This study examines the role of variations in occupational licensing policies in improving the quality of services provided to consumers and the effect of restrictive regulations on the prices of certain services and on the earnings of practitioners. Theory suggests that more restrictive licensing may raise prices and at the same time raise demand by reducing uncertainty about the quality of the services. This article uses unique data on the dental health of incoming Air Force personnel to analyze empirically the effects of varying licensing stringency among the states. It finds that tougher licensing does not improve outcomes, but it does raise prices for consumers and the earnings of practitioners. These results cast doubt on the principal public interest argument in favor of more stringent state licensing practices.

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Does regulation affect economic outcomes? the case of dentistry*

The enforcement of EU competition law in cartel cases : seeking effectiveness in divergence

Consignment contracts with cooperative programs and price discount mechanisms in a dynamic supply chain

Competition law and its enforcement have become necessary tools in the face of trade liberalisation.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of cross-border cartels. The global South is steadily
becoming aware of this. With the advent of globalisation and trade liberalisation, individual economies
have become intrinsically linked. Anti-competitive conduct in one territory may have an impact in
another territory. Therefore, an effective regional competition law framework complements trade
liberalisation, especially in light of the principal objective of the South-South regional economic
communities: the deepening of regional integration, in order to realise economic development and
alleviate poverty.
Cartel practices, such as, market allocation cartels, are in direct contradiction to this primary objective.
This is when enforcement collaborations in South-South regional economic communities becomes
crucial. The regional legal instruments of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the
East African Community, the Southern African Customs Union and the Southern African Development
Community make provision for enforcement collaborations among Member States. To facilitate
collaboration, regional competition authorities have been created to investigate, among other things,
cross-border cartels. Within these economic communities, there is a strong case for enforcement
collaborations, as evidence shows that the majority of the firms engaging in cartels are the so-called
Regional Multinational Corporations. They operate throughout the territories of Member States.
Additionally, the international nature of cartels, such as, private international cartels and export
cartels, provide an opportunity for South-South co-operation to be utilised. However, this co-operation
has not been utilised to the fullest extent, especially with reference to cross-border cartel activities.
This has been attributed to various factors, such as, institutional incapacities, resource austerity, the
absence of common procedural rules, the lack of adequate investigatory tools, and political ineptitude.
As a solution, this current study makes specific recommendations that are directed at enhancing the
effectiveness of South-South collaborations pertaining to cross-border cartel activities.

Competition law and cartel enforcement regimes in the global south: examining the effectiveness of co-operation in south-south regional trade agreements.

Shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses. Bork sees antitrust law as a microcosm which reflects the larger movements of our society, such as the tension between liberty and equality.

The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself

Cartel Sanctions and Deterrence

Competition at the Bar: The Correlation between the Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability of Practice

Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline

In this article, two enforcement officials at the Federal Trade Commission reexamine resale price maintenance in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp Commissioner Calvani and Mr Berg consider both antitrust law and economic policy in their review of the history of resale price maintenance; they point out the chronic inconsistencies to which this antitrust regime has been subject, and identify these same inconsistencies at work in Monsanto The authors set forth three theses with respect to Monsanto: first, that the Court intimated a willingness to reconsider at some future time the per se standard of illegality for resale price maintenance; second, that the Court recognized the continuing vitality of the Colgate doctrine, which had been seriously questioned in recent years; and, third, that the Monsanto Court unsuccessfully attempted to delineate a workable evidentiary standard applicable to communications between sellers and resellers when it is alleged that such communications constitute an illegal contract, combination, or consiracy under section one of the Sherman Act The authors suggest that, taken together, these elements in Monsanto display a doctrine at war with itself The authors conclude by examining the possible implications of the Monsanto decision for the future direction of the law of resale price maintenance Typically, antitrust issues do not generate widespread public interest; there is, however, a considerable amount of such interest in resale price maintenance,' as evidenced by numerous articles on the subject in newspapers and periodicals of general circulation2 This high level of

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Terry Calvani

Papers

Cartel Sanctions and Deterrence

Competition at the Bar: The Correlation between the Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability of Practice

Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline

Resale Price Maintenance After Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War With Itself