This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two “quasi-natural experiments” in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power. We therefore view the appropriate theoretical framework as a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution of resources as the state variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing economic institutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.

Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth

This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two 'quasi-natural experiments' in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power. We therefore view the appropriate theoretical framework as a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution of resources as the state variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing economic institutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.

Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth

The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associatedcolonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where "initial" political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of Atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy, and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights. These changes were central to subsequent economic growth.

/pdf/the-rise-of-europe-atlantic-trade-institutional-change-and-4dwuijokqy.pdf

The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth

This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power. We therefore view the appropriate theoretical framework as a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution of resources as the state variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing economic institutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.

/pdf/institutions-as-the-fundamental-cause-of-long-run-growth-4hwybjszry.pdf

Institutions as the fundamental cause of Long-Run growth

This Handbook charts the growing area of journalism studies, exploring the current state of theory and setting an agenda for future research in an international context. The volume is structured around theoretical and empirical approaches, and covers scholarship on news production and organizations; news content; journalism and society; and journalism in a global context. Emphasizing comparative and global perspectives, each chapter explores:
Key elements, thinkers, and texts; 
Historical context; 
Current state of the art;
Methodological issues;
Merits and advantages of the approach/area of studies;
Limitations and critical issues of the approach/area of studies;
Directions for future research

Offering broad international coverage from top-tier contributors, this volume ranks among the first publications to serve as a comprehensive resource addressing theory and scholarship in journalism studies. As such, the Handbook of Journalism Studies is a must-have resource for scholars and graduate students working in journalism, media studies, and communication around the globe.

/pdf/the-handbook-of-journalism-studies-1pxed9giz7.pdf

The Handbook of Journalism Studies

For two hundred years historians have viewed England's Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689 as an un-revolutionary revolution-bloodless, consensual, aristocratic, and above all, sensible. In this brilliant new interpretation Steve Pincus refutes this traditional view. By expanding the interpretive lens to include a broader geographical and chronological frame, Pincus demonstrates that England's revolution was a European event, that it took place over a number of years, not months, and that it had repercussions in India, North America, the West Indies, and throughout continental Europe. His rich historical narrative, based on masses of new archival research, traces the transformation of English foreign policy, religious culture, and political economy that, he argues, was the intended consequence of the revolutionaries of 1688-1689. James II developed a modernization program that emphasized centralized control, repression of dissidents, and territorial empire. The revolutionaries, by contrast, took advantage of the new economic possibilities to create a bureaucratic but participatory state. The postrevolutionary English state emphasized its ideological break with the past and envisioned itself as continuing to evolve. All of this, argues Pincus, makes the Glorious Revolution-not the French Revolution-the first truly modern revolution. This wide-ranging book reenvisions the nature of the Glorious Revolution and of revolutions in general, the causes and consequences of commercialization, the nature of liberalism, and ultimately the origins and contours of modernity itself.

1688: The First Modern Revolution

"Every man is now become a state man," the marquis of Newcastle warned Charles II before his Restoration. He consequently recommended that the king-in order that his subjects "be ever ready to serve your Majesty" should radically restrict the availability and circulation of "either domestic or foreign news" so that "all our discourse will be of hunting and hawking, bowling, cocking and such things." 1 Newcastle's hopes, however, were not realized. Not much more than a year after Charles II's return to his native land, the Oxford antiquary Anthony Wood observed that "nothing but news and the affairs of Christendom is discoursed of, and that also generally at coffeehouses."2 Almost two decades later coffeehouses were full of discussions "of religion and government," for "'tis all the discourse now, from the Lord to the fiddler, all are grown states-men."3 On the eve of the Glorious Revolution the marquis of Halifax averred that "the world hath of late years never been without some extraordinary word to furnish the coffee-houses and fill the pamphlets. "4 The rise of the coffeehouses, and the failure of Charles II's government to restore the marquis of Newcastle's world of bucolic pleasures, has prompted the German social theorist Jurgen Habermas to argue that "a public sphere that functioned in the political realm arose first in Great Britain at the turn of the eighteenth century."5 By public sphere Habermas means specifically an

"Coffee Politicians Does Create": Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture

T “public sphere” has become ubiquitous in the historiography and in historically oriented literary criticism of early modern England. In this article, we argue that the phrase does have real efficacy in discussions of early modern England. However, we want to use “public sphere” in slightly different ways than most scholars have done. In particular, we argue that a narrative of the emergence of the public sphere, in the ways we will define it, can be used to talk coherently about the entire period from the Reformation into the eighteenth century. The “public sphere” has been moving backward in time. The term “bourgeois public sphere” originally referred to a particular kind of Enlightenment discussion. However, “public sphere” now appears frequently in articles and monographs referring to the Restoration, the Interregnum, the Civil War, and it is even invading the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods.

/pdf/rethinking-the-public-sphere-in-early-modern-england-1umchysiwr.pdf

Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England

Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1. Introduction Part 1. The Rod of the Lord: Ideology and the Outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War: 2. Historiographical overview 3. The attempt at unification 4. The road to war Coda: the popular apocalyptic context Part II. To Unite Against the Common Enemy: The 1654 Treaty of Westminster and the End of Apocalyptic Foreign Policy: 5. Historiographical overview 6. The causes of the war stated 7. Peace proposed 8. Political upheavals and ideological divisions 9. The rejection of apocalyptic foreign policy 10. The Protectorate's new foreign policy Part III. Popery, Trade and Universal Monarchy: Ideology and the Outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War: 11. Historiographical overview 12. The establishment of an Orangist foreign policy 13. The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1662 14. The Northern Rebellion and the reestablishment of Anglican Royalist consensus 15. The April 1664 trade resolution 16. Popery, trade and universal monarchy Part IV. The Medway, Breda and the Triple Alliance: The Collapse of Anglican Royalist Foreign Policy: 17. Historiographical overview 18. The circulation of news and the course of the war 19. The popular understanding of the war 20. The government's war aims 21. An Orangist revolution 22. Victory denied and wartime consensus shattered 23. The rise of political opposition 24. The road to Chatham: the decision not to send out a battle fleet 25. The demise of Anglican Royalist foreign policy Conclusion Bibliography Index.

Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668

"THE CONCEPT OF REPUBLICANISM was one of the success stories of the 1980s," the intellectual historian Daniel Rodgers recently observed, "a generation ago the term-while not unknown-carried no more freight than scores of others in the historical vocabulary ... By 1990 it was everywhere and organizing everything, though perceptibly thinning out, like a nova entering its red giant phase."1 The remarkable spate of recent publications celebrating republicanism-books, articles, collections of essays-suggests that Rodgers has misconstrued the astronomical life of this particular star. "The wildfire popularity of republicanism" continues unabated.2 For scholars interested in republicanism, just as for those interested in liberalism, seventeenth-century English history, politics, and culture hold a special significance. C. B. Macpherson located "the roots of the liberal tradition ... in the political theory and practice of the English seventeenth century." This was because it was "in the course of a protracted struggle in parliament, a civil war, a series of republican experiments, a restoration of the monarchy, and a final constitutional revolution, that the principles which were to become basic to liberal democracy were all developed." Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock concurred that "English Liberalism"-which predates but is not conceptually distinguishable from "Continental Liberalism"-"was born out of the seventeenth century struggle for freedom of conscience and the resistance of Parliament to the arbitrary authority of the King." More recently, Stephen Holmes has claimed that "the early history of liberalism . . . cannot be detached from the political history in the seventeenth and

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2650569.pdf

Steve Pincus

Papers

1688: The First Modern Revolution

"Coffee Politicians Does Create": Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture

Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England

Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668

Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth