Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been considered one of the imperative requirements for implementation of Internet-of-Things applications. It helps to solve the identification issues of the things in a cost-effective manner, but RFID systems often suffer from various security and privacy issues. To solve those issues for RFID systems, many schemes have been recently proposed by using the cryptographic primitive, called physically uncloneable functions (PUFs), which can ensure a tamper-evident feature. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of them has succeeded to address the problem of privacy preservation with the resistance of DoS attacks in a practical way. For instance, existing schemes need to rely on exhaustive search operations to identify a tag, and also suffer from several security and privacy related issues. Furthermore, a tag needs to store some security credentials (e.g., secret shared keys), which may cause several issues such as loss of forward and backward secrecy and large storage costs. Therefore, in this paper, we first propose a lightweight privacy-preserving authentication protocol for the RFID system by considering the ideal PUF environment. Subsequently, we introduce an enhanced protocol which can support the noisy PUF environment. It is argued that both of our protocols can overcome the limitations of existing schemes, and further ensure more security properties. By analyzing the performance, we have shown that the proposed solutions are secure, efficient, practical, and effective for the resource-constraint RFID tag.

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Lightweight and Practical Anonymous Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems Using Physically Unclonable Functions

Lightweight and privacy-preserving RFID authentication scheme for distributed IoT infrastructure with secure localization services for smart city environment

A review on application of technology systems, standards and interfaces for agriculture and food sector

Recent advances in information and communication technologies and embedded systems have given rise to a new disruptive technology, the Internet of Things (IoTs). IoT allows people and objects in the physical world as well as data and virtual environments to interact with each other so as to create smart environments, such as smart transport systems, smart cities, smart health, and so on. However, IoT raises some important questions and also introduces new challenges for the security of systems and processes and the privacy of individuals, such as their location and movements and so on. In this paper, at first, we propose a distributed IoT system architecture. Subsequently, we propose an anonymous authentication scheme, which can ensure some of the notable properties, such as sensor anonymity, sensor untraceability, resistance to replay attacks, cloning attacks, and so on. It is argued that the proposed authentication scheme will be useful in many distributed IoT applications (such as radio-frequency identification-based IoT system, Biosensor-based IoT healthcare system, and so on), where the privacy of the sensor movement is greatly desirable.

Untraceable Sensor Movement in Distributed IoT Infrastructure

A realistic lightweight authentication protocol preserving strong anonymity for securing RFID system

Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is expected to become an important and ubiquitous infrastructure technology of supply chain processes and customer service. The low-cost tag, or so-called passive tag, will be likely the factor for widespread adoption of the technology. It must be noticed that the deployment of such tags may create new threats to user privacy due to the powerful tracking capability of the tags. As a result, some sort of security issues must be imposed on the passive tags for addressing the privacy problem. However, providing security in such tags is a challenging task because they are highly resource constrained and cannot support strong cryptography. This paper provides both discussion on the requirements and restrictions of security implementation of a RFID system. It also examines the features and issues pertinent to several existing RFID security solution. Finally, this paper suggests the use of our proposed lightweight security protocol based on Ohkubo's scheme, which protects user privacy using a hash chain mechanism and also provides an analysis of the protocol

T. Chan

Papers

A lightweight mutual authentication protocol for RFID networks