The American capitalist class is hypothesized to differ along an axis of inner group centrality, defined as the span of influence over major business firms. Those who serve as corporate executives and sit on boards of directors of several large corporations are at the center of the inner group, while businessmen who oversee only a single large firm are on the periphery. One expects inner group members to be disproportionately recruited from among wealthy individuals with large corporate assets and executives employed in financial institutions. It is hypothesized that, compared with other capitalist class members, inner group members will tend to have 1) stronger internal social cohesion, 2) greater influence on public and private decision-making bodies, and 3) a more unified political consciousness and one more oriented toward general class interests. Drawing on a subset of businessmen (1,307) responding to a 1968 national probability survey of college and university trustees, support is found for the prediction that the inner group, recruited from the wealthy and financial institutions, is relatively cohesive and influential. However, the results contradict the prediction on political consciousness, with inner group ideology differing little from that of the remainder of the class. It is suggested that the inner group may play a limited role in unifying and controlling the business community but that it does not provide a means for the integration and promotion of general class interests.

The Inner Group of The American Capitalist Class

Numerous network studies demonstrate that interlocking directors unite corporations in the United States into a tight-knit corporate community (e.g., Sonquist and Koenig, 1975; Mariolis, 1975; Mizruchi, 1982). In addition, nonnetwork studies of foundations, universities, and other nonprofit organizations suggest that corporate officers and directors play a large role in the governance of such institutions (e.g., Hartnett, 1969; Dye, 1976; Useem et al., 1976; Salzman and Domhoff, 1980; Useem, 1981). However, there are no studies that cast light on the structural position of nonprofit institutions in relation to the well-established corporate network.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1170840.pdf

Nonprofit Organizations and the Corporate Community

Beginning with the work of C. Wright Mills (1956), a considerable amount of empirical evidence has been developed by power structure researchers on the large numbers of corporate leaders who go into major positions in non-profit organizations and the federal government (e.g., Domhoff, 1967, 1970; Freitag, 1975; Mintz, 1975). However, there persists a tendency among many social scientists to minimize the degree of this interchange, and to ignore or explain away what is reported in systematic studies. The degree of interchange between corporations and government is especially sensitive to these problems. Involvement of former corporate executives in government is sometimes explained away by claiming that a high degree of interchange only occurred during the Eisenhower Administration (e.g., Parsons, 1957). More recently it has been claimed

Corporations, the Civic Sector, and Government: Do They Interlock?:

Neo-Marxist theory and corporate social expenditures

The elite university and corporate capital

It is generally agreed that higher education performs essential services for American business. Scientific research and a properly educated labor force are seen as decisive for the growth and profitability of industry (Gordon and Howell, 1959; Patrick and Eells, 1969). Analysts divide on whether the interests of institutions other than business have been equally well served by the college system. Structural-functionalists and kindred analysts lean toward the conclusion that higher education contributes to the collective interests of the entire society (Parsons and Platt, 1973), while Marxists generally conclude that business is disproportionately benefitted (Miliband, 1969; Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Nonetheless, both theoretical traditions emphasize the role of higher education in meeting the knowledge and training demands of modern industry. While education may be a &dquo;vital working tool of business&dquo; (Patrick and Eells, 1969: 22), business has also been vital to the support of higher education. Business has played an important role in shaping public opinion and legislation favorable to the college system, and it has been a major source of private contributions. It would appear that a central feature of the relationship between business and higher education is an exchange of essential re-

Thomas S. Moore

Papers

Class and Corporate Relations with the Private College System