant timing uncertainty, innovation sharing plays an important role in environments where projects experience product quality uncertainty, firms are similar in their capabilities, and the costs of integration of work across firms can be controlled. Our key contribution involves the modeling of joint work and decision making between collaborating firms and unearthing the complementary role of revenue, cost, and innovative effort sharing mechanisms for new product development. We translate our analytical findings into a managerial framework and illustrate the results with examples from the life-sciences and electronics industries.

Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Collaborative New Product Development

It has been recognized that when a durable goods manufacturer sells its output, it has an incentive to produce at a rate that will drive down the market price of the product over time. Because anticipation of declining prices makes consumers less willing to invest in owning the durable good, selling can be self-defeating for the manufacturer. If the manufacturer instead leases the product, it can eliminate its own incentive to decrease the price over time, which allows it to extract larger rents from consumers. In this paper, we investigate how a durable goods manufacturer's choice between leasing and selling is affected by a complementary product that is produced by an independent firm. We show that a durable goods manufacturer that leases its product has an incentive to increase prices (by limiting the availability of the product) in response to the availability of a complement. Because this potential for opportunistic behavior discourages output of the complement, leasing can also be problematic. As a result, the durable goods manufacturer faces a trade-off between leasing, which commits the manufacturer to not overproduce, and selling, which commits it to not underproduce. Our contribution is to identify this trade-off and show how a durable goods manufacturer can use a combination of leasing and selling to balance its strategic commitment across both its own market as well as the complementary market.

Selling and Leasing Strategies for Durable Goods with Complementary Products

In spite of the fact that many durable products are sold through dealers, the literature has largely ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealers. We seek to fill this gap by considering a durable goods manufacturer that uses independent dealers to get her product to consumers. In contrast to much of the literature, we specifically consider the possibility that if the manufacturer sells her product, then the dealers can either sell or lease it to the final consumer. One of our more interesting findings is that, when the level of competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to use a lease-brokering arrangement in which the dealers earn a margin for brokering leases between the manufacturer and end consumers, instead of selling her product to the dealers. This complements existing results that show that when suppliers of durable goods interact directly with consumers, selling is the dominant strategy for high levels of competitive intensity.

Implications of Channel Structure for Leasing or Selling Durable Goods

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time-to-market trade-offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Firms in a variety of industries offer addon products to consumers who have previously purchased a base-product. We posit that consumers, in making their decision whether to purchase an addon that complements the base-product, find a greater need for the value offered by the addon when the “unrecovered” value (i.e., price paid minus the benefits obtained so far) associated with the base-product is higher. We conduct experiments that test the proposed hypothesis, and examine the strategic implications of such consumer decision making to a firm who sells base-product addon pairs. Consistent with our hypothesis, the experiments show that the “unrecovered” value associated with the base-product is positively correlated to a consumer's likelihood of purchasing the addon. Formal modeling of this bias shows that firms may find penetration pricing strategies (such as loss-leader pricing) suboptimal. Furthermore, the identified bias leads to the firm spending more resources toward enhancing the both base-product quality and the quality of the addon, especially so when the addon will be offered before the consumer has a chance to extensively use the base-product. Finally, the effect of competition in the base-product market is also considered.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2026292_code343405.pdf?abstractid=1521923&mirid=1&type=2

Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran

Papers

Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Collaborative New Product Development

Selling and Leasing Strategies for Durable Goods with Complementary Products

Implications of Channel Structure for Leasing or Selling Durable Goods

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Consumer Mental Accounts and Implications to Selling Base Products and Add-Ons