Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques

With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...

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Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

In a seminal paper, Garrett Hardin argued in 1968 that users of a commons are caught in an inevitable process that leads to the destruction of the resources on which they depend. This article discusses new insights about such problems and the conditions most likely to favor sustainable uses of common-pool resources. Some of the most difficult challenges concern the management of large-scale resources that depend on international cooperation, such as fresh water in international basins or large marine ecosystems. Institutional diversity may be as important as biological diversity for our long-term survival.

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Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and Poverty

Contemporary research on the outcomes of diverse institutional arrangements for governing common-pool resources (CPRs ) and public goods at multiple scales builds on classical economic theory while developing new theory to explain phenomena that do not fit in a dichotomous world of “the market” and “the state.” Scholars are slowly shifting from positing simple systems to using more complex frameworks, theories, and models to understand the diversity of puzzles and problems facing humans interacting in contemporary societies. The humans we study have complex motivational structures and establish diverse private-for-profit, governmental, and com munity institutional arrangements that operate at multiple scales to generate productive and inno vative as well as destructive and perverse outcomes ( Douglass C. North 1990, 2005 ). In this article, I will describe the intellectual journey that I have taken the last half century from when I began graduate studies in the late 1950s. The early efforts to understand the poly centric water industry in California were formative for me. In addition to working with Vincent Ostrom and Charles M. Tiebout as they formulated the concept of polycentric systems for gov erning metropolitan areas, I studied the efforts of a large group of private and public water producers facing the problem of an overdrafted groundwater basin on the coast and watching saltwater intrusion threaten the possibility of long term use. Then, in the 1970s, I participated with colleagues in the study of polycentric police industries serving US metropolitan areas to find that the dominant theory underlying massive reform proposals was incorrect. Metropolitan areas served by a combination of large and small producers could achieve economies of scale in the production of some police services and avoid diseconomies of scale in the production of others. These early empirical studies led over time to the development of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. A common framework consistent with game theory enabled us to undertake a variety of empirical studies including a meta-analysis of a large number of existing case studies on common-pool resource systems around the world. Carefully designed experimental studies in the lab have enabled us to test precise combinations of structural vari ables to find that isolated, anonymous individuals overharvest from common-pool resources. Simply allowing communication, or “cheap talk,” enables participants to reduce overharvest ing and increase joint payoffs contrary to game theoretical predictions. Large studies of irrigation systems in Nepal and forests around the world challenge the presumption that governments always do a better job than users in organizing and protecting important resources.

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Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems

An institutional analysis approach: Findings from the NIIS on irrigation performance

Purpose – Effective irrigation management hinges upon effective collective action among farmers and irrigation managers. The purpose of this study is to examine how the institutional design of irrigation agency affects the incentives and ability of irrigation managers to do a conscientious job and to relate to farmers in managing irrigation, and hence affects irrigation performance.Design/methodology/approach – This study compares the Department of Irrigation (DOI) in Nepal and the Irrigation Associations (IAs) in Taiwan. Based upon extensive fieldwork undertaken in the two countries, this study identifies the opportunities and constraints embedded in the institutional designs of the agencies, and analyzes their effects on the behavior of irrigation managers.Findings – The two irrigation agencies are designed upon very different conceptions of how the provision and production of irrigation can be organized. The DOI is built upon the premises of top‐down control, a reliance on technical knowledge, professi...

Designing institutions for irrigation management: Comparing irrigation agencies in Nepal and Taiwan

Irrigation sector reform in Asia: from 'participation with patronage' to 'empowerment with accountability'.

Paper presented at the Conference on Asian Irrigation in Transition: Responding to the Challenges Ahead, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand, 22-23 April 2002

https://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/assessment/files_new/publications/Workshop%20Papers/Bangkok_2002_Molle.pdf

The closure of the Chao Phraya river basin in Thailand: its causes, consequences, and policy implications.

Current research on policy advocacy relies exclusively on established regimes where instability is largely contained. Using the harbour protection advocacy in Hong Kong as an exploratory case, the article documents how conservationists exploited the unique opportunities arising from the transfer of sovereignty to advance heritage protection policy. Three new strategic choices in policy advocacy are identified. First, policy advocates strategically switched between issue frames instead of becoming strongly identified with any issue frame. Second, they avoided prolonged involvement by pursuing modest, programme-level adjustments. Third, they circumvented the restrictions on scope and focus by creating new venues outside of the policy subsystem.

Wai Fung Lam

Papers

An institutional analysis approach: Findings from the NIIS on irrigation performance

Designing institutions for irrigation management: Comparing irrigation agencies in Nepal and Taiwan

Irrigation sector reform in Asia: from 'participation with patronage' to 'empowerment with accountability'.

The closure of the Chao Phraya river basin in Thailand: its causes, consequences, and policy implications.

Policy Advocacy in Transitioning Regimes: Comparative Lessons from the Case of Harbour Protection in Hong Kong