Showing papers by "Venkataraman Bhaskar published in 2000"
Book Chapter•
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, the effect of privatization on employment in the Bangladeshi jute textile industry has been analyzed and the extent of employment reduction has been substantially greater among clerical workers and managers as compared to manual workers.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of privatization upon employment in the Bangladeshi jute textile industry. Privatization was partia and the selection of mills which were privatized was not based on current economic performance. This provides us with a panel data set which permits reliable estimates of the effects of ownership on employment and output. Privatization has reduced employment of all categories of permanent workers significantly, but the extent of employment reduction has been substantially greater among clerical workers and managers as compared to manual workers. This implies that public sector excess employment benefited white-collar workers, who were both better off and better educated, and suggests that public sector behaviour was clientelist rather than welfarist.
83 citations
TL;DR: This work analyzes the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over Equilibria—the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk–dove game are key examples.
55 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that even if we have efficient product choices for a fixed number of firms, one always has excessive entry into the ranks of lobbyists in free entry equilibrium.
Abstract: We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. Although perfect price discrimination ensures efficient output decisions given product characteristics, coordination failures may prevent efficiency in the choice of product characteristics. More fundamentally, even if we have efficient product choices for a fixed number of firms, one always has excessive entry in free entry equilibrium. Our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation including location models as well as representative consumer models of the demand for variety. These results also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entry and imply that one has excessive entry into the ranks of lobbyists.
8 citations