Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

1 For example, in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with patient agents, both cooperate and defect may be played in equilibrium. Even though the theory of infinitely repeated games has been used to explain cooperation in a variety of environments, no definitive solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection: when both cooperation and defection are possible equilibrium outcomes, which one should we expect to prevail? Previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a specific equilibrium when they play a small number of infinitely repeated games: some subjects attempt to establish cooperative agreements, while others defect. But how would behavior evolve as subjects learn from previous repeated games? Would cooperation prevail when it can be supported in equilibrium? Or will subjects learn

/pdf/the-evolution-of-cooperation-in-infinitely-repeated-games-4r9u2ifywy.pdf

The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

This paper examines vertical arrangements in electricity markets. Vertically integrated wholesalers, or those with long-term contracts, have less incentive to raise wholesale prices when retail prices are determined beforehand. For three restructured markets, we simulate prices that define bounds on static oligopoly equilibria. Our findings suggest that vertical arrangements dramatically affect estimated market outcomes. Had regulators impeded vertical arrangements (as in California), our simulations imply vastly higher prices than observed and production inefficiencies costing over 45 percent of those production costs with vertical arrangements. We conclude that horizontal market structure accurately predicts market performance only when accounting for vertical structure. (JEL L��, L�3, L94)

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Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets

https://www.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/Discussion_Paper/065_Fonseca_Normann.pdf

Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments

In this note we obtain the following products of the n -dimensional distributions: (i) (m^{2} + {\bi P} \pm io)^{\lambda} \cdot (m^{2} + {\bi P} \pm io)^{\mu} = (m^{2} + {\bi P} \pm io)^{\lambda + \mu} (cf. (1.10)) (ii) ({\bi P} \pm io)^{\lambda} \cdot ({\bi P} \pm io)^{\mu} = ({\bi P} \pm io)^{\lambda + \mu} (cf. (1.11)) (iii) (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{+}^{\lambda} \cdot (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{+}^{\mu} = (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{+}^{\lambda + \mu} (cf. (3.4)) (iv) (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{-}^{\lambda} \cdot (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{-}^{\mu} = (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{-}^{\lambda + \mu} (cf. (3.5)) (v) e^{i\pi \lambda}(m^{2} + {\bi P})_{-}^{\lambda} \cdot (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{+}^{\mu} = -e^{i\pi\mu}(m^{2} + {\bi P})_{-}^{\mu} \cdot (m^{2} + {\bi P})_{+}^{\lambda} (cf. (3.7)) (vi) (-1)^{\lambda} {\bi P}_{-}^{\lambda} {\bi P}_{+}^{\lambda} = (-1)(-1)^{\mu} {\bi P}_{-}^{\mu} \cdot {\bi P}_{+}^{\lambda} (cf. (3.8)) (vii) [(m^{2} + {\bi P} \pm io)^{\lambda} \log^{r} (m^{2} + {\bi P} \pm io)] \cdot [(m^{2} + {\b...

On The Distribution

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well-run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white-collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.

/pdf/fines-leniency-and-rewards-in-antitrust-17vcpco1rz.pdf

fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust

We demonstrate a “preemptive merger mechanism” which may explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce pro…ts, and raise share prices. A merger may confer strong negative externalities on the …rms outside the merger. If being an “insider” is better than being an “outsider,” …rms may merge to preempt their partner merging with someone else. Furthermore, the pre-merger value of a merging …rm is low, since it re‡ects the risk of becoming an outsider. These results are derived in a model of endogenous mergers which predicts the conditions under which a merger occurs, when it occurs, and how the surplus is divided.

/pdf/why-mergers-reduce-pro-ts-and-raise-share-prices-2gamf719ok.pdf

Why Mergers Reduce Pro…ts and Raise Share Prices ¤

provide a possible explanation for the empirical puzzle that mergers often reduce profits, but raise share prices. If being an "insider" is better than being an "outsider", firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The insiders' stock market value is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. These results are derived in an endogenous- merger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, when they occur, and how the surplus is shared. (JEL: L13, L41, G34, C78)

/pdf/why-mergers-reduce-profits-and-raise-share-prices-a-theory-wdlf3wkhni.pdf

Why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices: a theory of preemptive mergers

We review the recent empirical research concerning market power on the Nordic wholesale market for electricity, Nord Pool. There is no evidence of blatant and systematic exploitation of system level market power on Nord Pool. However, generation companies seem from time to time able to take advantage of capacity constraints in transmission to wield regional market power. Market power can manifest itself in a number of ways which have so far escaped empirical scrutiny. We discuss investment incentives, vertical integration and buyer power, as well as withholding of base-load (nuclear) capacity.

Sven-Olof Fridolfsson

Papers

fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust

Why Mergers Reduce Pro…ts and Raise Share Prices ¤

Why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices: a theory of preemptive mergers

Market Power in the Nordic Electricity Wholesale Market: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence

Market power in the Nordic electricity wholesale market: A survey of the empirical evidence ☆