Vagueness in Reality

My project is primarily expository and context setting. I also want to correct a few misunderstandings that Russell or I or others may have had. Although I flag a few issues in my own voice, I am trying, on the whole, to present my discussion and analysis in a way that is recognizably Russellian. Part I sets out the logical/semantical background to “On Denoting”, including an exposition of Russell’s views in Principles of Mathematics and speculation about how the search for a solution to the contradiction Russell had discovered in Frege’s logic might have motivated a new treatment of denoting. I try to locate Russell’s earlier views in relation to Frege’s, and to frame the new treatment of denoting in opposition to these earlier views. In Part II, I begin my examination of “On Denoting” itself, the logical, semantical, and epistemological theses it proposes. I start with an analysis of Russell’s use of “denoting phrase” and follow with an extended discussion of Russell’s views on knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. I try to show that the discomfiture between Russell’s semantical and epistemological commitments begins as far back as 1903. Part II completes my review of the first two paragraphs of “On Denoting”. I hope to write a sequel.

Reading "On Denoting" on its Centenary

In this essay I defend six theses about pleasure: 1. 'Pleasure' has one English antonym: 'unpleasure'. 2. Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. 3. The \" hedonic calculus \" is a joke. 4. An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. 5. Pleasures in bad company are still good. 6. Higher pleasures aren't pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn't be higher). I devote one section to each thesis. The sections are fairly self-contained and may be read separately, so read what looks interesting. The first section is merely terminological, but the others defend substantive claims about pleasure. Sometimes philosophers forget how widely 'pleasure' is used. Perry's little-read book, now almost forty years old, can remind us. Perry says that 'pleasure' can ordinarily refer to: states of consciousness; innocent diversions; sensual indulgences; what one chooses; and sources of pleasure. i I'll use 'pleasure' to refer to states of consciousness. More specifically, I'll use it to 2 refer to states of consciousness that are desirable merely as feeling. Some philosophers have found this usage unnatural. Mayerfeld, for instance, echoes Sidgwick in his complaint that \" [i]n everyday talk, pleasure tends to mean gratification of the senses. \" ii He evidently has in mind Perry's third use of 'pleasure' (\" sensual indulgences \"), but the first is also circulating. Perry says that 'pleasure' lacks a strict antonym. iii And indeed, philosophers have contrasted pleasure with various things, none of them quite right. 'Unhappiness' is too narrow. It suggests a non-transient state with important emotional and cognitive elements. So someone who stubs their toe gets the opposite of pleasure but need not be unhappy. 'Displeasure' has the defect of connoting disapproval. It is the antonym, not of pleasure, but of being pleased. Those who think that pleasures essentially involve an attitude towards a sensation won't mind the connotation. iv However, a true antonym of 'pleasure' should be neutral on this issue, since 'pleasure' is. Ethicists have traditionally spoken of \" pleasure and pain, \" but the differences between them are well known. 'Pleasure' includes the greatest array of positive experiences, but 'pain' ordinarily means \" physical pain \" and thus excludes anxiety, humiliation, terror, and so on. 'Pain' typically excludes some bad physical experiences as well, such as itches, aches and exhaustion. Moreover, if states are of the right phenomenological type, we normally call them \" painful \" even …

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Six Theses About Pleasure

.............................................................................................ii Dedication...........................................................................................iv Acknowledgments.................................................................................v Vita...................................................................................................vii List of Figures...................................................................................... xiii PART I: THE QUINE-PUTNAM INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENT The Justifiability of Believing in the Existence of Mathematical Objects General Synopsis.................................................................................. 1 Chapter Summaries................................................................................ 2 1. The Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument........................................... 3 1.1 Overview.............................................................................. 3 1.2 The Argument........................................................................ 4 1.3 The Premisses........................................................................ 6 1.3.1 The Acceptability of Current Science Thesis........................... 6 1.3.2 The Doxastic Commitment Thesis........................................ 11 1.3.3 The Quantificational Criterion of Ontological Commitment.......... 16 1.3.4 The Quantificational Indispensability Thesis........................... 26 1.4 Summary.............................................................................. 27 2. The Case for Quinean Naturalism ..........................................................29 2.1 Overview.............................................................................. 29 2.2 What is Naturalism? ................................................................. 30 2.2.1 Step One: The Negative Step............................................. 31 2.2.2 Step Two: The Positive Step.............................................. 32 ix 2.3 The Historical Argument for Naturalism.......................................... 33 2.3.1 Step One: Abandoning the Goal of First Philosophy...................34 2.3.2 Step Two: Re-envisioning the Goal of Philosophy.....................41 2.3.3 Summing Up the Historical Argument for Naturalism................. 42 2.4 The Semantic Argument for Naturalism.......................................... 43 2.4.1 The First Source: Meaning Holism....................................... 43 2.4.2 The Second Source: Unregenerate Realism.............................. 47 2.5 Reflecting on the Naturalized Indispensability Argument...................... 49 3. The Argument for Radical Confirmational Holism....................................... 51 3.1 Overview.............................................................................. 51 3.2 Introduction........................................................................... 52 3.3 The Circularity Argument Against Analyticity................................. 53 3.4 Induction on the History of Philosophy .......................................... 58 3.5 The Argument from the Indeterminacy of Translation.......................... 61 3.6 A Brief Interlude..................................................................... 62 3.7 The Argument from Testability to Irrefutability to Vulnerability.............. 63 3.8 The Inductive Revisability Argument............................................. 70 3.8.1 The Rejection of Geometric Laws: General Relativity and the Rejection of the Parallel Postulate........ 74 3.8.2 The Rejection of Logical Laws: Rejecting the Law of Excluded Middle and the Law of Non-Contradiction....................................... 76 3.9 The Case for Sheltering Mathematics............................................. 77 3.10 Summary.............................................................................. 79 4. Contra Naturalism and the Doxastic Commitment Thesis............................... 80 4.1 Overview.............................................................................. 80 4.2 Introduction........................................................................... 80 4.3 Acceptance for Scientific Purposes................................................ 82 4.4 The Objection........................................................................ 84 4.5 The Naturalist’s Reply............................................................... 87 4.6 The Self-Exemption of Naturalism................................................ 90 4.7 Summing up the Case Against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument....................................92 4.8 Appendix: Colyvan’s Analysis of the Quine-Putnam Argument............. 95

W. D. Hart

Papers

Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example