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The concept of mind

Naming and necessity

There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are false. The probability that a research claim is true may depend on study power and bias, the number of other studies on the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no relationships among the relationships probed in each scientific field. In this framework, a research finding is less likely to be true when the studies conducted in a field are smaller; when effect sizes are smaller; when there is a greater number and lesser preselection of tested relationships; where there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes; when there is greater financial and other interest and prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a scientific field in chase of statistical significance. Simulations show that for most study designs and settings, it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true. Moreover, for many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias. In this essay, I discuss the implications of these problems for the conduct and interpretation of research.

Why most published research findings are false

We consider several key aspects of prediction in language comprehension: its computational nature, the representational level(s) at which we predict, whether we use higher-level representations to predictively pre-activate lower level representations, and whether we “commit” in any way to our predictions, beyond pre-activation. We argue that the bulk of behavioural and neural evidence suggests that we predict probabilistically and at multiple levels and grains of representation. We also argue that we can, in principle, use higher-level inferences to predictively pre-activate information at multiple lower representational levels. We suggest that the degree and level of predictive pre-activation might be a function of its expected utility, which, in turn, may depend on comprehenders’ goals and their estimates of the relative reliability of their prior knowledge and the bottom-up input. Finally, we argue that all these properties of language understanding can be naturally explained and productively e...

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What do we mean by prediction in language comprehension

Causes and conditions.

Preface 1. Passing Powers Around 2. Modelling Causes as Vectors 3. Against Necessity 4. Reductionism, Holism, and Emergence 5. Simultaneity 6. Explanation, Absences, and Counterfactuals 7. The Logic of Causation 8. Primitive Modality 9. Perceiving Causes 10. A Biologically Disposed Theory of Causation Conclusion Bibliography Index

Getting Causes from Powers

1. Introduction: Laws in Science and Philosophy Part One: Humean Lawlessness 2. The Lawless World 3. Regularities and Best Systems 4. Hume's Argument Part Two: Nomological Realism 5. The Nomological Argument 6. Natural Necessitation Relations 7. Necessitarian Essentialism Part Three: Realist Lawlessness 8. Are Natural Laws a Natural Kind 9. The Central Dilemma 10. Modal Properties 11. Objections and Replies 12. Conclusion: Law and Metaphor

Laws in nature

George Molnar came to see that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lay in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. Molnar set about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remained, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Humean assumptions. He succeeded in producing something both highly focused and at the same time wide-ranging. He showed both that the notion of a power was central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. Molnar's account of powers is as realist as any that has so far appeared. He shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend for their existence on their manifestations. Nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. Molnar thus appropriates the notion of intentionality, from Brentano, and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. He offers a persuasive case for there being some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, he does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, his final position is dualistic. This is contemporary metaphysics of the highest quality. It is a work that was almost complete when its author died. It has been edited for publication by another specialist in the subject, Stephen Mumford, who has also provided an introduction that will allow non-specialists to become acquainted with the issues. David Armstrong, one of the greatest living metaphysicians and personal friend of George Molnar, has provided a Foreword.

Powers: A Study in Metaphysics

There is an argument that has yet to be made wholly explicit though it might be one of the most important in contemporary metaphysics. This paper is an attempt to rectify that omission. The argument is of such high importance because it involves a host of central concepts, concerning actuality, modality, groundedness and powers. If Ellis’s (2001) assessment is correct, the whole debate between Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics might rest on this viability of the argument. The argument, which I call the Ungrounded Argument (abbreviated to UA), has in various implicit forms been discussed or defended by Blackburn (1990), Molnar (1999, 2003, ch. 8) and Ellis (2001, 114 and 2002, 74–75). It concerns the alleged possibility of ungrounded dispositional properties or causal powers. It is an argument against a thesis that might be called universal or global groundedness; namely, that every dispositional property is grounded in some property other than itself. In Section 2 I formulate, for the first time, an explicit version of the Ungrounded Argument and present the evidence and reasons for its premises. Along the way, I will clarify some of the key concepts and issues. In Section 3 I consider the likely responses to UA and identify the main basis on which it might be challenged. In Section 4, I try to distil the issue down to its central core and show what must be overcome, and what must be acknowledged, if the argument is to be accepted. The main aim of this paper is the explicit articulation of the argument. Sections 3 and 4 are briefer, therefore, and give only an indication of the lines that may have to be developed for the argument’s ultimate acceptance.

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The Ungrounded Argument

Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) remain recalcitrant to the medical profession, proving less suitable for homogenic treatment with respect to their aetiology, taxonomy and diagnosis. While the majority of existing medical research methods are designed for large scale population data and sufficiently homogenous groups, MUS are characterised by their heterogenic and complex nature. As a result, MUS seem to resist medical scrutiny in a way that other conditions do not. This paper approaches the problem of MUS from a philosophical point of view. The aim is to first consider the epistemological problem of MUS in a wider ontological and phenomenological context, particularly in relation to causation. Second, the paper links current medical practice to certain ontological assumptions. Finally, the outlines of an alternative ontology of causation are offered which place characteristic features of MUS, such as genuine complexity, context-sensitivity, holism and medical uniqueness at the centre of any causal set-up, and not only for MUS. This alternative ontology provides a framework in which to better understand complex medical conditions in relation to both their nature and their associated research activity.

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Stephen Mumford

Papers

Getting Causes from Powers

Laws in nature

Powers: A Study in Metaphysics

The Ungrounded Argument

At the borders of medical reasoning - aetiological and ontological challenges of medically unexplained symptoms