Статья посвящена вопросам влияния власти на поведение человека. Авторы рассматривают данные различных источников, в которых увеличение власти связывается с напористостью, а ее уменьшение - с подавленностью. Конкретно, власть ассоциируется с: а) позитивным аффектом; б) вниманием к вознаграждению и к свойствам других, удовлетворяющим личные цели; в) автоматической переработкой информации и резкими суждениями; г) расторможенным социальным поведением. Уменьшение власти, напротив, ассоциируется с: а) негативным аффектом; б) вниманием к угрозам и наказаниям, к интересам других и к тем характеристикам я, которые отвечают целям других; в) контролируемой переработкой информации и совещательным типом рассуждений; г) подавленным социальным поведением. Обсуждаются также последствия этих паттернов поведения, связанных с властью, и потенциальные модераторы.

Power, approach, and inhibition. Власть, напористость и подавленность

Definition: To what extent does the study allow us to draw conclusions about a causal effect between two or more constructs? Issues: Selection, maturation, history, mortality, testing, regression towrd the mean, selection by maturation, treatment by mortality, treatment by testing, measured treatment variables Increase: Eliminate the threats, above all do experimental manipulations, random assignment, and counterbalancing.

Reliability and validity

This article reviews scientific advances in the prevention and treatment of substance-use disorder and related developments in public policy. In the past two decades, research has increasingly supported the view that addiction is a disease of the brain. Although the brain disease model of addiction has yielded effective preventive measures, treatment interventions, and public health policies to address substance-use disorders, the underlying concept of substance abuse as a brain disease continues to be questioned, perhaps because the aberrant, impulsive, and compulsive behaviors that are characteristic of addiction have not been clearly tied to neurobiology. Here we review recent advances in the neurobiology of addiction to clarify the link between addiction and brain function and to broaden the understanding of addiction as a brain disease. We review findings on the desensitization of reward circuits, which dampens the ability to feel pleasure and the motivation to pursue everyday activities; the increasing strength of conditioned responses and stress reactivity, which results in increased cravings for alcohol and other drugs and negative emotions when these cravings are not sated; and the weakening of the brain regions involved in executive functions such as decision making, inhibitory control, and self-regulation that leads to repeated relapse. We also review the ways in which social environments, developmental stages, and genetics are intimately linked to and influence vulnerability and recovery. We conclude that neuroscience continues to support the brain disease model of addiction. Neuroscience research in this area not only offers new opportunities for the prevention and treatment of substance addictions and related behavioral addictions (e.g., to food, sex, and gambling) but may also improve our understanding of the fundamental biologic processes involved in voluntary behavioral control. In the United States, 8 to 10% of people 12 years of age or older, or 20 to 22 million people, are addicted to alcohol or other drugs. 1 The abuse of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs in the United States exacts more than $700 billion annually in costs related to crime, lost work productivity, and health care. 2-4 After centuries of efforts to reduce addiction and its related costs by punishing addictive behaviors failed to produce adequate results, recent basic and clinical research has provided clear evidence that addiction might be better considered and treated as an acquired disease of the brain (see Box 1 for definitions of substance-use disorder and addiction). Research guided by the brain disease model of addiction has led to the development of more effective methods of prevention and treatment and to more informed public health policies. Notable examples include the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, which requires medical insurance plans to provide the same coverage for substance-use disorders and other mental illnesses that is provided for other illnesses, 5 and the proposed bipartisan Senate legislation that From the National Institute on Drug Abuse (N.D.V.) and the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (G.F.K.) — both in Bethesda, MD; and the Treatment Research Institute, Philadelphia (A.T.M.). Address reprint requests to Dr. Volkow at the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 6001 Executive Bld., Rm. 5274, Bethesda, MD 20892, or at nvolkow@ nida . nih . gov.

Review Article: Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of Addiction

The scientific study of creativity has proven a difficult undertaking. Researchers have employed a diversity of definitions and measurement methods. As a result, creativity research is underrepresented in the literature and the findings of different studies often prove difficult to draw into a coherent body of understanding. A heuristic framework to explicate the different methods by which creativity may be studied forms the basis of this article. Drawing upon existing conceptions of the creativity construct and previous efforts to provide structure to creativity research, the new taxonomic framework examines creativity from 3 primary perspectives in the form of a 3-dimensional matrix. The implications of the taxonomic framework for creativity research are examined. The new taxonomic framework contributes to the understanding of creativity research through the introduction of a comprehensive heuristic to guide future research and the interpretation of previous studies.

The Measurement of Creativity: From Definitional Consensus to the Introduction of a New Heuristic Framework

Metacognition and consciousness

Metacognition refers to the knowledge and regulation of one’s own cognitive processes, which has been regarded as a critical component of creative thinking. However, the current literature on the association between metacognition and creative thinking remains controversial, and the underlying role of metacognition in the creative process appears to be insufficiently explored and explained. This review focuses on the roles of three aspects of metacognition (i.e., metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experience, and metacognitive monitoring and control) in creative thinking and offers a primary summary of the neurocognitive mechanisms that support metacognition during creative thinking. Future research is needed to explore the interactive effects of the metacognitive components on creative thinking and to elucidate the function of metacognition during different stages of the creative process.

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The Role of Metacognitive Components in Creative Thinking

The correlation between age and empathy is not clear, with prior findings yielding mixed and inconsistent results. Here, we distinguished between two aspects of empathy and respectively investigated the effects of age on the affective and cognitive facets of empathy using a self-report measure (interpersonal reactivity index, IRI) and performance-based tasks (viewing films). The results showed that older adults manifested age-related deficits in both trait and state cognitive empathy, with the latter being positively associated with memory. Otherwise, the overall affective empathy increased in the elderly, but the age-related differences in affective empathy may be qualified by the valence of the film clips. Specifically, older participants showed more empathic concern (EC) and less personal distress (PD) to other people's emotions than the younger participants for the distress film. Interestingly, for the amusing film, older participants demonstrated more EC and PD. Overall, the two aspects of empathy have different development trajectories.

Age-related differences in affective and cognitive empathy: self-report and performance-based evidence.

Previous research has shown that the animacy quality of materials affects basic cognitive processes such as memory (i.e., animate stimuli are remembered better than are inanimate stimuli). This is referred to as the animacy effect. Little research has examined, however, whether this effect can be extended to higher cognitive processes such as metamemory. In the present studies, we investigated the influence of animacy on judgments of learning (JOLs) and the underlying basis of the animacy effect, namely, processing fluency and beliefs about the animacy effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied animate and inanimate words and made immediate JOLs. Results revealed that participants gave higher estimates for animate than they did for inanimate words. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency to the animacy effect either by measuring self-paced study time or by disrupting fluency by presenting half of the words in an easy or difficult font style. Results from both experiments indicated that processing fluency contributes minimally to the animacy effect. In questionnaire-based Experiment 3, participants estimated hypothetical participants would better remember the animate words than the inanimate words, suggesting the potential role of beliefs on the animacy effect on JOLs. To conclude, these findings suggest that animacy is a reliable cue when people monitor their learning in higher cognitive processes. The beliefs, not processing fluency, contribute substantially to the animacy effect on JOLs.

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The effect of animacy on metamemory.

Previous research has shown that word frequency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). Specifically, people give higher JOLs for high-frequency (HF) words than for low-frequency (LF) words. However, the exact mechanism underlying this effect is largely unknown. The present study replicated and extended previous work by exploring the contributions of processing fluency and beliefs to the word frequency effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied HF and LF words and made immediate JOLs. The findings showed that participants gave higher JOLs for HF words than for LF ones, reflecting the word frequency effect. In Experiment 2a (measuring the encoding fluency by using self-paced study time) and Experiment 2b (disrupting perceptual fluency by presenting words in an easy or difficult font style), we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency. The findings of Experiment 2a revealed no significant difference in self-paced study time between HF and LF words. The findings of Experiment 2b showed that the size of word frequency effect did not decrease or disappear even when presenting words in a difficult font style. In Experiment 3a (a questionnaire-based study) and Experiment 3b (making pre-study JOLs), we evaluated the role of beliefs in this word frequency effect. The results of Experiment 3a showed that participants gave higher estimates for HF as compared to LF words. That is, they estimated that hypothetical participants would better remember the HF words. The results of Experiment 3b showed that participants gave higher pre-study JOLs for HF than for LF words. These results across experiments suggested that people’s beliefs, not processing fluency, contribute substantially to the word frequency effect on JOLs. However, considering the validation of the indexes reflecting the processing fluency in the current study, we cannot entirely rule out the possible contribution of processing fluency. The relative contribution of processing fluency and beliefs to word frequency effect and the theoretical implications were discussed.

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The Effect of Word Frequency on Judgments of Learning: Contributions of Beliefs and Processing Fluency

Prior research has shown that moral judgment, moral elevation, and moral identity contribute to prosocial behavior. However, how these three motivating factors interact in predicting prosocial behaviors is not yet clear. The current study proposed and examined a moderated mediation model to illustrate the specific process of how prosocial behavior is motivated by these factors. A total of 264 Chinese undergraduate and graduate students participated in the present study (140 females; age range 17-26, M = 20.25, SD = 1.57). Moral judgment competence, intensity of moral elevation, and moral identity were measured by self-reported scales, and the tendency to engage in prosocial behavior was assessed in a simulated "Ask for help" situation. The multiple regressive results showed that moral elevation mediated the effect of moral judgment on prosocial behavior, and moral identity moderated this mediation through interacting with moral elevation. However, within the proposed model, the mediating effect of moral elevation was stronger in women than in men, while the moderating role of moral identity appeared only in women. These findings imply different methods for men and women to enhance their prosocial behaviors, including the need to pay more attention to developing moral reasoning in men while putting more emphasis on evoking moral emotion and moral traits in women. Together, these results supported the assumptive model and provided a comprehensive framework to explain prosocial behaviors.

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Weijian Li

Papers

The Role of Metacognitive Components in Creative Thinking

Age-related differences in affective and cognitive empathy: self-report and performance-based evidence.

The effect of animacy on metamemory.

The Effect of Word Frequency on Judgments of Learning: Contributions of Beliefs and Processing Fluency

How Can Prosocial Behavior Be Motivated? The Different Roles of Moral Judgment, Moral Elevation, and Moral Identity Among the Young Chinese.