The Theory of Matrices. By F R. Gantmacher. Two volumes, pp. 374 and 276. 1959. (Translated from the Russian by K. A. Hirsch; Chelsea Publishing Company, New York)

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the South? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.(JEL O34, F13) During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, the United States and several European countries expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of intellectual property in many developing countries. The developed countries made the upgrading of intellectual property rights (IPRs) one of their highest priorities for the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Their efforts bore fruit in the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which was approved as part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. TRIPs establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intellectual property. For example, in the area of new technology, it essentially harmonizes

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International Protection of Intellectual Property

https://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/wgpark/upload/Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf

Appropriate intellectual property protection and economic growth in countries at different levels of development

http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/pdf/dp/DP2006-019.pdf

The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?

This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.

/pdf/economic-growth-with-imperfect-protection-of-intellectual-1d5pihx9ul.pdf

Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model

In this paper, we investigate how strengthening patent protection affects economic growth in an endogenous growth model where both innovation and capital accumulation are the driving forces of economic growth. In this model, stronger patent protection raises the profit flow obtained by innovation but reduces the factor demand for capital. This process accelerates innovation but discourages capital accumulation, and because of the negative effect on economic growth through reducing capital accumulation, strengthening patent protection may then impede economic growth. This result contrasts with earlier studies where innovation is the sole driving force for economic growth. Moreover, in an open economy model where technologies are transferred and capital is imported from abroad, the strictest protection of patents enhances technology adoption from abroad but impedes capital accumulation, and thus, the relation derived between patent protection and output can be nonmonotone. In terms of implications, these findings may be able to partly explain the complex relation found by some empirical studies in this area.

Patent protection, capital accumulation, and economic growth

We investigate how the patent policy affects economic growth and social welfare based on an endogenous growth model with R&D activities. We show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is finite. Moreover, by introducing compulsory licensing, we also show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is not infinite even if the royalty rate can be controlled.

Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with productive government spending. In this model, the government can finance its costs through income tax and government debt and has a target level of government debt relative to the size of the economy. We show that there are two steady states. One is associated with high growth and the other with low growth. It is also shown that whether the government uses income taxes or government bonds makes the results differ significantly. In particular, an increase in government bonds reduces the growth rate in the high-growth steady state and raises the growth rate in the low-growth steady state. Conversely, an increase in the income tax rate reduces the growth rate in the low-growth steady state and there exists some tax rate that maximizes the growth rate in the high-growth steady state. Finally, the level of welfare in the low-growth steady state is lower than that in the high-growth steady state.

Tatsuro Iwaisako

Papers

Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model

Patent protection, capital accumulation, and economic growth

Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model

Debt policy rule, productive government spending, and multiple growth paths