The literature on the role of ideology in congressional voting argues that congressional preferences are driven by a commitment to coherent sets of ideas and principles. These ideologies imply related positions on a variety of domestic and foreign policy issues. Using data on voting in the U.S. Senate between 1947 and 1993, we present evidence that although commitment to a liberal or conservative ideology is strongly related to senators' positions on foreign policy issues, this relationship is not stable over time. Conservatives tended to back "nationalist" policy positions prior to 1965, while liberals generally supported "internationalist" positions until 1963. After these dates, conservatives became strong supporters of internationalist positions while liberals moved toward a nationalist posture. This finding suggests that ideology should not be understood as a coherent set of ideas with consistent policy implications over time.

Timeless Principles or Today's Fashion? Testing the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate

Although foreign policy choices, especially on security questions, are often treated as autonomous state responses to international pressures, these events and conditions do not affect society in a uniform way. International conditions influence policy, but their implications depend on the interests of the domestic political faction controlling the state. Because decisions about military strategy and force structure are closely linked to the international balance of power, they offer an especially demanding test of this argument. This article offers evidence that Republican and Democratic presidents systematically differed on the allocation of resources within the Pentagon during the Cold War. Republicans directed spending toward strategic forces, while Democrats stressed conventional forces. Furthermore, although Soviet gains in relative nuclear capabilities influenced Democrats' decisions about strategic forces, they had little or no influence on Republican choices. These differences make sense in light...

Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending

Some states define their interests more broadly than others, looking beyond their immediate security and mobilizing their national wealth in pursuit of more ambitious goals. The most successful of these states come to be seen by others as major powers. Though major powers and states aspiring to attain this status are very important in world politics, relatively little explicit attention has been paid to the question of why some states expand their foreign policy ambitions, adopting what can be termed a major-power foreign policy. This article evaluates three explanations for this policy choice. Some international relations theory claims that potential power is itself a sufficient motivation for the adoption of major-power foreign policy. Other theorists suggest that some triggering condition is required, such as increasing international threat or expanding international economic interests. Evidence concerning the construction of military capabilities and diplomatic activism indicates that potential power ...

Who wants to be a major power? Explaining the expansion of foreign policy ambition:

Since the beginning of the modern state system only a few select nations have achieved great power status. But what can account for their rise? The presence of existing great powers would suggest that aspiring states should encounter formidable obstacles that would render their success implausible. In some cases extant great powers sought to counter the rise of a new peer, but the historical record also reveals that incumbents sometimes did not contest the rise of potential competitors. Thus, great powers have pursued two divergent strategies: contestation and nonintervention. How then do great powers decide on which policy to implement? This dissertation advances the argument that a great power’s military strategy is premised on its national interests. It argues that the reason incumbent powers rarely preempt the rise of aspiring powers is because of the low level of threat they pose to states. Incumbent great powers are far more concerned about contemporary rival powers since they possess the immediate capacity to undermine a state’s interests. The Preemptive Paradox: The Rise of Great Powers & Management of the International System by Jeffrey Philip Treistman B.A., University of Colorado, 2003 M.P.P., Harvard University, 2010 M.A., Syracuse University, 2012 Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. Syracuse University December 2017 © Jeffrey Philip Treistman

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The Preemptive Paradox: The Rise of Great Powers & Management of the International System

This lecture inquires into two existential positions that concern Robert Frost in an excerpt from his poem “Mending Wall.”

Tetsuya Kataoka

Papers

Defining the National Interest

Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor": Japan Debates Defense