We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

Health At A Glance

A new empirical study of the relation between money, nominal income, prices, and real output in postwar quarterly U.S. data rejects virtually all of the conclusions reached by Families provide individuals with risk sharing opportunities which may not otherwise be available. Within the family there is a degree of trust and a level of information which alleviates three key problems in the provision of insurance by markets open to the general public, namely, moral hazard, adverse selection, and deception. The informational advantages of pooling risk within families must be set against the inability of families to provide complete insurance because of the small size of the risk pooling group. This paper demonstrates how families can provide insurance against uncertain dates of death. Death risk sharing family arrangements effectively constitute an incomplete annuities market. Our analysis indicates that these arrangements even in small families can substitute by more than70% for complete annuities. Given the adverse selection problem and transactions costs in public annuity markets, risk pooling in families may well be preferred to purchasing market annuities. In the absence of organized public markets in annuities, these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful economic incentives for marriage and family formation. The paper suggests that inter-family transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings; rather, they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of thi(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market

https://services.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1217&context=feem

The Impact of Urbanization on CO2 Emissions: Evidence from Developing Countries

Applied econometricians frequently apply the inverse hyperbolic sine (or arcsinh) transformation to a variable because it approximates the natural logarithm of that variable and allows retaining zero‐valued observations. We provide derivations of elasticities in common applications of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation and show empirically that the difference in elasticities driven by ad hoc transformations can be substantial. We conclude by offering practical guidance for applied researchers.

Elasticities and the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation

Two pension reforms in Austria increased the early retirement age from 60 to 62 for men and from 55 to 58.25 for women. The reforms reduced early retirement by 18.9 percentage points among affected men aged 60-62 and by 22.3 percentage points among affected women aged 55-58.25. The associated increase in employment was merely 6.8 percentage points among men and 10.1 percentage points among women. The reforms had large spillover effects to the unemployment insurance program but negligible effects on disability insurance claims. Specifically, unemployment increased by roughly 10 percentage points both among men and women. Spillover effects had substantial fiscal implications. Absent spillover effects, the reduction of net government expenditures would have amounted to 264 million Euros per year. Due to higher unemployment insurance claims and associated foregone income tax revenues the actual reduction was only 148 million Euros. High-wage and healthy workers carried the bulk of the fall in net government expenditures. Low-wage and less healthy workers generated much less government savings as they either continue to retire early via disability pensions or bridge the gap to regular retirement by drawing unemployment benefits.

/pdf/does-raising-the-retirement-age-increase-employment-of-older-hfiai1meol.pdf

Does Raising the Retirement Age Increase Employment of Older Workers

http://www.labornrn.at/wp/2012/wp1206.pdf

Does Raising the Early Retirement Age Increase Employment of Older Workers

The impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance on labor force participation

This paper explores how extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits targeted to older workers affect early retirement and social welfare. The trade-off of optimal UI between consumption smoothing and moral hazard requires accounting for the entire early retirement system, which often includes extended UI and relaxed access to disability insurance (DI). We argue that extended UI generates program complementarity (increased take-up of UI followed by DI and/or regular retirement benefits) and program substitution (increased take-up of UI instead of DI). Exploiting Austria's regional extended benefit program, which extended regular UI benefits to up to 4 years, we find: (i) program complementarity is quantitatively important for workers aged 50; and (ii) program substitution is quantitatively relevant for workers aged 55. We derive a simple rule for optimal UI that accounts for program complementarity and program substitution. Using the sufficient statistics approach, we conclude that UI for older workers was too generous and the regional extended benefit program was a suboptimal policy.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2255990_code365048.pdf?abstractid=2255990&type=2

Extended Unemployment Benefits and Early Retirement: Program Complementarity and Program Substitution

We analyze the effect of means-tested benefits on annuitization decisions. Most industrialized countries provide a subsistence level consumption floor in old age, usually in the form of means-tested benefits. The availability of such means-tested payments creates an incentive to cash out (occupational) pension wealth for low and middle income earners, instead of taking the annuity. Agents trade-off the advantages from annuitization, receiving the wealth-enhancing mortality credit, to the disadvantages, giving up, “free,” wealth in the form of means-tested supplemental benefits. We find that the availability of means-tested benefits can reduce the desired annuitization levels substantially. Using individual level data, we show that the model’s predicted annuitization rates as a function of the level of pension wealth are roughly consistent with the cash-out patterns of occupational pension wealth observed in Switzerland.

/pdf/how-much-do-means-tested-benefits-reduce-the-demand-for-20lw7tj3k5.pdf

Stefan Staubli

Papers

Does Raising the Retirement Age Increase Employment of Older Workers

Does Raising the Early Retirement Age Increase Employment of Older Workers

The impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance on labor force participation

Extended Unemployment Benefits and Early Retirement: Program Complementarity and Program Substitution

How Much Do Means-Tested Benefits Reduce the Demand for Annuities?