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Thomas Nyman

Researcher at Åbo Akademi University

Publications -  42
Citations -  1044

Thomas Nyman is an academic researcher from Åbo Akademi University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Memory corruption & Pointer (computer programming). The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 40 publications receiving 698 citations. Previous affiliations of Thomas Nyman include Aalto University & University of Helsinki.

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Proceedings ArticleDOI

C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software

TL;DR: Control-FLOW ATtestation (C-FLAT) as mentioned in this paper enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code, which is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

LO-FAT: Low-Overhead Control Flow ATtestation in Hardware

TL;DR: LO-FAT as mentioned in this paper is a hardware-based approach to control-flow attestation that leverages existing processor hardware features and commonly used IP blocks to enable efficient attestation without requiring software instrumentation.
Journal ArticleDOI

ASSURED: Architecture for Secure Software Update of Realistic Embedded Devices

TL;DR: ASSURED is a secure and scalable update framework for IoT that includes all stakeholders in a typical IoT update ecosystem, while providing end-to-end security between manufacturers and devices, and is considerably faster than current update mechanisms in realistic settings.
Posted Content

PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication

TL;DR: PARTS, an instrumentation framework that integrates PA-based defenses into the LLVM compiler and the GNU/Linux operating system is presented and it is shown that PARTS provides better protection than current solutions at a reasonable performance overhead.
Posted Content

C-FLAT: Control-FLow ATtestation for Embedded Systems Software

TL;DR: The design and implementation of Control-FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) is presented that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code, and its performance is evaluated using a real-world embedded application and against control- flow hijacking attacks.