Thomas Shrimpton

TL;DR: It is unlikely that bandwidth-efficient, general-purpose TA countermeasures can ever provide the type of security targeted in prior work, and it is shown that nine known countermeasures are vulnerable to simple attacks that exploit coarse features of traffic.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider basic notions of security for cryptographic hash functions: collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second-preimage resistance and give seven different definitions that correspond to these three underlying ideas, and then work out all of the implications and separations among these seven definitions within the concrete-security, provable-security framework.

TL;DR: In this paper, a formal and quantitative treatment of the 64 most basic hash function constructions considered by Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle is provided.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider basic notions of security for cryptographic hash functions: collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second-preimage resistance and give seven different definitions that correspond to these three underlying ideas, and then work out all of the implications and separations among these seven definitions within the concrete-security, provable-security framework.

TL;DR: It is suggested that key-wrap's goal is security in the sense of deterministic authenticated-encryption (DAE), and it is shown that a DAE scheme with a vector-valued header, such as SIV, directly realizes this goal.