Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

The four Visegrad states — Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia (until 1993 Czechoslovakia) and Hungary — form a compact area between Germany and Austria in the west and the states of the former USSR in the east. They are bounded by the Baltic in the north and the Danube river in the south. They are cut by the Sudeten and Carpathian mountain ranges, which divide Poland off from the other states. Poland is an extension of the North European plain and like the latter is drained by rivers that flow from south to north west — the Oder, the Vlatava and the Elbe, the Vistula and the Bug. The Danube is the great exception, flowing from its source eastward, turning through two 90-degree turns to end up in the Black Sea, forming the barrier and often the political frontier between central Europe and the Balkans. Hungary to the east of the Danube is also an open plain. The region is historically and culturally part of western Europe, but its eastern Marches now represents a vital strategic zone between Germany and the core of the European Union to the west and the Russian zone to the east.

Economy and Society

The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy: By the World Bank. (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993. 389 pp. $19.95, paper.)

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing 'insurance' to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

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Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases

1. Introduction 2. How long should constitutions endure? 3. Conceptualizing constitutions 4. A positive theory of constitutional endurance 5. Empirical implications of the theory: identifying risks to constitutional life 6. An epidemiological analysis of constitutional mortality 7. Contrasts in constitutional endurance 8. Contexts of chronic failure 9. Conclusion.

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The Endurance of National Constitutions

1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa 2. Of judges and generals: security courts under authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile Anthony Pereira 3. Administrative law and judicial control of agents in authoritarian regimes Tom Ginsburg 4. Singapore: the exception that proves rules matter Gordon Silverstein 5. Judicial independence in authoritarian regimes: insights from Chile Lisa Hilbink 6. Law and resistance in authoritarian states: the Egyptian case Tamir Moustafa and Simon Fraser 7. Courts out of context: the authoritarian sources of judicial failure in Chile (1973-90) and Argentina (1976-83) Robert Barros 8. An authoritarian enclave? The supreme court in Mexico's emerging democracy Beatriz Magaloni 9. The institutional diffusion of courts in China: evidence from survey data Pierre Landry 10. Building judicial independence in semi-democracies: Uganda and Tanzania Jennifer Widner 11. Judicial power in authoritarian states: the Russian experience Peter Solomon 12. Courts in a semi-democratic/authoritarian regime: the judicialization of Turkish and Iranian politics Hootan Shambayati 13. Judicial systems and economic development Hilton Root and Karen May 14. Courts in authoritarian regimes Martin Shapiro.

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Rule by law : the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes

The relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is much debated in the literature on judicial politics. Some studies find no relationship between the formal rules governing the structure of the judiciary and de facto judicial independence, while others find a tight correlation. This article sets out to reassess the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence using a new theory and an expanded data set. De jure institutional protections, we argue, do not work in isolation but work conjunctively, so that particular combinations of protections are more likely to be effective than others. We find that rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the only de jure protections that actually enhance judicial independence in practice and that they work conjunctively. This effect is strongest in authoritarian regimes and in contexts with checks on executive authority.

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Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter

It is often asserted that the United States’ Constitution is the world’s most difficult to amend. But how do we really know this? This paper unpacks the tricky methodological issues in measuring flexibility cross-nationally. We find that the various metrics of amendment difficulty offered in the literature are poorly correlated, suggesting potential validity problems. This illustrates a general challenge of institutional accounts of constitutional behavior. Institutions surely matter, but institutional explanations are, like all explanations, always partial. For some matters, behavior may be more driven by political or social factors that can overcome the powerful force of institutional incentives. We argue that amendment difficulty is an example of just such a matter, and provide an alternative theory of amendment difficulty, the key element of which is amendment culture. Drawing on new data, we develop a simple indicator of amendment culture and show empirically that this does a better job of explaining observed patterns of amendment within constitutional systems than do any of the institutional indices or variables on offer. Our article thus offers both a critique of the existing literature and a way toward understanding why constitutional systems vary in their rates of amendment.

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Tom Ginsburg

Papers

Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases

The Endurance of National Constitutions

Rule by law : the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes

Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter

Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty