Electoral competition is necessary but not sufficient for the consolidation of democratic regimes; not all elections are free and fair; nor do they necessarily lead to actual civilian rule or respect for human rights. If there is more to democracy than elections, then there is more to democratization than the transition to elections. But in spite of the rich literature on the emergence of electoral competition, the dynamics of political transitions toward respect for other fundamental democratic rights is still not well understood. Political democracy is defined here in classic procedural terms: free and fair electoral contestation for governing offices based on universal suffrage, guaranteed freedoms of association and expression, accountability through the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. Although analyses of democratization typically acknowledge that these are all necessary criteria, most examine only electoral competition. This study, however, develops a framework for explaining progress toward another necessary condition for democratization respect for associational autonomy, which allows citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention or punishment.

The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico

Author(s): Fox, Jonathan A | Abstract: Electoral competition is necessary but not sufficient for the consolidation of democratic regimes; not all elections are free and fair; nor do they necessarily lead to actual civilian rule or respect for human rights. If there is more to democracy than elections, then there is more to democratization than the transition to elections. But in spite of the rich literature on the emergence of electoral competition, the dynamics of political transitions toward respect for other fundamental democratic rights is still not well understood.Political democracy is defined here in classic procedural terms: free and fair electoral contestation for governing offices based on universal suffrage, guaranteed freedoms of association and expression, accountability through the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. Although analyses of democratization typically acknowledge that these are all necessary criteria, most examine only electoral competition. This study, however, develops a framework for explaining progress toward another necessary condition for democratization respect for associational autonomy, which allows citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention or punishment.

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Part I. The Macro Perspective: 1. A theory of single-party dominance and opposition party development 2. Dominant party advantages and opposition party failure, 1930s-90s Part II. The Micro Perspective: 3. Why participate? A theory of elite activism in dominant party systems 4. The empirical dynamics of elite activism Part III. Implications: 5. Constrained to the core: opposition party organizations, 1980s-90s 6. Dominance defeated: voting behavior in the 2000 elections 7. Extending the argument: Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

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Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective

Shaping the Political Arena

The concept of "corporatism" has usefully called attention to the importance of systems of interest representation based on non-competing groups that are officially sanctioned, subsidized, and supervised by the state. Yet these patterns have appeared in such a remarkable variety of political contexts that this concept may be too broad to be useful. On the basis of an analysis of the relationship between the state and organized labor in Latin America, this article argues that the concept of corporation can be disaggregated so that it sheds light on rather than obscures the different power relationships and political contexts with which it is associated. The analysis focuses on the distinction between "inducements" extended by the state to win the cooperation of groups and "constraints" through which the state directly controls groups. This disagreggated approach enables one to distinguish more subtly among systems of group representation, to conceive of state-group relations in more interactive terms, and to gain insights into the larger political context.

Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism

In recent years, as political scientists have witnessed the establishment of non-democratic governments in an ever-increasing number of countries, there has been renewed interest in the concept of an authoritarian regime. Despite its frequent use, however, the concept of an authoritarian regime rarely has been defined so that it could be applied in a comparative analysis. Furthermore, the theoretical utility of classifying a regime as “authoritarian” remains unclear. If the classification is to have some explanatory value, the way in which such a regime's defining characteristics produce distinctive political processes and behavior must be demonstrated.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100001738

Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study

The Mexican state is based on a constantly renewed bargain among several ruling groups and interests representing a broad range of ideological tendencies and social bases. Mexican political stability rests primarily not upon formal institutions, but upon the interaction of principles of political discipline (closely linked to the concept of authoritarianism) and political negotiation (associated with the concept of proto-democracy). The combination of repression and co-optation with just the “right” mix of responsiveness and compromise produces: (1) elites that are both linked to, and insulated from, their potential constituencies; (2) a pattern of political and administrative decision making called “policy incoherence”; and (3) avoidance of the crystallization of factional alliances, and their opposition to one another.

State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?

The Mexican profit-sharing decision : politics in an authoritarian regime

In patients with cyanotic congenital heart disease (CCHD), a right-to-left shunt results in systemic hypoxemia. Systemic hypoxemia incites a compensatory erythrocytosis, which increases whole blood...

https://www.physiology.org/doi/pdf/10.1152/ajpheart.01309.2004

Myocardial perfusion reserve in adults with cyanotic congenital heart disease

LAS DISCUSIONES ACTUALES sobre el sistema político mexicano tienden a enfatizar la solidez y estabilidad de la coalición gobernante, así como la fortaleza de aquellas instituciones que permiten a la élite política una continua captación y control de las masas. 1 Por el contrario nos¬ * Este trabajo es una versión de uno anterior, preparado bajo el nombre "La Naturaleza del Estado Mexicano", para ser presentado en el Coloquio del Centro Internacional The Woodrow Wilson, Washington, D, C , el 1* de junio de 1977. Agradecemos a John Barchfield, Richard Fagen, Rainer Horst Godu, Edward González, Nora Hamilton, Albert Hirschman, Robert Kaufman, Daniel Levy, Abraham Lowenthal, Guillermo O'Donnell y Ezra Suleiman por sus excelentes comentarios y sugerencias en la revisión del mismo. Este trabajo es el resultado de una investigación que incluye cerca de 200 entrevistas con líderes del Gobierno, el sector privado y las instituciones académicas. La investigación fue desarrollada entre septiembre de 1975 y octubre de 1976 en México, con el respaldo de donaciones hechas a los autores por el Joint Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies y el Social Science Research Council, así como por la donación a uno de los autores por parte del Academic Senate y el Committee on International and Comparative Studies of the University of California, Los Angeles. Muchas de las ideas en este trabajo fueron desarrolladas durante la estancia de los autores como becarios en The Wilson Center, entre noviembre de 1976 y agosto de 1977. i Véase por ejemplo, Frank Branderburg, The Making of Modem Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), Roger Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore y Londres: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), Richard R. Fagen and William S. Tuohy, Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City (Stanford: University Press, 1972), David Ronfeldt, Atencingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido (Stanford: University Press, 1973), Evelyn P. Stevens, Protest and Response in México (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1974), Susan Kaufman Purcell, The Mexican Profit Sharing Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System, segunda edición (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), José Luis Reyna y Richard S. Weinert, eds., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: ISHI Press, 1977), y Susan Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Véase también: Bo Anderson y James J. Cockcroft, "Controland Cooptation in Mexican Politics", en Irving

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Susan Kaufman Purcell

Papers

Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study

State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?

The Mexican profit-sharing decision : politics in an authoritarian regime

Myocardial perfusion reserve in adults with cyanotic congenital heart disease

Estado y sociedad en México : debe un sistema político estable, institucionalizarse?