Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Phd by thesis

Models for the processes by which ideas and influence propagate through a social network have been studied in a number of domains, including the diffusion of medical and technological innovations, the sudden and widespread adoption of various strategies in game-theoretic settings, and the effects of "word of mouth" in the promotion of new products. Recently, motivated by the design of viral marketing strategies, Domingos and Richardson posed a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes: if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new product or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions, which set of individuals should we target?We consider this problem in several of the most widely studied models in social network analysis. The optimization problem of selecting the most influential nodes is NP-hard here, and we provide the first provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms. Using an analysis framework based on submodular functions, we show that a natural greedy strategy obtains a solution that is provably within 63% of optimal for several classes of models; our framework suggests a general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms for these types of influence problems in social networks.We also provide computational experiments on large collaboration networks, showing that in addition to their provable guarantees, our approximation algorithms significantly out-perform node-selection heuristics based on the well-studied notions of degree centrality and distance centrality from the field of social networks.

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Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This tutorial is concerned with a comprehensive introduction to the research area of learning to rank for information retrieval. In the first part of the tutorial, we will introduce three major approaches to learning to rank, i.e., the pointwise, pairwise, and listwise approaches, analyze the relationship between the loss functions used in these approaches and the widely-used IR evaluation measures, evaluate the performance of these approaches on the LETOR benchmark datasets, and demonstrate how to use these approaches to solve real ranking applications. In the second part of the tutorial, we will discuss some advanced topics regarding learning to rank, such as relational ranking, diverse ranking, semi-supervised ranking, transfer ranking, query-dependent ranking, and training data preprocessing. In the third part, we will briefly mention the recent advances on statistical learning theory for ranking, which explain the generalization ability and statistical consistency of different ranking methods. In the last part, we will conclude the tutorial and show several future research directions.

/pdf/learning-to-rank-for-information-retrieval-2q6t3viyug.pdf

Learning to Rank for Information Retrieval

We define a general framework for a large class of combinatorial multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problems, where subsets of base arms with unknown distributions form super arms. In each round, a super arm is played and the base arms contained in the super arm are played and their outcomes are observed. We further consider the extension in which more base arms could be probabilistically triggered based on the outcomes of already triggered arms. The reward of the super arm depends on the outcomes of all played arms, and it only needs to satisfy two mild assumptions, which allow a large class of nonlinear reward instances. We assume the availability of an offline (α β)-approximation oracle that takes the means of the outcome distributions of arms and outputs a super arm that with probability β generates an α fraction of the optimal expected reward. The objective of an online learning algorithm for CMAB is to minimize (α β)-approximation regret, which is the difference in total expected reward between the αβ fraction of expected reward when always playing the optimal super arm, and the expected reward of playing super arms according to the algorithm. We provide CUCB algorithm that achieves O(log n) distribution-dependent regret, where n is the number of rounds played, and we further provide distribution-independent bounds for a large class of reward functions. Our regret analysis is tight in that it matches the bound of UCB1 algorithm (up to a constant factor) for the classical MAB problem, and it significantly improves the regret bound in an earlier paper on combinatorial bandits with linear rewards. We apply our CMAB framework to two new applications, probabilistic maximum coverage (PMC) for online advertising and social in uence maximization for viral marketing, both having nonlinear reward structures. In particular, application to social in uence maximization requires our extension on probabilistically triggered arms.

/pdf/combinatorial-multi-armed-bandit-and-its-extension-to-2b8bkaukw1.pdf

Combinatorial multi-armed bandit and its extension to probabilistically triggered arms

We study the combinatorial pure exploration (CPE) problem in the stochastic multi-armed bandit setting, where a learner explores a set of arms with the objective of identifying the optimal member of a decision class, which is a collection of subsets of arms with certain combinatorial structures such as size-K subsets, matchings, spanning trees or paths, etc. The CPE problem represents a rich class of pure exploration tasks which covers not only many existing models but also novel cases where the object of interest has a non-trivial combinatorial structure. In this paper, we provide a series of results for the general CPE problem. We present general learning algorithms which work for all decision classes that admit offline maximization oracles in both fixed confidence and fixed budget settings. We prove problem-dependent upper bounds of our algorithms. Our analysis exploits the combinatorial structures of the decision classes and introduces a new analytic tool. We also establish a general problem-dependent lower bound for the CPE problem. Our results show that the proposed algorithms achieve the optimal sample complexity (within logarithmic factors) for many decision classes. In addition, applying our results back to the problems of top-K arms identification and multiple bandit best arms identification, we recover the best available upper bounds up to constant factors and partially resolve a conjecture on the lower bounds.

