Showing papers by "Steen Thomsen published in 1999"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined causes and effects of ownership concentration among the largest companies in 12 European countries and found that ownership concentration decreases with firm size and increases with earnings volatility.
Abstract: The paper examines causes and effects of ownership concentration among the largest companies in 12 European countries. As a reference point the paper takes a seminal empirical study on US data and examines to what extent the model is applicable in European countries. The findings indicate that both general economic effects and system effects are significant. Ownership concentration is found to decrease with firm size and to increase with earnings volatility. But in support of the system theories advocated nationality is also found to have a significant effect which is partly attributable to institutional differences between nations such as stock market size and the frequency of large banks. Finally ownership concentration is found to have an insignificant effect on accounting profitability (return on equity)
86 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider and test alternative explanations of this paradox and find that Danish foundation-owned companies do no worse in terms of profitability and growth than companies with dispersed ownership or family ownership, but some support is found for performance advantages related to family control and long-term business commitment.
Abstract: Industrial foundations are self-governing, non-profit institutions that own business companies. This ownership structure is found in a fair number of Northern European companies, some of them successful world-class competitors. Standard agency theory would predict foundation-owned companies to be relatively inefficient since they lack monitoring by residual claimants and access to equity finance from the stock market. Nevertheless, empirical research (Thomsen 1996) has found that Danish foundation-owned companies do no worse in terms of profitability and growth than companies with dispersed ownership or family ownership. The paper considers and tests alternative explanations of this paradox. Explanations based on tax incentives, alternative control mechanisms and product-market advantages are rejected, but some support is found for performance advantages related to family control and long-term business commitment.
44 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, business systems and corporate governance are discussed in the context of business systems, and a discussion of the role of corporate governance in business systems is presented, e.g., business systems: critical perspectives.
Abstract: (1999). Business Systems and Corporate Governance. International Studies of Management & Organization: Vol. 29, Business Systems: Critical Perspectives, pp. 43-59.
34 citations