Other affiliations: University of Oslo
Bio: Thomas Hegghammer is an academic researcher from Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The author has contributed to research in topics: Jihadism & Terrorism. The author has an hindex of 16, co-authored 42 publications receiving 1478 citations. Previous affiliations of Thomas Hegghammer include University of Oslo.
TL;DR: Hegghammer, Thomas as mentioned in this paper, explains variation in Western Jihadists' choice between domestic and foreign fighting between Jihadists and Jihadists in the Middle East and North Africa.
Abstract: Hegghammer, Thomas. Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. American Political Science Review 2013 ;Volum 107.(1) s. 1-15
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain the increase in transnational war volunteering as the product of a pan-Islamic identity movement that grew strong in the 1970s Arab world from elite competition among exiled Islamists in international Islamic organizations and Muslim regimes.
Abstract: Why has transnational war volunteering increased so dramatically in the Muslim world since 1980? Standard explanations, which emphasize US-Saudi support for the 1980s Afghan mujahideen, the growth of Islamism, or the spread of Wahhabism are insufficient The increase in transnational war volunteering is better explained as the product of a pan-Islamic identity movement that grew strong in the 1970s Arab world from elite competition among exiled Islamists in international Islamic organizations and Muslim regimes Seeking political relevance and increased budgets, Hijaz-based international activists propagated an alarmist discourse about external threats to the Muslim nation and established a global network of Islamic charities This “soft” pan-Islamic discourse and network enabled Arabs invested in the 1980s Afghanistan war to recruit fighters in the name of inter-Muslim solidarity The Arab-Afghan mobilization in turn produced a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, as a phenomenon partly di
•01 Apr 2010
TL;DR: The politics of pan-Islamism as mentioned in this paper, the classical jihadists, recruitment to the early jihad fronts, and the failure of the jihad in Arabia Conclusion: The failure of Jihad in Arabia
Abstract: Introduction 1. The politics of pan-Islamism 2. The classical jihadists 3. Recruitment to the early jihad fronts 4. Opportunities for global jihad 5. Al-Qaida and Saudi Arabia 6. Recruitment to al-Qaida 7. Post-9/11 Saudi Arabia 8. The Mujahidin on the Arabian Peninsula 9. Recruitment to the QAP 10. The failure of the jihad in Arabia Conclusion.
TL;DR: The authors examines the origin and legacy of the rebel group that stormed the great Mecca mosque in November 1979 and concludes that the rebels represented a radicalized faction of a large pietistic organization established in Medina in the mid-1960s under the name al-Jama a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM).
Abstract: This article examines the origin and legacy of the rebel group that stormed the great Mecca mosque in November 1979. Extensive fieldwork and new primary sources show that the rebels represented a radicalized faction of a large pietistic organization established in Medina in the mid–1960s under the name al–Jama a al–Salafiyya al–Muhtasiba (JSM). The rebel faction had broken with the mother organization in 1977 and developed into an apocalyptic sect under the leadership of Juhayman al–Utaybi, who spent two years as a fugitive in the desert before the attack. Although the rebellion was crushed, the early 1990s witnessed a resurgence of Juhayman's ideas in Saudi Arabia. The article argues that the JSM, the Mecca rebels, and their heirs represent a widely ignored undercurrent of Saudi Islamism. Pietistic and isolationist, this so–called rejectionist Islamism is intellectually and sociologically distinct from the two other strains of Saudi Islamism, namely, reformism and jihadism.
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: Weinstein this article describes Inside Rebellion as "an insightful account of the internal conflict of the Inside Rebellion Rebellion" and discusses the role of race relations in the book's success. But
Abstract: Jeremy M. Weinstein, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007 xx +402 pp. £43.00 ISBN 0-521-86077-6 (hardback); £16.99 ISBN 0-521-67797-1 (paperback) Inside Rebellion offers an insightful accoun...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors of 50c party posts vociferously argue for the government's side in political and policy debates are identified and analyzed, and the authors show that most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime.
Abstract: The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2 million people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called 50c party posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of most posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large-scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes.
01 Mar 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, the French political philosopher Olivier Roy presents an entirely different verdict: political Islam is a failure and even if Islamic fundamentalists take power in countries like Algeria, they will be unable to reshape economics and politics and, in the name of Islamic universalism, will express no more than nationalism or an even narrower agenda.
Abstract: For many Westerners, ours seems to be the era of the \"Islamic threat, \" with radical Muslims everywhere on the rise and on the march, remaking societies and altering the landscape of contemporary politics. In a powerful corrective to this view, the French political philosopher Olivier Roy presents an entirely different verdict: political Islam is a failure. Even if Islamic fundamentalists take power in countries like Algeria, they will be unable to reshape economics and politics and, in the name of \"Islamic universalism, \" will express no more than nationalism or an even narrower agenda. Despite all the rhetoric about an \"Islamic way, \" an \"Islamic economy, \" and an \"Islamic state, \" the realities of the Muslim world remain essentially unchanged. Roy demonstrates that the Islamism of today is still the Third Worldism of the 1960s: populist politics and mixed economies of laissez-faire for the rich and subsidies for the poor. In Roy's striking formulation, those marching today beneath Islam's green banners are same as the \"reds\" of yesterday, with similarly dim prospects of success. Roy has much to say about the sociology of radical Islam, about the set of ideas and assumptions at its core. He explains lucidly why Iran, for all the sound and fury of its revolution, has been unable to launch \"sister republics\" beyond its borders, and why the dream of establishing Islam as a \"third force\" in international relations remains a futile one. Richly informed, powerfully argued, and clearly written, this is a book that no one trying to understand Islamic fundamentalism can afford to overlook.