T
Torsten Persson
Researcher at Stockholm University
Publications - 234
Citations - 33322
Torsten Persson is an academic researcher from Stockholm University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Politics & Fiscal policy. The author has an hindex of 78, co-authored 232 publications receiving 31934 citations. Previous affiliations of Torsten Persson include University of Copenhagen & Harvard University.
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Book
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini +1 more
TL;DR: The authors combine the best of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science, and propose a unified approach to the field of political economics, and identify the main outstanding problems.
Book
Is inequality harmful for growth
Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a theoretical model for the relationship between inequality and economic growth is proposed, and the model implications are supported by the evidence that both historical panel data and post-war cross-sectional data indicate a significant and large negative relation between inequalities and growth.
Book
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini +1 more
TL;DR: The Economic Effects of Constitutions as discussed by the authors ) is an empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy, taking recent theoretical findings as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts, and find that presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits.
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Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
TL;DR: The authors show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future, if the conservative government is more stubborn (in a particular sense) than the succeeding government.
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Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
TL;DR: In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage as discussed by the authors, which helps the voters elicit information and also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances.