In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4— our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4— not in the framework of Kirpke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability.

On an intuitionistic modal logic

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction- and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hilbert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of \({\square\,A}\) from A.

Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic

This is a survey of {\lambda}-calculi that, through the Curry-Howard isomorphism, correspond to constructive modal logics. We cover the prehistory of the subject and then concentrate on the developments that took place in the 1990s and early 2000s. We discuss logical aspects, modal {\lambda}-calculi, and their categorical semantics. The logics underlying the calculi surveyed are constructive versions of K, K4, S4, and LTL.

The Many Worlds of Modal λ−calculi: I. Curry−Howard for Necessity‚ Possibility and Time

We present a multi-context focused sequent calculus whose derivations are in bijective correspondence with normal natural deductions in the propositional fragment of the intuitionistic modal logic IS4 . This calculus, suitable for the enumeration of normal proofs, is the starting point for the development of a sequent calculus-based bidirectional decision procedure for propositional IS4 . In this system, relevant derived inference rules are constructed in a forward direction prior to proof search, while derivations constructed using these derived rules are searched over in a backward direction. We also present a variant which searches directly over normal natural deductions. Experimental results show that on most problems, the bidirectional prover is competitive with both conventional backward provers using loop-detection and inverse method provers, significantly outperforming them in a number of cases.

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Bidirectional Decision Procedures for the Intuitionistic Propositional Modal Logic IS4

Various conceptual approaches to the notion of information can currently be traced in the literature in logic and formal epistemology. A main issue of disagreement is the attribution of truthfulness to informational data, the so called Veridicality Thesis (Floridi 2005). The notion of Epistemic Constructive Information (Primiero 2007) is one of those rejecting VT. The present paper develops a formal framework for ECI. It extends on the basic approach of Artemov’s logic of proofs (Artemov 1994), representing an epistemic logic based on dependent justifications, where the definition of information relies on a strict distinction from factual truth. The definition obtained by comparison with a Normal Modal Logic translates a constructive logic for “becoming informed”: its distinction from the logic of “being informed”—which internalizes truthfulness—is essential to a general evaluation of information with respect to truth. The formal disentanglement of these two logics, and the description of the modal version of the former as a weaker embedding into the latter, allows for a proper understanding of the Veridicality Thesis with respect to epistemic states defined in terms of information.

An epistemic logic for becoming informed

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Thomas W. Satre

Papers

Natural deduction rules for modal logics.