https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.159162

Suitability of aircraft wastewater for pathogen detection and public health surveillance

Since its declaration as a pandemic in March 2020, SARS-CoV-2 has infected more than 217 million people worldwide and despite mild disease in the majority of the cases, more than 4.5 million cases of COVID-19-associated death have been reported as of September 2021. The question whether recovery from COVID-19 results in prevention of reinfection can be answered with a “no” since cases of reinfections have been reported. The more important question is whether during SARS-CoV-2 infection, a protective immunity is built and maintained afterwards in a way which protects from possibly severe courses of disease in case of a reinfection. A similar question arises with respect to vaccination: as of September 2021, globally, more than 5.2 billion doses of vaccines have been administered. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to study the cellular and humoral immunity towards SARS-CoV-2 in a longitudinal manner. In this study, reconvalescent COVID-19 patients have been followed up for more than one year after SARS-CoV-2 infection to characterize in detail the long-term humoral as well as cellular immunity. Both SARS-CoV-2-specific T cells and antibodies could be detected for a period of more than one year after infection, indicating that the immune protection established during initial infection is maintained and might possibly protect from severe disease in case of reinfection or infection with novel emerging variants. Moreover, these data demonstrate the opportunity for immunotherapy of hospitalized COVID-19 patients via adoptive transfer of functional antiviral T cells isolated from reconvalescent individuals.

Long-Lasting Immunity Against SARS-CoV-2: Dream or Reality?

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a contagious disease caused by a new coronavirus called SARS-CoV-2. The first case was discovered in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, raising concerns about the emergence of a new coronavirus that poses a significant public health risk. The objective of this study, based on data collected and sequenced at the Institut de Recherche en Santé, de Surveillance Epidémiologique et de Formations (IRESSEF), is to characterize the pandemic evolution, establish a relationship between the different strains in each wave, and finally determine the phylodynamic evolution of the pandemic, utilizing microreact simulations. The study shows that SARS-CoV-2 strains have evolved over time and the variability of the virus is characterized by sequencing during each wave, as is its contagiousness (the speed at which it spreads). The pandemic has spread at a rate of 44.34 cases/week during the first wave. Twelve weeks later it has risen to 185.33 cases/week during the second wave. Twenty-three weeks into the pandemic, the numbers have reached 681.77 cases/week during the third wave. During the fourth wave, the rate of infection was found to decrease slightly at 646 cases/week between early December 2021 and mid-January 2022. Data collected during this study also provided us with a geographical distribution of COVID-19, indicating that the epidemic started in Dakar before spreading inland.

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Evolution of SARS-CoV-2 Strains in Senegal: From a Wild Wuhan Strain to the Omicron Variant

A newly emerged respiratory viral disease called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) is also known as pandemic coronavirus disease (COVID-19). This pandemic has resulted an unprecedented global health crisis and devastating impact on several sectors of human lives and economies. Fortunately, the average case fatality ratio for SARS-CoV-2 is below 2%, much lower than that estimated for MERS (34%) and SARS (11%). However, COVID-19 has a much higher transmissibility rate, as evident from the constant increase in the count of infections worldwide. This article explores the reasons behind how COVID-19 was able to cause a global pandemic crisis. The current outbreak scenario and causes of rapid global spread are examined using recent developments in the literature, epidemiological features relevant to public health awareness, and critical perspective of risk assessment and mitigation strategies. Effective pandemic risk mitigation measures have been established and amended against COVID-19 diseases, but there is still much scope for upgrading execution and coordination among authorities in terms of organizational leadership’s commitment and diverse range of safety measures, including administrative control measures, engineering control measures, and personal protective equipment (PPE). The significance of containment interventions against the COVID-19 pandemic is now well established; however, there is a need for its effective execution across the globe, and for the improvement of the performance of risk mitigation practices and suppression of future pandemic crises.

COVID-19 Pandemic: Public Health Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation Strategies

Background Public health and social measures (PHSM) against COVID-19 in Japan involve requesting the public to voluntarily reduce social contact; these measures are not legally binding. The effectiveness of such PHSM has been questioned with emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant (B.1.1.7), which exhibited elevated transmissibility. Materials and Methods We investigated the epidemic dynamics during the fourth epidemic wave in Japan from March to June 2021 involving pre-emergency measures and declaration of a state of emergency (SoE). We estimated the effective reproduction number (Rt) before and after these interventions, and then analyzed the relationship between lower Rt values and each PHSM. Results With implementation of pre-emergency measures (PEM) in 16 prefectures, the Rt was estimated to be < 1 in six prefectures; its average relative reduction ranged from 2 to 19%. During the SoE, 8 of 10 prefectures had an estimated Rt < 1, and the average relative reduction was 26%–39%. No single intervention was identified that uniquely resulted in an Rt value < 1. Conclusion An SoE can substantially reduce the Rt and may be required to curb a surge in cases caused by future SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern with elevated transmissibility. More customized interventions did not reduce the Rt value to < 1 in this study, but that may be partly attributable to the greater transmissibility of the Alpha variant.

Assessing Public Health and Social Measures Against COVID-19 in Japan From March to June 2021

Association of public health interventions and COVID-19 incidence in Vietnam, January to December 2020.

International air travel plays an important role in the global spread of SARS-CoV-2, and tracing of close contacts is an integral part of the public health response to COVID-19. We aimed to assess the timeliness of contact tracing among airline passengers arriving in Vietnam on flights containing COVID-19 cases and investigated factors associated with timeliness of contact tracing. We included data from 2228 passengers on 22 incoming flights between 2 and 19 March 2020. Contact tracing duration was assessed separately for the time between the date of index case confirmation and date of contact tracing initiation (interval I), and the date of contact tracing initiation and completion (interval II). We used log-rank tests and multivariable Poisson regression models to identify factors associated with timeliness. The median duration of interval I and interval II was one (IQR: 1–2) and 3 days (IQR: 2–5), respectively. The contact tracing duration was shorter for passengers from flights where the index case was identified through mandatory testing directly upon arrival (median = 4; IQR: 3–5) compared to flights with index case detection through self-presentation at health facilities after arrival (median = 7; IQR: 5–8) (p-value = 0.018). Cumulative hazards for successful tracing were higher for Vietnamese nationals compared to non-Vietnamese nationals (p < 0.001). Contact tracing among flight passengers in the early stage of the COVID-19 epidemic in Vietnam was timely though delays occurred on high workload days. Mandatory SARS-CoV-2 testing at arrival may reduce contact tracing duration and should be considered as an integrated screening tool for flight passengers from high-risk areas when entering low-transmission settings with limited contact tracing capacity. We recommend a standardized risk-based contact tracing approach for flight passengers during the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic.

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Tu Anh Tran

Papers

Association of public health interventions and COVID-19 incidence in Vietnam, January to December 2020.

Timeliness of contact tracing among flight passengers during the COVID-19 epidemic in Vietnam.