We present “Ouroboros”, the first blockchain protocol based on proof of stake with rigorous security guarantees. We establish security properties for the protocol comparable to those achieved by the bitcoin blockchain protocol. As the protocol provides a “proof of stake” blockchain discipline, it offers qualitative efficiency advantages over blockchains based on proof of physical resources (e.g., proof of work). We also present a novel reward mechanism for incentivizing Proof of Stake protocols and we prove that, given this mechanism, honest behavior is an approximate Nash equilibrium, thus neutralizing attacks such as selfish mining.

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Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol

Blockchain technologies are gaining massive momentum in the last few years. Blockchains are distributed ledgers that enable parties who do not fully trust each other to maintain a set of global states. The parties agree on the existence, values, and histories of the states. As the technology landscape is expanding rapidly, it is both important and challenging to have a firm grasp of what the core technologies have to offer, especially with respect to their data processing capabilities. In this paper, we first survey the state of the art, focusing on private blockchains (in which parties are authenticated). We analyze both in-production and research systems in four dimensions: distributed ledger, cryptography, consensus protocol, and smart contract. We then present BLOCKBENCH, a benchmarking framework for understanding performance of private blockchains against data processing workloads. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of three major blockchain systems based on BLOCKBENCH, namely Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger Fabric. The results demonstrate several trade-offs in the design space, as well as big performance gaps between blockchain and database systems. Drawing from design principles of database systems, we discuss several research directions for bringing blockchain performance closer to the realm of databases.

Untangling Blockchain: A Data Processing View of Blockchain Systems

The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of decentralized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review of the strategy adopted for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey of the emerging applications of blockchain networks in a broad area of telecommunication. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions.

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A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks

In the Internet of Things (IoT) scenario, the block-chain and, in general, Peer-to-Peer approaches could play an important role in the development of decentralized and dataintensive applications running on billion of devices, preserving the privacy of the users. Our research goal is to understand whether the blockchain and Peer-to-Peer approaches can be employed to foster a decentralized and private-by-design IoT. As a first step in our research process, we conducted a Systematic Literature Review on the blockchain to gather knowledge on the current uses of this technology and to document its current degree of integrity, anonymity and adaptability. We found 18 use cases of blockchain in the literature. Four of these use cases are explicitly designed for IoT. We also found some use cases that are designed for a private-by-design data management. We also found several issues in the integrity, anonymity and adaptability. Regarding anonymity, we found that in the blockchain only pseudonymity is guaranteed. Regarding adaptability and integrity, we discovered that the integrity of the blockchain largely depends on the high difficulty of the Proof-of-Work and on the large number of honest miners, but at the same time a difficult Proof-of-Work limits the adaptability. We documented and categorized the current uses of the blockchain, and provided a few recommendations for future work to address the above-mentioned issues.

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Blockchain for the Internet of Things: A systematic literature review

We study the problem of building a verifiable delay function (VDF). A \(\text {VDF}\)requires a specified number of sequential steps to evaluate, yet produces a unique output that can be efficiently and publicly verified. \(\text {VDF}\)s have many applications in decentralized systems, including public randomness beacons, leader election in consensus protocols, and proofs of replication. We formalize the requirements for \(\text {VDF}\)s and present new candidate constructions that are the first to achieve an exponential gap between evaluation and verification time.

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Verifiable Delay Functions

Bitcoin has become the most successful cryptocurrency ever deployed, and its most distinctive feature is that it is decentralized. Its underlying protocol (Nakamoto consensus) achieves this by using proof of work, which has the drawback that it causes the consumption of vast amounts of energy to maintain the ledger. Moreover, Bitcoin mining dynamics have become less distributed over time.

SpaceMint: A Cryptocurrency Based on Proofs of Space

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Going from bad to worse: from Internet voting to blockchain voting

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Practical Accountability of Secret Processes

Since its introduction in 2009, Bitcoin has become the most successful cryptocurrency ever deployed. However, the currency’s dramatic expansion has also raised serious concerns about its long-term sustainability: (1) Bitcoin mining dynamics have shifted away from decentralization, as dedicated hardware and entry of governments and energy producers has gradually placed most mining power in the hands of a select few, and (2) the network’s growth spurt has come with accompanying, vast amounts of energy constantly “wasted” solely for the purpose of sustaining the currency. In this work, we propose SpaceMint, a cryptocurrency based on proofs of space instead of wasteful proofs of work. Mining in SpaceMint is designed to have low setup and overhead costs, yielding a fairer reward structure for small and large miners. Miners in SpaceMint dedicate disk space rather than computation. In our design, we adapt proof-of-space for the cryptocurrency setting, and propose a new block chain format and transaction types that prevent attacks that exploit the inexpensiveness of mining (from which alternative non-proof-of-work-based proposals have suffered). Our prototype shows that initializing 1 TB for mining takes about a day (a oneoff cost), and miners on average spend just a fraction of a second per block mined. We also provide a formal game-theoretic analysis modeling SpaceMint as ∗In a previous version, this cryptocurrency proposal was called “Spacecoin” rather than “SpaceMint”, but this has been changed due to name conflicts. an extensive game, and prove that following the protocol is an equilibrium, thereby arguing for the currency’s stability and consensus.

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Spacemint: A Cryptocurrency Based on Proofs of Space.

Ring signatures, introduced by [RST01], are a variant of digital signatures which certify that one among a particular set of parties has endorsed a message while hiding which party in the set was the signer. Ring signatures are designed to allow anyone to attach anyone else’s name to a signature, as long as the signer’s own name is also attached. But what guarantee do ring signatures provide if a purported signatory wishes to denounce a signed message—or alternatively, if a signatory wishes to later come forward and claim ownership of a signature? Prior security definitions for ring signatures do not give a conclusive answer to this question: under most existing definitions, the guarantees could go either way. That is, it is consistent with some standard definitions that a non-signer might be able to repudiate a signature that he did not produce, or that this might be impossible. Similarly, a signer might be able to later convincingly claim that a signature he produced is indeed his own, or not. Any of these guarantees might be desirable. For instance, a whistleblower might have reason to want to later claim an anonymously released signature, or a person falsely implicated in a crime associated with a ring signature might wish to denounce the signature that is framing them and damaging their reputation. In other circumstances, it might be desirable that even under duress, a member of a ring cannot produce proof that he did or did not sign a particular signature. In any case, a guarantee one way or the other seems highly desirable.

Sunoo Park

Papers

SpaceMint: A Cryptocurrency Based on Proofs of Space

Going from bad to worse: from Internet voting to blockchain voting

Practical Accountability of Secret Processes

Spacemint: A Cryptocurrency Based on Proofs of Space.

It Wasn’t Me!