T
Timothy W. Crawford
Researcher at Boston College
Publications - 14
Citations - 303
Timothy W. Crawford is an academic researcher from Boston College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Politics & Humanitarian intervention. The author has an hindex of 7, co-authored 14 publications receiving 289 citations. Previous affiliations of Timothy W. Crawford include Nanyang Technological University & Brookings Institution.
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Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the British pivotal deterrence policy during the July crisis and the effects it had on the behavior of the major European powers (France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia).
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Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics
TL;DR: The wedge strategies that are likely to have significant effects use selective accommodation (concessions, compensations, and other inducements) to detach and neutralize potential adversaries.
Book
Gambling on humanitarian intervention : moral hazard, rebellion and civil war
TL;DR: Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention as discussed by the authors explores whether the emerging norm of intervention backfires in conflicts such as Kosovo, exacerbating the ethnic cleansing and killing of innocent civilians, and concludes that future interventions mitigate violence, as intended, rather than tragically worsening it.
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Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed
TL;DR: In the early 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army's (KLA) insurgency in Kosovo had provoked Belgrade's ham-fisted repression tactics, and the Serb military police (MUP) and the Yugoslav National Army (VJ) killed innocent civilians and loosed a flood of refugees wherever they went as discussed by the authors.
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Moral hazard, intervention and internal war: A conceptual analysis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors unpack and examine the descriptive and causal logic of the concept of moral hazard, which suggests that domestic groups which would not otherwise resort to political violence may be encouraged to do so by the prospect of outside support.