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Susan F. Haka

Researcher at Michigan State University

Publications -  21
Citations -  1109

Susan F. Haka is an academic researcher from Michigan State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Accounting information system & Information system. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 21 publications receiving 1056 citations. Previous affiliations of Susan F. Haka include Saint Petersburg State University.

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI

Information overload: A temporal approach☆

TL;DR: The purpose of this paper is to provide a more precise definition of information overload than previously found in the literature, essential to designing usable information systems.
Journal ArticleDOI

Cost System and Incentive Structure Effects on Innovation, Efficiency and Profitability in Teams

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how accounting cost system and incentive structure choices interact and find that profits are highest when ABC is linked with group-based incentives, which provide high motivation to cooperate.
Book ChapterDOI

Sophisticated capital budgeting selection techniques and firm performance

TL;DR: In this article, several tests were conducted on firms that adopted sophisticated capital budgeting techniques versus a control group of firms that employed naive techniques, and they concluded that the adoption of sophisticated selection techniques will not, per se, result in superior firm performance.
Book ChapterDOI

A Review of the Literature on Capital Budgeting and Investment Appraisal: Past, Present, and Future Musings

TL;DR: In this paper, a historical appraisal of the development of current capital budgeting practices and reviews of academic research is provided, focusing on appraisal techniques, individual decision-maker effects, organizational issues, and environmental factors.
Journal ArticleDOI

Does ABC Information Exacerbate Hold‐Up Problems in Buyer‐Supplier Negotiations?

TL;DR: The authors found that negotiators are more reluctant to share fine information than coarse, less detailed information, which suggests that fine information systems can exacerbate hold-ups and that when negotiators share the fine information, they achieve more efficient bargaining agreements.