/pdf/combinatorial-pure-exploration-of-multi-armed-bandits-1x0t9444z5.pdf

Combinatorial Pure Exploration of Multi-Armed Bandits

We define a general framework for a large class of combinatorial multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problems, where simple arms with unknown distributions form super arms. In each round, a super arm is played and the outcomes of its related simple arms are observed, which helps the selection of super arms in future rounds. The reward of the super arm depends on the outcomes of played arms, and it only needs to satisfy two mild assumptions, which allow a large class of nonlinear reward instances. We assume the availability of an (α, β)-approximation oracle that takes the means of the distributions of arms and outputs a super arm that with probability β generates an β fraction of the optimal expected reward. The objective of a CMAB algorithm is to minimize (α, β)- approximation regret, which is the difference in total expected reward between the αbeta; fraction of expected reward when always playing the optimal super arm, and the expected reward of playing super arms according to the algorithm. We provide CUCB algorithm that achieves O(log n) regret, where n is the number of rounds played, and we further provide distribution-independent bounds for a large class of reward functions. Our regret analysis is tight in that it matches the bound for classical MAB problem up to a constant factor, and it significantly improves the regret bound in a recent paper on combinatorial bandits with linear rewards. We apply our CMAB framework to two new applications, probabilistic maximum coverage (PMC) for online advertising and social influence maximization for viral marketing, both having nonlinear reward structures.

/pdf/combinatorial-multi-armed-bandit-general-framework-results-1jxmurnvg3.pdf

Combinatorial multi-armed bandit: general framework, results and applications

Many supervised learning tasks are emerged in dual forms, e.g., English-to-French translation vs. French-to-English translation, speech recognition vs. text to speech, and image classification vs. image generation. Two dual tasks have intrinsic connections with each other due to the probabilistic correlation between their models. This connection is, however, not effectively utilized today, since people usually train the models of two dual tasks separately and independently. In this work, we propose training the models of two dual tasks simultaneously, and explicitly exploiting the probabilistic correlation between them to regularize the training process. For ease of reference, we call the proposed approach dual supervised learning. We demonstrate that dual supervised learning can improve the practical performances of both tasks, for various applications including machine translation, image processing, and sentiment analysis.

/pdf/dual-supervised-learning-2x6d0uwx8h.pdf

Dual supervised learning

We define a general framework for a large class of combinatorial multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problems, where subsets of base arms with unknown distributions form super arms. In each round, a super arm is played and the base arms contained in the super arm are played and their outcomes are observed. We further consider the extension in which more based arms could be probabilistically triggered based on the outcomes of already triggered arms. The reward of the super arm depends on the outcomes of all played arms, and it only needs to satisfy two mild assumptions, which allow a large class of nonlinear reward instances. We assume the availability of an offline (\alpha,\beta)-approximation oracle that takes the means of the outcome distributions of arms and outputs a super arm that with probability {\beta} generates an {\alpha} fraction of the optimal expected reward. The objective of an online learning algorithm for CMAB is to minimize (\alpha,\beta)-approximation regret, which is the difference between the \alpha{\beta} fraction of the expected reward when always playing the optimal super arm, and the expected reward of playing super arms according to the algorithm. We provide CUCB algorithm that achieves O(log n) distribution-dependent regret, where n is the number of rounds played, and we further provide distribution-independent bounds for a large class of reward functions. Our regret analysis is tight in that it matches the bound of UCB1 algorithm (up to a constant factor) for the classical MAB problem, and it significantly improves the regret bound in a earlier paper on combinatorial bandits with linear rewards. We apply our CMAB framework to two new applications, probabilistic maximum coverage and social influence maximization, both having nonlinear reward structures. In particular, application to social influence maximization requires our extension on probabilistically triggered arms.

Wei Chen

Papers

Combinatorial multi-armed bandit and its extension to probabilistically triggered arms

Combinatorial Pure Exploration of Multi-Armed Bandits

Combinatorial multi-armed bandit: general framework, results and applications

Dual supervised learning

Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit and Its Extension to Probabilistically Triggered Arms