Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(12)61684-5.pdf

Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis

Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1

국제정치이론 = Theory of international politics

Advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have made a historic contribution to the cause of international human rights by publicizing the need to prevent mass atrocities such as war crimes, genocide, and widespread political killings and torture.1 However, a strategy that many such groups favor for achieving this goal—the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities according to universal standards—risks causing more atrocities than it would prevent, because it pays insufacient attention to political realities.2 Recent international criminal tribunals have utterly failed to deter subsequent abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Central Africa. Because tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), have often been unable to gain the active cooperation of powerful actors in the United States and in countries where abuses occur, it is questionable whether this strategy will succeed in the long run unless it is implemented in a more pragmatic way. Trials and Errors

Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice

International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore, using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate. In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also surprisingly effective.Many panel and seminar participants have offered useful comments on this work, but my thanks goes in particular to Michael Zurn, Alexandra Gheciu, Frank Schimmelfennig, Jeff Checkel, Robert Keohane, Steven Wilkinson, Robert Putnam, Milada Vachudova, and the editors and anonymous reviewers of International Organization. I also thank Princeton University Press for allowing me to use material from my book Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. The usual caveats apply. This research was funded by a grant from the Danish Research Academy (former Forskerakademiet), and by travel support from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard.

/pdf/international-actors-on-the-domestic-scene-membership-1v2nv5ka1n.pdf

International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions

This book is the first systematic examination of the impact of reconciliation on restoring and maintaining peace following civil and international conflicts. Through eleven comparative case studies of civil war and eight of international conflict, it constructs a surprising explanation for when and why reconciliation restores social order.The civil war cases reveal that successful reconciliation is associated with a process of national forgiveness, not merely negotiated settlement. All successful cases followed a four-step pattern of public truth telling, justice short of revenge, redefinition of the identities of former belligerents, and a call for a new relationship. The book argues that success is not solely the result of rational choice decision making. It proposes a hypothesis, grounded in evolutionary psychology, that to restore social order we use emotional/cognitive techniques that have evolved to ensure human survival.On the international level, however, successful reconciliation was not a part of a forgiveness process. Reconciliation was successful in bringing about sustained peace when it was associated with a signaling process -- an exchange of costly, novel, voluntary, and irrevocable concessions in a negotiated bargain. This result is consistent with realist notions of the limits of international society and illustrates the context in which a rational choice model is appropriate. The book's approach, integrating emotion with reasoning and linking political science to scientific research in other disciplines, particularly biology and neuroscience, has broad implications for social science theory.

War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution

Dr. William J. Long is Professor and Director of Graduate Programs at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He also serves as Co-Director of the European Union Center of the University System of Georgia and Research Director for Georgia Tech’s Center for International Business Education and Research. He is the author of US Export Control Policy (Columbia University Press, 1989) and Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (University of Michigan Press, 1996). Dr. Suzette R. Grillot is Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Academic Programs at the University of Oklahoma. She is coeditor of Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (Routledge, 1998) and Arms and the Environment: Preventing the Perils of Disarmament (forthcoming).

/pdf/ideas-beliefs-and-nuclear-policies-the-cases-of-south-africa-22npxazf90.pdf

Ideas, beliefs, and nuclear policies: The cases of South Africa and Ukraine

This article develops a theory of how economic incentives alter a state's external payoff environment and affect its internal preferences and choices. Externally, incentives offer an exchange of economic gains from trade and technology transfer for political concessions. Incentives may be compelling in altering state behavior and fostering bilateral cooperation over time, especially when: (1) both the sender and the recipient stand to gain in economic terms through the creation of new trade; (2) the recipient's total utility for the goods or gains from trade remains substantially positive (this situation typically occurs when technology is a part of the package because technology alters a state's overall productive capacity); and (3) the sender has market power in the traded goods. Internally, incentives shape state preferences in a cooperative direction in four important ways, in contrast to sanctions. First, societal actors in the sender state who stand to gain economically from expanded trade lend support over time for an incentive thereby improving the policy's legitimacy and endurance. Public opinion is likely to follow the lead of elites. Second, certain actors in the recipient state who can appropriate the economic benefits tend to ally with the sender state and reinforce its efforts to move the recipient's policy preference in the direction of the sender's intent. Third, incentives are unlikely to create an impetus to elude or undermine its influence through the search for third-party suppliers or to create the economic conditions that invite new entrants. Finally, incentives convey more-precise information to decision-makers in the recipient state and in a manner that is unlikely to be filtered or avoided by them. As for the dependent variable of international cooperation, the theoretical argument commends investigation of diffuse factors that shape state preferences and influence cooperation.

While incentives are “under-theorized” in the international relations literature (despite considerable interest in economic coercion), they are not unnoticed by policy-makers. This article examines three pertinent historical case studies, in part to help generate hypotheses on how incentives work but also to offer some policy advice as to when incentives might work and what factors contribute to or detract from their practical effectiveness. The article concludes with suggestions for further research.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2600932

Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation

Many scholarly disciplines as well as popular opinion recognize reconciliation as a powerful force in restoring social order following conflict. Reconciliation between countries following a war or a series of wars has attracted little attention from international relations scholars, however. This paper uses four international events datasets developed by others and a reconciliation events dataset assembled by the authors to determine whether reconciliation events lead to a discernable decrease in the level of conflict between former belligerents. The results suggest that reconciliation events signal a change towards more cooperative and less conflictual bilateral relations in a number of cases. The impact of reconciliation is hardly uniformly positive, however, and limitations of the data constrain what can be asserted. The paper concludes with thoughts on continuing this inquiry to determine the forces that give rise to reconciliation and the factors that might explain the variance in the dependent varia...

War and reconciliation

Can the United States meet its security challenges through economic incentives and expanded commercial exchange? How can market access and technology transfer build stable long-term cooperative relations between countries? Incentives have been prescribed for diverse problems including dissuading North Korea from developing nuclear weapons or convincing the Ukraine to destroy them, and encouraging developing nations to adopt less environmentally dangerous economic policies. Unfortunately, international relations scholars have seldom considered the operation and possible uses of economic incentives as a means of international influence.William Long uses three pertinent historical incentive cases to develop an original theory of how trade and technology incentives work to affect interstate cooperation and to provide some practical guidelines for policymakers regarding when incentives work and the factors that enhance or limit their success.Theoretically, this book develops a two-level explanation of how economic incentives can alter the structure of a state's external payoffs and affect its internal preferences and choices to induce cooperation by the recipient. Externally, according to Long, incentives offer an exchange of economic gains from trade and technology transfer for political concessions and are compelling when the sender has market power in the traded goods, both recipient and sender stand to gain from economic relations and the recipient's total utility for the gains from trade remains positive. Internally, incentives shape state preferences in a cooperative direction by building alliances with actors in the recipient state who will benefit from the incentives: by creating support for the incentives in the sending state among actors who will benefit from the incentives and, unlike sanctions, by not encouraging the recipient state to find ways to evade the impact of the action or to filter out the message behind the incentives.This book contributes to the scholarly literature on international cooperation and economic statecraft. It will also engage policymakers and practitioners involved in a wide range of issues where incentives are an option.William J. Long is Associate Professor, School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology.

William J. Long

Papers

War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution

Ideas, beliefs, and nuclear policies: The cases of South Africa and Ukraine

Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation

War and reconciliation

Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation