http://bbcr.uwaterloo.ca/~xshen/paper/2013/saasae.pdf

Se-aka

Radio interface and wireless service accesses are two areas, in which wireless networks do not provide the same level of protection as wired networks. It may result in the wireless networks being vulnerable to various attacks. For example, the first generation cellular mobile communication systems, such as advanced mobile phone service (AMPS), and the second generation cellular mobile communication systems, such as global system for mobile (GSM), do not take account of security issues comprehensively. It brings about an intruder to be able to eavesdrop user traffic or even change the identities of mobile phones to gain fraudulent services. Therefore, the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), which is known as the third generation (3G) cellular mobile communication system, is proposed. UMTS adopts the security feature of GSM in order to interwork with GSM smoothly. Furthermore, the UMTS adds new security features to design an authentication and key agreement protocol, which is called UMTS AKA protocol. However, it is found that the UMTS AKA has some problems, including bandwidth consumption between a serving network and a user's home network, space overhead of the serving network and sequence number synchronization. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an extension of UMTS AKA protocol, called UMTS X-AKA to overcome the aforementioned problems of UMTS AKA.

Authentication and key agreement protocol for UMTS with low bandwidth consumption

Generic construction for secure and efficient handoff authentication schemes in EAP-based wireless networks

The need for robust access control mechanisms is paramount, especially in Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)s and Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN)s. Current authentication systems are vulnerable to device impersonation by rogue devices. 
Within cellular mobile networks, this threat is actualized by cloning cell phones, and using the clones for obtaining free services. A well known example in Wireless Fidelity (WiFi)/802.11 networks is Media Access Control (MAC) address spoofing. In this case, an attacker captures the MAC address of an authorized device and programs it into his device, in order to obtain unauthorized access. The threat of address spoofing is equally applicable to Bluetooth (BT) ad-hoc networks. 
The underlying problem is the continued use of Access Control List (ACL)s, based on a single malleable identifier, e.g. MAC addresses. Given the ease with which the aforementioned attacks are mounted, and the potential impact on these networks, there is a requirement for access control mechanisms that are capable of detecting impersonation attacks. What would prove useful is to associate a malleable identifier with less malleable characteristics. Hence, we explore the feasibility of using Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection (ABID), which makes use of device-based and/or user-based profiles for ad dressing the aforementioned problem. For example, an ABID system would compare multiple instances of device/user characteristics, associated with a given identifier, to those in the corresponding profile. Deviations from pre-established thresholds would be indicative of cloning or address spoofing. 
More specifically, we explore the use of Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) for characterizing transceivers in WiFi/802.11 and BT wireless cards, i.e. create device-based profiles, and Hotelling's T 2 statistics for classification purposes. Similarly, we also investigate the adoption of User Mobility Pattern (UMP)s for user-based profiles and the Instance-Based Learning (IBL) technique for classification. Average detection rates of 93% (BT) and 94.5% (WiFi/802.11) support the feasibility of incorporating RFF, in ABID, for detecting address spoofing. On the other hand, the use of UMPs for similar purposes is also technically feasible. Thus, device-based and user-based characteristics can be exploited for detecting rogue devices in wireless networks.

/pdf/detection-of-rogue-devices-in-wireless-networks-la7k2c37fk.pdf

Detection of rogue devices in wireless networks

A cocktail protocol with the Authentication and Key Agreement on the UMTS

The security of the current 3G wireless protocols addresses the problems faced by the 2G systems, in addition to fulfilling the higher 3G security requirements mandated from operating in IP networks as well as voice networks. However, the approach adopted by the two most popular 3G mobile system forerunners, UMTS and cdma2000, leaves many areas for improvement. In this paper, we improve the security of the 3G protocols in network access by providing strong periodically mutual authentication, strong key agreement, and non-repudiation service in a simple and elegant way.

/pdf/on-the-security-of-wireless-network-access-with-enhancements-b272lmd6n6.pdf

On the security of wireless network access with enhancements

The first on-line/off-line signature scheme introduced by Even et al. in 1990 has two problems: (a) impractical signature length and (b) a one-time use of signature generated during the off-line phase. In 2001, Shamir and Tauman significantly shortened the length of the signature by using trapdoor hash families introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin in 2000. However, each trapdoor hash value and its signature in the off-line phase of Shamir and Tauman's signature scheme can be used for signing only one message in the on-line phase. In this paper, we propose multiple-collision trapdoor hash families based on discrete logarithm and factoring assumptions, and provide formal proofs of their security. We also introduce an efficient on-line/off-line signature scheme based on our proposed trapdoor hash families. Our on-line/off-line signature scheme can re-use a trapdoor hash value for signing multiple messages. If a signer includes this trapdoor hash value in the public-key digital certificate, there is no need to have any regular digital signature scheme to sign the trapdoor hash value in the off-line phase.

Efficient On-line/Off-line Signature Schemes Based on Multiple-Collision Trapdoor Hash Families

In this paper, we propose a simple certified e-check scheme. It is simple because no full PKI setup is needed by the e-check users. Additionally, it provides privacy and flexibility that are not in the current certified e-check scheme. Furthermore, it can be easily implemented on top of the existing Internet banking systems without additional cost. With this simple solution, we hope that the e-check will gain wide acceptance among the general population.

Wen-Jung Hsin

Papers

On the security of wireless network access with enhancements

Efficient On-line/Off-line Signature Schemes Based on Multiple-Collision Trapdoor Hash Families

Simple certified e-check with a partial PKI solution

Offline/Online Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The e-Traveler's Check.